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Successive governments have committed New Zealand to implementing international 
human rights standards domestically. In terms of practical governance, what does this 
mean and how might effectiveness be measured? A face-value answer can be found in 
domestic laws and institutions relating to human rights. However, this thesis argues that 
the effective implementation of ratified international human rights goes well beyond 
what this thesis terms the law+litigation approach (crucial though that is). By tracing 
developments historically, analysing the policy and governance issues, and using case 
studies this research shows that effective implementation is characterised by a new 
concept: ‗complementarity’. This concept is about an increasing coherence between a 
number of factors affecting the state sector which impact on the fostering and delivery 
of human rights. These include international and domestic dimensions, law and public 
policy, public fairness, administrative pragmatism, and proactive and reactive 
approaches to implementation. Greater complementarity is shown to produce another 
term suggested in the thesis: robust human rights governance. The opposite – fragile 
human rights governance – is also explored. 
As well as the complementarity model, this research also suggests there are six phases 
in New Zealand‘s human rights history. It is argued that the sixth most robust stage has 
been reached, but that there are elements of previous stages that are weak, developing or 
non-existent. Leading on from this 20 criteria to assess what effectiveness ‗looks like‘ in 
relation to robust human rights governance are also developed. Although this is 
primarily a New Zealand study, the widespread adoption of human rights standards by 
many states inevitably means that the issues are relevant to other countries, even though 
there are always varying degrees of similarity-difference in constitutional background 
and developed or emerging human rights systems. This thesis shows the pathways, the 
mechanisms, the evolving frameworks and the approaches that would help to 
differentiate robust from fragile human rights governance. The tools in this research 
should therefore enable a more nuanced assessment of effectiveness in terms of robust 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 International obligation and domestic action 
Many states have ratified international human rights treaties and thereby accepted 
international obligations in relation to human rights – but how have those states given 
effect to these obligations ‗at home‘? More particularly, how has New Zealand done so? 
It is not hard to find strong expressions of good intentions from successive New 
Zealand governments, such as a commitment to creating an environment in which:  
… human rights considerations are at the heart of public and international policy 
development (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 16). 
New Zealand has an outwardly well-developed domestic human rights architecture 
reflected in institutions, laws and policies and an endorsement of international 
standards. However, the means to judge the effectiveness of the achievements to date 
and to highlight areas for improvement is currently lacking. This thesis suggests there 
are six phases in New Zealand‘s human rights history. This history unearths a 
multiplicity of changes that have affected the way the state sector works in order to 
produce what is widely recognised as a country that is reasonably compliant with its 
international human rights obligations. Twenty criteria relating to the suggested 
construct in the thesis of human rights governance are therefore developed to assess 
what effectiveness in this area ‗looks like‘. Developing the criteria for assessing 
robustness in human rights governance therefore asks: ‗What is international best 
practice in the implementation of ratified treaty rights‘? Before proceeding a number of 
key concepts are identified. 
1.2 Concepts 
1.2.1 Law + litigation 
In most countries the standard prescription for human rights involves a foundation of 
some form of constitutional or legislative recognition of rights alongside access to the 
courts by complainants who feel their rights have been breached. In this research this is 
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termed the law+litigation formula. It leaves effective protection to the possible 
coincidence of several key factors including: complainants being aware of a breach and 
having the capacity to litigate effectively; a functioning rule of law system; and 
appropriate responsiveness of government to the judgments of courts. Mostly the 
law+litigation formula remains the foundation of domestic protection techniques, 
illustrated in this country by the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (NZBORA) 1990, the 
Human Rights Act 1993 and other statutes.  
The law+litigation concept has been developed to succinctly capture that there is a 
well-functioning and strong legal approach in this area which is the ‗bedrock‘ for 
human rights protection. Nothing in this thesis is intended to diminish the critical 
importance of the right to assert a violation of human rights through judicial processes. 
However important law+litigation is, experience has shown it is not enough and this is 
even more so in states with weak judicial systems. Chapter 7 raises the notion of ‗fragile 
human rights states‘, which can have laws that actively attack human rights and at the 
same time have weak institutions protecting them. This research suggests that to have 
effective implementation of ratified treaty rights, there needs to be a complementarity of 
the law+litigation and policy fields in particular, and that robust human rights 
governance is only possible when these fields are fully aligned. Even in states that are 
sympathetic to the human rights endeavour, laws are better implemented when backed 
by sound policies. Legislation dealing with domestic violence, for instance, will be 
more effective when state sector agencies are jointly working on preventive measures. It 
is therefore more effective to reconcile the law+litigation approach with the efficiency 
and policy issues already part of the public management role of the state sector.  
Because of this, a commitment to place ‗human rights considerations at the heart of 
public and international policy development‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 16) is a very 
much more ambitious agenda than the law+litigation formula and it demands a 
different, more active, approach from government. An increasingly ‗whole-of-
government‘ approach would include policy-based interventions ahead of or as well as 
litigation-based, and the state being proactive rather than reactive about human rights 
issues. These two factors – a wider approach to give effect to obligations and a more 
proactive role – would see a new trend by government in relation to human rights. As 
will be shown in Chapter 7, these factors can also be seen as a move towards ‗best 
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practice‘ in human rights implementation. 
The Baigent case study in Chapter 8 is a good example of why the law+litigation 
approach is only one part of a whole. When the new judicial remedy was created by this 
decision, there was a strong reaction from the state sector as officials tried to work out 
the fiscal and policy, as well as the legal, implications. Importantly too, the case tested 
judicial/parliamentary boundaries. In other words, at what point is a court ‗making law‘ 
as opposed to ‗interpreting law‘? Baigent is discussed fully in Chapter 8, but there are 
other cases that deserve brief mention in this law+litigation section, particularly 
Moonen v Film & Literature Review Board [2000] 2 NZLR 9. In this case the Court of 
Appeal gave clear guidance about section 5 of NZBORA concerning ‗the limits that are 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society‘. This was an important marking 
point about setting reasonable limits on the exercise of rights and freedoms. The issue in 
Moonen was whether the book and photographs in question could be deemed 
‗objectionable‘, and the Court took a clarifying role about the ‗reasonable limits‘ 
provision. In its decision, the Court stated the test involved five aspects, but it also took 
ultimate responsibility for determining ‗whether the limitation in issue can or cannot be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society‘.1 There is obviously a short step 
from taking this responsibility, to issuing (if necessary) what was to become known as a 
‗Declaration of Inconsistency‘ with NZBORA, and this can be seen as a type of 
remedial jurisdiction. According to Butler and Butler it was in the Moonen case that the 
Court of Appeal ‗first seriously mooted‘ that ‗the Courts have the power‘ to declare 
inconsistencies between NZBORA and other legislation and to grant ‗a formal order to 
that effect‘ (Butler and Butler, 2005: 1017). 
A year after Moonen, an important feature of the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 
was that the newly created Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT) could now make 
Declarations of Inconsistency if discriminatory legislation was identified;
2
 this could be 
further appealed to the High Court, Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Once a 
declaration is made, the government is then required to publicly reassess the 
                                                 
1 These tests were: ‗identify the objective‘ of the legislature in making the provision; assess the ‗importance and significance of that 
objective‘; ‗reasonable‘ proportion must be used to statutorily achieve the objective; ‗the means used must also have a rational 
relationship with the objective‘; and ‗there must be as little interference as possible with the right or freedom affected‘ in achieving 
the objective (Moonen v Film & Literature Review Board [2000] 2 NZLR 9 at 18). 
 
2 See Section 4.2.3 for more information. 
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inconsistent legislation and report to Parliament. This does not mean that the legislation 
is repealed, and the courts must still enforce it, but it does pressure the government to 
defend the need for the discriminatory enactment. So far only one declaration has been 
issued by the HRRT (Howard v Attorney-General), and none by the courts.
3
 Chief 
Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan has noted that: ‗This decision is a landmark in human 
rights law in that it shows how any New Zealander can challenge legislation they 
believe to be discriminatory and impacts upon them adversely‘ (HRC, 2008c: 1). Since 
Moonen, therefore, the courts have asserted their jurisdiction to examine legislative 
breaches of rights contained in NZBORA, but have not actually issued an formal 
declaration of inconsistency.
4
 It is perhaps out of sensitivity to the border that exists 
between policy and law that the courts have yet to issue any declarations.
5
 
The next concept is about aligning this law+litigation field with that of public policy. 
1.2.2 Complementarity 
Using a variety of inputs from writings in both international human rights law and 
public policy the concept of complementarity was developed. It captures a sense of the 
‗progression of movement‘ that is evident in the historical sweep from 1945-2010 
presented in this research. Many laws have been passed, policies developed, values 
accepted or rejected, and different ways of thinking and working have arisen, that have 
all led to the domestic human rights system that has emerged. This is all 
complementarity, and in effect the thesis is painting a ‗complementarity scene’. Having 
reflected on the picture that developed, and taking the elements of the concept a little bit 
further, they bridged into the evaluation portion of the research, which leads to the 
                                                 
3 In Howard v Attorney-General (HRRT Decision 46/06; 11 December 2006) the HRRT ruled that a section of ACC law was 
inconsistent with the right to freedom from discrimination set out in NZBORA (on the grounds of age). Specifically section 85 and 
clause 52 of the Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001 were inconsistent with the right to freedom from 
discrimination affirmed by section 19 of NZBORA. The plaintiff John Howard had an arm injury and the inconsistency related to 
being denied simultaneously receiving both superannuation weekly compensation and vocational rehabilitation. Mr Howard wanted 
to continue his rehabilitation in order to be able to work in the future. Chief Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan has noted that: ‗This 
decision is a landmark in human rights law in that it shows how any New Zealander can challenge legislation they believe to be 
discriminatory and impacts upon them adversely‘ (HRC, 2008c: 1).
 
 
4 One view on this was given by Butler and Butler who asserted that Parliament had ‗effectively legitimised the notion that Courts 
can make declarations of inconsistency through its recognition of that form of order in the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001‘ 
(Butler and Butler, 2005: 1020). 
5 See also three other cases involving the courts potentially issuing Declarations of Inconsistency: R v Poumako (2000) about a 
home invasion; Taunoa v Attorney General (2004; 2006) about prisoner compensation vs victims‘ rights; and R v Hansen (2005; 
2007) about the misuse of drugs and the presumption of innocence.  
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notion of effectiveness. Later at the end of the case studies (Chapter 8) the notion of a 
‗human rights governance level‘ is introduced. 
Complementarity describes a process underway, and this direction can continue (or 
reverse). It also suggests an alignment that will point towards a ‗coming together‘ of the 
law+litigation and policy fields to aid the mainstreaming
6
 of human rights by the state 
sector. The international human rights system developed with the specific intention that 
states would themselves implement the obligations through their own systems by 
choice. States that signed up to the obligations promised to ‗do‘ something. But what 
and how? As this thesis shows the answers developed over time. But underlying the 
New Zealand version at least has been the interaction between international processes 
and domestic constitutional, law and bureaucratic systems. This thesis suggests that this 
interaction can best be understood using the metaphor of ‗weaving‘. Weaving describes 
more fully what the complex, mainstreamed law+litigation/policy complementarity 
system would look like. Threads of human rights thinking and practice might run 
horizontally, vertically and perhaps diagonally throughout the social and political fabric.  
For this country, as elsewhere, the mesh between international and domestic human 
rights implementation occurred incrementally. Today international-domestic 
perspectives arguably cannot be seen distinctly from each other. In the 1940s New 
Zealand had what in retrospect was clearly an undeveloped domestic human rights 
framework, matching the undeveloped international system. Over time the core 
international human rights conventions, international and domestic institutions, and 
domestic laws, policies and practices have all strengthened and become increasingly 
inter-linked. Thus complementarity as used in this thesis does not just describe a 
‗coming together‘ in its normal usage, but a ‗weaving together‘. International and 
domestic systems interact. A table tennis metaphor of balls being hit over the net 
between international and domestic players would not be quite right, although there are 
elements of that on occasion. A ‗weave‘ is a better description, since the systems now 
interact in ways that appear to have created a new phenomenon in modern government, 
as well as in international law and practice.  
                                                 
6 The ‗mainstreaming‘ terminology occurs across a number of disciplines but it is also used at the international human rights level. 
For a discussion on this see Oberleitner (2007: 103-151) who noted that a formal process was started at the time of the UN 1997 
programme of reform to purposefully mainstream human rights thinking into all UN work and structures. 
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Jumping to the present, this description of complementarity can be put into immediate 
context with reference to statements from the National Party-led government of New 
Zealand elected in 2008, making clear its ongoing commitment (and reflecting the 
stance of successive governments) to the implementation of international human rights 
standards. At the NZ Diversity Forum 09 the Minister of Justice, Simon Power, stated 
that after his personal involvement in the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process in 
Geneva earlier in the year he was seeking input from government agencies, NGOs and 
others about how to further strengthen human rights implementation in New Zealand 
through the state sector.
7
 He highlighted a number of areas needing improvement that 
were set out in the UPR report, and he expected these to be advanced before the next 
reporting round in 2013.
8
 At the same forum Rosslyn Noonan, New Zealand‘s Chief 
Human Rights Commissioner, noted that at the present time there was:  
… an unprecedented focus on human rights standards and performance [and that] the 
new government is open to some significant human rights initiatives (Noonan, 2009).  
She believed there were several reasons for this. The presentation of New Zealand‘s 
first UPR at the Geneva in early 2009 had obviously brought this country‘s overall 
human rights situation into sharp focus, continuing the momentum from 2008 
surrounding the 60
th
 anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), including a conference and other activities at the community level.
9
  
This background about the government‘s commitment to the human rights area helps 
answer the question: ‗If the four-yearly UPR report gives a full account of New 
Zealand‘s compliance with international human rights obligations, then why the need 
for this research?‘ The UPR report gave a detailed account of the status of human rights 
                                                 
7 On 23-24 August 2009 the HRC hosted the NZ Diversity Forum 09. Part of the programme included a session on ‗International 
Accountability for New Zealand‘s Human Rights and Race Relations, Human Rights Treaties and Domestic Policy and Practice‘. 
Speakers included the Minister of Justice, the Chief Human Rights Commissioner, other Human Rights Commissioners and officials 
from government agencies. A question and answer time was held at the end of the session. Public comments were made by both the 
participants in the forum and by the audience. Occasional reference (without specific attribution) to such comments is made because 
the discussion suggested informal support for some of the trends I was identifying in the research.  
8 The UPR report is a state-of-play report about this country‘s current compliance, and is a new four-yearly reporting requirement 
for all States Parties that was instigated by the UN Human Rights Council in 2006 (see UNGA, 2009a).
 
The UPR report states that: 
‗The key priorities of the New Zealand Government as noted in the present report are: (a) Improving the economic, social and 
cultural well-being of people in New Zealand; (b) Reducing violence within families and its impact on women and children; (c) 
Improving the opportunities of young New Zealanders through the education and youth justice systems; (d) Strengthening the rights 
of victims of crime; (e) Improving the consultation process with civil society for future human rights reporting and follow-up 
recommendations; (f) Strengthening the partnership between the Government and Māori by continuing to support Māori to realise 
their potential and continuing the momentum on achieving fair, just and practical settlements of historical claims under the Treaty of 
Waitangi; and (g) The implementation of the new Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the New Zealand 
Disability Strategy‘ (UNGA, 2009a: 22). 
9 For the proceedings of this conference see Alley (2009). 
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in this country i.e. how well New Zealand was doing in relation to prison standards or 
Māori child health? However, this thesis is: (a) looking at the history of the framework 
that has been set up; and (b) trying to develop tools (such as the six-phase history and 
the 20 effectiveness criteria) to see how well the specific processes and mechanisms of 
New Zealand‘s human rights framework are operating. While the UPR report may be 
telling the UN what they need to know about compliance, this research shows that it is 
not fully understand how this these processes and mechanisms really work.  
It could then be asked: ‗Is there any value in doing more than is already being done, 
given that New Zealand is considered largely human rights compliant by the UN?‘ This 
research aims to show (again using the staged history and the criteria) that there are 
areas where the New Zealand human rights system is strong, developing, weak or non-
existent and that there is value in strengthening all aspects of it. If the goal of the human 
rights system is to produce a society in which all people are treated with respect and 
dignity, then the better the checking mechanisms, the more cost-effective it could be for 
the government. For instance, a fully functioning system can potentially head off costly 
implications that will result from breaches of rights and this will save money in 
discrimination cases and avoid conflict emerging on various grounds. The two case 
studies – Baigent‘s Case and the military justice system – have been chosen to illustrate 
this very point. The first was expensive to the state, time-consuming and had a panic 
effect in the public sector; the second was done in a considered manner and before the 
potential breaches could be tested in the courts. The case studies are essential because 
the effectiveness criteria are about assessing the robustness or fragility of a whole state; 
the studies on the other hand illustrate both effective and non-effective implementation 
on a small scale and therefore act as a support to the larger thesis. 
This immediate context for explaining the processes of complementarity therefore 
frames an important discussion about how the protection of human rights should be 
seen as part and parcel of the broader processes of government. Ministerial-level 
participation in international human rights fora shows leadership from the elected 
government. This is an important lever towards Chief Executives in the public sector, 
reflecting accountability to ministers, who in turn have further accountabilities in 
Parliament. Public servants respond to all this institutional leverage. Attending fora 
such as the UPR adds another level of responsibility: if ministers are representing New 
Zealand personally, their own accountability widens into the international arena. This 
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ministerial commitment to these issues on the domestic stage therefore reflects the 
momentum for the more effective implementation of international human rights through 
the state sector. No doubt, the Minister‘s speeches would have pleased Prime Minister 
Peter Fraser who in the 1940s led New Zealand‘s active engagement with the formation 
of international human rights (see Chapter 3.1 for a more detailed discussion). The 
processes of complementarity therefore help explain how ‗implementing‘ issues fits into 
the broader field of public policy as a discipline.  
It is also the case that implementation is an ongoing evolving process. Having adopted 
the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC), for instance, new issues 
around children‘s rights arise over time and these are dealt with on a case by-case basis. 
Ongoing compliance for a country like New Zealand, which takes initial ratification 
very seriously and therefore lays a substantial basis at the start, is effectively about 
getting the margins right. UN reporting could be conceived as an ongoing test of those 
margins. The fact that New Zealand has ratified so many human rights treaties is in a 
sense a large ‗intrusion‘ into the way the state operates, and taking these treaties into 
account has enormous ramifications for the government‘s public policy programme. 
This is a key reason why the system needs to be functioning optimally. Not only is the 
face New Zealand presents to the UN important; ‗getting human rights right‘ at the 
domestic level is a major part of the everyday work of the state sector.  
Complementarity is therefore an important construct in this research and part of the 
original conceptual work, as well as the basis for eventual findings and analytical 
conclusions.  
Other terminology is now briefly described. The result of complementarity is 
effectiveness, and this is characterised by the elements in place for robust human rights 
governance. The criteria for effectiveness are set out in Table 9 in Section 7.2 and these 
broadly relate to best practice in relation to: the UN-NZ human rights relationship; the 
growth of the domestic human rights architecture; timely evaluation and planning 
initiatives; and more effective implementation of ratified rights in the state sector at a 




1.2.3 Other terms 
The term robust is used to mean essentially that the processes for implementation are 
progressively strengthening, encompassing ongoing durability and innovation, and that 
this continuous development will withstand changes of government and circumstance. 
This does not imply fixed answers, but rather adaptability and robustness of processes 
related to the implementation of ratified rights. Robust human rights governance is 
therefore characterised by the concept of complementarity leading to effectiveness. The 
concept of fragile, in contrast, is used with its dictionary connotations of weak, tenuous, 
unsound and delicate human rights protections. The spectrum here would range from 
states where government institutions are actively attacking human rights, to the more 
benign notions of states that have good intentions, but are still developing institutions 
and processes.  
This envisages that the international and domestic processes are becoming more and 
more ‗intermeshed‘,10 government responses and interventions see human rights as 
integral to all policy, and ‗whole-of-government‘ responses are increasingly adopted. At 
its most simple, complementarity envisages that human rights have become part of 
public policy, and vice-versa. The notion of robust human rights governance was 
developed during the course of the research. Its counterpart then naturally seemed 
fragile human rights governance,
11
 and this has obvious links with the well-known 
concept in international policy making of ‗fragile states‘.12  
The term implementation is used often in this thesis and has been usefully described by 
Victor Conde from a human rights perspective:  
                                                 
10 This term is drawn from Christine Bell using a somewhat different context for the intermeshing of international and domestic law 
and actors, namely self-determination issues
 
(Bell, 2008: 231).  
11 Just prior to completing this work the concept of ‗robust economic governance‘ was sighted (Bradford and Scott, 2009). These 
authors propose this analogous concept in relation to economic governance, but with particular reference to fragile states in the 
World Bank programme, which links to the other concept of fragile human rights governance. Their use of this robust/fragile 
terminology strengthens this research as the core concepts are being used in other ways independently in another international and 
related field.  
12 A definition of this concept is given by NZ Aid: ‗What is meant by the term ―a fragile state‖? ―Fragile states‖ is one of the many 
terms that have been used to describe states that are weak in their institutional capacity, control of territory and ability or willingness 
to provide services to their people‘ (accessed at nzaidtools.nzaid.govt.nz/aid-effectiveness-fragile-states/what-meant-term-fragile-
state on 30 January 2010). Bradford and Scott have a similar definition: ‗Fragile states are characterized by weak and unaccountable 
state institutions and policies that often cannot, or will not, control corruption or deliver essential services to their citizens‘
 
(Bradford and Scott, 2009: 1). The OECD also has a Development and Co-operation Directorate (DAC), which has developed 
‗Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations‘, otherwise known as the ‗INCAF Principles‘ 
(OECD, 2007). For a further discussion on these principles see Bradford and Scott (2009: 19-20). For a general analysis about 
improving the status of fragile states see Department of International Development (2005). 
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Implementation: A word used to mean the taking of steps through legislation, policy, 
and action to give practical effect to, and to ensure, the actual, full enjoyment of human 
rights by concrete measures. This word is used in the field of human rights instead of 
the word enforcement, which implies the use of force to correct violations. Human 
rights are ―implemented‖, not enforced. Implementation is a word used to describe all 
methods and means used to assure the realization of human rights. For example, 
reporting systems, courts, special rapporteurs, and mobilization of shame (bad 
publicity) are all ―implementation‖ measures (Conde, 2004: 118-119).  
In the human rights field implementation is therefore about how New Zealand 
practically gives effect to the obligations arising from signing international human 
rights treaties. The term can of course be used differently across a wide number of 
disciplines. For instance when clarifying the relationship between human rights and 
public policy in the next chapter it is noted that implementation in the policy literature 
can be seen as the ‗operationalisation‘ of legislation (see Section 2.2). 
Finally reactive and proactive are further terms used in the research. The first approach 
responds (sometimes in crisis mode) to whatever emerges as a breach of rights. The 
second approach seeks to actively check for difficulties and inconsistencies ahead of 
time, which means initiating change rather than reacting to events. A reactive stance 
assumes that officials are not fully alert to possible problems that could arise and that 
systems are not geared to optimally avoid these. A proactive approach assumes a state 
sector that is highly geared to compliance with international obligations and that 
officials and systems are working to best practice. 
However, other developments have helped enlarge the human rights field in New 
Zealand proactively, including New Zealand‘s role through international conventions in 
ending capital punishment, and in banning landmines and cluster munitions. A major 
proactive initiative also came to fruition in 2007 when the new UN disabilities 
convention emerged from some years of international negotiation in which this country 
had been a key player. This convention was signed by 81 countries in March 2007, and 
had the largest numbers of nations signing on the opening day and was negotiated in 
four years, the fastest time for any international instrument so far. This country was 
involved in its development at every stage. New Zealand was one of the first states to 
sign up and ratified the convention in September 2008, an Ad Hoc Committee to deal 
with negotiations was formed in 2001, and then in 2003 the New Zealand negotiation 
team was established (including disabled people and NGOs). This team worked on the 
first draft of the text, and in 2005 Don McKay (the UN representative) chaired the 
second draft committee.  
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The convention marks a paradigm shift in approaching disability: instead of having a 
health or social welfare focus, disability is now dealt with as a human rights issue. New 
Zealand was already advanced in the disability field by enacting legislation such as: 
section 8 of the Education Act in 1989 on equal rights to primary and secondary 
education regardless of disability; the Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act in 
1975; and the Health and Disability Commissioner Act (1994). The New Zealand 
Disability Strategy, led by the Office for Disability Issues established in 2001, was a 
useful background experience to involvement in the negotiations about the convention 
and this is one of the few countries in the world to have developed such as strategy.
13
  
For the purposes of this research, the Baigent case study has been chosen as an example 
of a reactive approach to human rights implementation. This case is particularly helpful 
in highlighting the difficulties that occur when an unexpected issue arises in the state 
sector. The military justice system case, on the other hand, has been chosen as a 
proactive example because it illustrates a more streamlined process when an issue arises 
in a planned and considered manner. It can be noted, too, that part of the reason this was 
such a good proactive example was because the NZDF had increased its legal 
directorate from four to 28 in the space of ‗just a few years‘ (Hansard, 2007a: 13). This 
allowed the NZDF to play such an active role in the development of the Armed Forces 
Law Reform Bill 2007. 
1.3 Chapter outline 
Chapter 1 sets out the main background information for the thesis, and in particular 
contains the methodology and the relationship to the literature field. Chapter 2 locates 
the implementation of rights in New Zealand‘s constitutional context and looks at the 
complex relationship between the international human rights system and domestic 
public policy. Chapter 3 contains the historical background and international context of 
New Zealand‘s early relationship with the United Nations (UN) in the 1940s through to 
the development of the international architecture and regional and national human rights 
institutions and mechanisms of today. The chapter notes the 2008 guidelines produced 
by the UN for states that want to have good human rights governance practices (UN, 
                                                 
13 For more information on this area see Cabinet Office (2006) and Cabinet Office (2007). 
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2008). This background therefore locates the contemporary New Zealand domestic 
human rights situation in its fuller international context.  
Chapter 4 canvasses the several stock-takings that were carried out on the ad hoc build-
up of human rights institutions, legislation and policies over the several decades since 
New Zealand signed the UDHR in 1948. These initiatives take account of international 
human rights treaty obligations and how the rights in these are best implemented and 
progressively realised. Some also look at where New Zealand‘s human rights record is 
meeting or surpassing international standards and areas where it is falling below. 
Chapter 5 builds the integration theme. It shows how human rights considerations have 
been integrated into the policy environment in several ways including through: non-
judicial approaches, early mainstreaming efforts, clarifying the locus of control within 
departments about who has oversight over human rights issues, training officials on the 
human rights system, examining inconsistencies in the Cabinet vetting system, and 
looking at new German and New Zealand models to fully implement the UN‘s 
Concluding Observations (i.e. feedback) on major treaty periodic reports. The chapter 
ends with Section 5.9 Better implementation. It is clarified at this point that in similar 
vein to other stock-taking documents – such as the Re-evaluation of Human Rights 
Protections in New Zealand (Ministry of Justice, 2000a) report and Human Rights in 
New Zealand Today (HRC, 2004a) – this thesis is highlighting possible shortcomings 
and raising possible ideas. That is, it is an issue-raising piece of research. The points in 
Section 5.9 are therefore not formal recommendations. For this reason, the parameters 
of the research are that no prioritising of future work to be done or costings on this are 
made in the thesis. 
During the course of analysing the stock-take and planning material, it became clear 
that there are currently two important ‗issues of discussion‘ in the human rights field in 
New Zealand: the status of second generation rights; and the clarification of the human 
rights dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi (third generation rights).
14
 These are 
analysed in Chapter 6 because these topics flesh out the complexity of various parts of 
the New Zealand human rights story. How to implement second generation rights 
effectively has been a long-standing problem and some of the literature on ways they 
                                                 
14 The Treaty of Waitangi, signed in 1840, is considered a founding document for New Zealand and was made between over 500 
Māori chiefs (rangitira) and the British Crown. It is considered to be a key component of New Zealand‘s constitutional framework. 
See Chapter 6.2.1 for a discussion on the Treaty as a human rights document. 
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can be given some parity to first generation rights is examined.
15
 Not all rights are seen 
to be (or treated as) equal, and when looked at closely it becomes clear that the 
implementation of various generations of rights through the state sector is a highly 
nuanced task. This chapter also examines the Treaty of Waitangi from a rights 
perspective, particularly since many of the poorer statistics around the provision of 
second generation rights affect Māori. This area is included because of the important 
position of the Treaty in New Zealand‘s constitutional framework, which is intimately 
connected to the human rights framework.  
Having presented and interpreted the complementarity concept in the first six chapters, 
an assessment is made in Chapter 7 using 20 criteria about whether New Zealand has 
the factors present for robust human rights governance. In examining what constitutes 
effectiveness in this way its opposite – fragile human rights governance – is also 
explained.  
Having taken two selected areas that are currently important, two case studies are then 
presented in Chapter 8 that show differing reactive-proactive approaches with shorter 
or longer mainstreaming processes, depending on whether an issue has an expected or 
unexpected entry into the state sector. There is also a sense in which New Zealand itself 
is a case study as it has moved towards robust human rights governance. It was not clear 
at the outset of the thesis study that these approaches existed, but during the course of 
the research it was possible to gain a better picture of what was happening and 
differences in how issues are processed. These cases serve as detailed illustrations of the 
emerging thesis. They also weave the following different levels of response to each 
issue: international obligation level; domestic statute level; judicial response at domestic 
level; policy formulation and implementation at Cabinet and departmental levels; 
individuals as rights-holders level. 
These two studies identify the ease and difficulty with which rights, with their genesis 
in the international arena, are implemented in the New Zealand state sector and then 
affect individual rights-holders. Any of the actors at each level – Ministers, judges, 
officials, individuals – can have various responses to new human rights developments 
that impact on New Zealand society. Using the case studies this research suggests that 
                                                 
15 Generations of rights are discussed more fully in Section 1.10. 
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the state sector itself can react in multiple ways about a new issue including: a possible 
immediate reaction of alienation/panic/rejection; then acceptance and modification so 
the issue can be implemented and assimilated; and then ultimately the mainstreaming of 
the issue into the state sector. It is a measure of effectiveness, a sign of robust human 
rights governance, when this mainstreaming process is carried out in a considered 
manner and does not need to go through the first alienation/panic/rejection stage. The 
case studies therefore refine the evaluation of effectiveness, showing important 
differences along the reactive-proactive spectrum, and that analysing the mainstreaming 
process in these two cases may well have lessons that are applicable to other instances.  
Chapters 3 to 8 therefore comprise the empirical and analytic heart of the thesis. The 
topical issues in Chapter 6 and the case studies in Chapter 8, in particular, serve the 
research by helping pin down ‗where New Zealand is really at‘ in terms of robust 
human rights governance and give more colour to the ‗what does effectiveness look 
like?‘ question of Chapter 7 (which contains explanatory work). Having moved across 
the whole design framework, the conclusions of the research can then be found in 
Chapter 9 where the contributions to the field are re-stated.  
1.4 Six-phase human rights history 
Reflecting on this country‘s human rights involvement since the establishment of the 
UN in the mid-1940s, and on the developments above, New Zealand‘s history has been 
categorised into six phases instead of viewing the last several decades as one block. 
This allowed a more nuanced analysis of this time period, and resulted in the suggestion 
that effectiveness in complementarity will lead to robust human rights governance. 
Effectiveness is assessed by the position a country has reached on each stage in the 
model, as well as by the degree to which human rights are addressed reactively or 
proactively. The six phases are set out in Table 1, which also shows the relationship of 
the phases to the structure of this thesis. Each of the phases has key themes, and these 





Table 1. Six phases of New Zealand’s human rights history  
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THREE Stock-take initiatives 1994 – 2005 Reviewing 
Restructuring 
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FIVE More effective 
implementation of 






















In the initial phase of the research and structuring of the thesis this table was a useful 
organising device, especially since it became clear that the developments have arisen 
like waves on a beach. The first wave came in the 1940s and continues even today, and 
the next major wave in the 1970s has also followed that pattern. The third major wave 
was the stock-take and planning initiatives that were carried out between 1994 and 
2009. The last two waves – trying to implement rights more effectively and actively 
setting up robust human rights governance – have occurred since 2000. 
Phase One marks out the early process of New Zealand helping to develop the UN 
organisation, and this was a time of considerable input towards that institution. 
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This period in the human rights story is well-documented.
16
 What is not well known is 
the history of how that vision was implanted into New Zealand i.e. how the UDHR 
rights were seeded into various facets of government and civil society over the next 
several decades. It was during this phase that human rights in this country were largely 
protected domestically by common law and social services because at this time no 
international treaties had been ratified.
17
 Phase Two saw the growth of domestic human 
rights institutions and structures and the enactment of a steady stream of human rights 
legislation over the next three decades (see Table 3 in Section 4.2).  
Phases Three and Four cover the stock-take and planning initiatives of the 15-year 
period 1994-2009, undertaken once the structural and legislative build-up had largely 
come to an end. The Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 was passed as a result of this 
stock-take.
18
 At this point New Zealand at last had the right structures and legislation in 
place, which is why it is suggested that Phase Five has now been entered. This 
concerns the more effective implementation of international human rights and explores 
other approaches e.g. policy-based. Phase Six then tackles the simple question of what 
effectiveness should look like and how such an understanding can be used to underpin 
further strengthening of robust human rights governance, with all phases subject to 
further strengthening. The stages are analytical, not a simple ladder of steps. Hence 
elements of all stages might be in progress, with varying degrees of effectiveness.  
1.5 Developing criteria for effectiveness 
The criteria for effectiveness are set out in Chapter 7. Specifically, Table 9 in Section 
7.2 sets out a four-part scale for assessing New Zealand‘s performance in terms of 
robust human rights governance: strong; developing; weak; and non-existent. This scale 
has been used to give some nuance to otherwise bald assertions that an area is simply 
                                                 
16 USA human rights historian Professor Paul Lauren for instance states that: ‗New Zealand played a most significant role in 
advancing the cause of international human rights and made a contribution that we are still experiencing today [and] exercised an 
influence far out of proportion to the size of the country or any previous role in international relations‘ (Lauren 1997: 1, 7).  
17 Although the first two major covenants – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – entered into force in 1976, New Zealand did not ratify both until 
1978 once all domestic laws, policies and practices had been checked for compliance.  
18 Another important parallel stock-take was occurring around the same time. In 2005 the New Zealand Constitutional 
Arrangements Committee (2005: 9) commented about their brief of reviewing this country‘s current arrangements that: ‗It has been 
a scene-setting or stock-taking exercise, designed to provide a platform of information and the beginnings of a roadmap …‘
.
 Given 
that the constitutional framework and human rights framework are so intimately connected, it was timely that both underwent 
extensive reviews around the same time. 
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‗weak‘ or ‗strong‘. For instance this country‘s exploration of proactive vs reactive 
approaches to human rights issues as they arise in the state sector is growing and 
therefore ‗developing‘. There is no ‗formal‘ inter-departmental group of officials in the 
state sector focusing on human rights issues, so it is fair to categorise this as ‗non-
existent‘.19 Treaties are ratified after a careful check for compliance, so it seems 
reasonable to say this area is ‗strong‘. Other researchers may have developed a different 
scale, but these are put forward as sound choices using two primary influences: 
 the UN Economic and Social Council has identified key features of national 
human rights protection systems and some of their criteria are used e.g. the rule 
of law, independent judiciary, incorporation of human rights standards into 
domestic law, good governance practices, human rights education and 
specialised human rights institutions (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003: 
403)  
 many of the ideas raised in the stock-take and planning initiatives of 1994-2009 
have also been used e.g. the need for a formal inter-departmental network of 
officials,
20
 increasing the status of second generation rights, and early 
mainstreaming into policy making. 
The criteria are therefore an amalgamation of these two influences and key issues that 
have arisen from this research about the more effective implementation of ratified treaty 
rights through the state sector.  
1.6 Methodology 
1.6.1 Research design 
Having given some brief background information about the phased history and the 
evaluative criteria, this section now describes the research design. First, a useful 
distinction between ‗methodology‘ and ‗methods‘ is given by Michael Crotty. For him, 
                                                 
19 Section 5.3 contains a discussion on this. 
20 Although there is no formal inter-departmental group of officials there have been very good instances of cross-agency 
coordination (a Phase Five theme) on certain projects. For instance, the Crown Law Office, Treasury, the Ministry of Defence, 
MFAT, the Ministry of Justice and the Parliamentary Counsel Office all helped with the NZDF review of the military justice 
system.  
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methodology was the ‗strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice 
and use of particular methods‘. Out of this research design come the research questions, 
as he described methods as the techniques ‗used to gather and analyse data related to 
some research question or hypothesis‘ (Crotty, 1998: 3). In simpler terms, Clough and 
Nutbrown saw methodology as providing ‗the reasons for using a particular research 
recipe‘, while methods are ‗some of the ingredients of the research‘ (Clough and 
Nutbrown, 2002: 22). They also stated that trying to pin down a definition of 
methodology that satisfies all researchers is extremely difficult, although for them a 
‗common idea‘ across a number of definitions is ‗justification‘ (Clough and Nutbrown 
2002: 29-30). What follows examines the broad research design and why the research is 
being carried out. A note is also made on ‗the reflexive researcher‘ in this section on 
methodology, as some authors such as Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) and Luttrell 
(2010) go so far as to call this approach to research ‗reflexive methodology‘. 
Norman Blaikie noted that there are several core elements of a social research design 
including (Norman Blaikie, 2000: 43): 
 topic/problem 
 research questions 
 research strategies 
 data sources 
 concepts 
 data analysis.21  
With this research, the core topic or problem was thinking about the comment in the Re-
evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand report that the government 
is committed to having human rights at the ‗heart‘ of public policy (Ministry of Justice, 
2000a: 16). This led to reflection on a number of issues: What does this mean – to have 
human rights at the heart of public policy? How is this being done at the moment? Can 
it be assessed? Is there any way of doing it better? What does it mean to be a fully 
compliant human rights state? Having thought about these issues further (and relating to 
the second part of the research design) two research questions started to develop: 
                                                 
21 Clough and Nutbrown had a similar ‗critical social science enquiry‘ approach. Again, the research design for this thesis was 
similar to their model which included: ‗Framing a research question; Finding out what existing answers there are to that question; 
Establishing what is missing from those answers; Getting information which will answer the question; Making meanings from the 
information which helps to answer your research question; and
 
Presenting a report which highlights the significance of your study‘ 
(Clough and Nutbrown, 2002: 89). 
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 How have human rights considerations been integrated into the policy 
environment, and does this policy area align with the law+litigation 
approach to achieve the complementarity of these fields? 
 
 How might effectiveness be characterised in relation to robust human rights 
governance? 
In order to answer the research questions an inductive research strategy was needed (the 
third part of the research design). It became clear that what was lacking was a 
framework for describing or capturing what had been found while reflecting on the core 
topic. This was the point where the first analytically rich framework – the more nuanced 
six-phased history culminating in the ideal of robust human rights governance – 
emerged. For the first framework, which relates to the first research question, instead of 
looking at the period 1945-2010 as one time block, it became clear that breaking the 
period down into chronological phases was a useful way of demarcating this history. 
This became an original contribution in itself.  
Once this clearer picture had been gained, it also became clear that what was lacking 
was a way of exploring the utility of the first framework. The time blocks or phases of 
the staged history then became a device through which to start to develop the second 
original and analytically rich framework (related to the second research question) about 
evaluating robust human rights governance. By this stage in the research strategy, this 
second framework had begun to be populated with the evaluative criteria that eventually 
resulted in ‗Table 9: New Zealand status – effectiveness in robust human rights 
governance‘ in Chapter 7.  
The research therefore started out with a curiosity about what it meant to have human 
rights at the ‗heart‘ of public policy. In order to further sharpen this picture (through an 
iterative and inductive process), the fourth part of the research design came into effect 
as data sources were explored. These sources are discussed more fully in Section 1.7.1 
on documentary analysis. Research was carried out first on the historical international 
setting of New Zealand‘s domestic architecture. Then a close examination was made of 
the stock-taking and planning initiatives that occurred between 1994 and 2009. Doing 
this, it became apparent that many of the recommendations of diverse reports had not 
been carried out, and that the specific processes and mechanisms of New Zealand‘s 
human rights architecture were not functioning as well as they could be in the state 
sector. Research was also carried out into the status of second and third generation 
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rights in New Zealand. The combined reading in all these areas helped increase the 
nuanced understanding of the six historical phases, as well as in developing the 
evaluative criteria of Chapter 7. 
Arising out of the research design came the fifth of Blaikie‘s core elements: concepts. 
Section 1.2 has already set out definitions of a number of these including 
complementarity, effectiveness, law+litigation, robust and fragile human rights states, 
proactive and reactive, and implementation. Reaching the final stage of the core 
elements (data analysis) enabled all the elements of the research to eventually be drawn 
together to fully develop the significant contributions, which are set out in the 
concluding chapter in Section 9.2. 
As mentioned, one of the key themes of the research is implementation, and this can be 
carried out well (proactively) or in an ineffective way (reactively). The two case studies, 
which in this thesis were the final part of the research design, show clear examples of 
each. They help illustrate reactive and proactive examples by looking at specific 
instances that have recently affected the state sector. They were placed at the end of the 
thesis, as they do not drive the research but evolved out of it, and could only be 
discussed fully once the background information of the previous seven chapters had 
been given. 
1.6.2 The reflexive researcher 
Carrying out the research involved an iterative and reflexive approach. Part of the 
research process involved analysis and reflection as the research progressed. Lewis-
Beck et al talked about reflexivity as the researcher‘s own relationship with the research 
(Lewis-Beck, 2004: 934):  
It is argued that researchers are always part of the social world they study; they can 
never step above it in order to gain an Olympian perspective or move outside it to get a 
‗view from nowhere‘. It is taken to follow from this that they should continually reflect 
on their own role in the research process. 
It is important for researchers to have practices in place that mitigate this tendency 
towards bias when they go into the field. This self-awareness of potential biases across 
a number of areas – ideological, political, social, theoretical, ethical – can help keep the 
research far less subjective. The greatest danger is that the researcher will go into the 
field with pre-conceived ideas, looking to substantiate the opinions they have already 
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formed, instead of as an open-minded inquirer. Lewis-Beck et al saw reflexivity in a 
positive light, as they advocated it as a ‗feature of social research practice‘ (Lewis-Beck 
et al, 2004: 934). For instance, they cited that authors such as Alvesson and Skoldberg 
(2000) who claimed that ‗through reflexivity, research can be made a transparent 
activity that generates genuine knowledge‘ (Lewis-Beck, 2004: 934). Quinn Patton 
more concretely provided the following guidelines about how to help ensure separation 
between the observer and the observed (or in this case the researcher and the research). 
His advice related to fieldwork with participants, but many of the points are also 
relevant for general social science research: 
 ‗Stay open. Gather a variety of information from different perspectives. Allow 
the design to emerge flexibly as new understandings open up new paths of 
inquiry. 
 Use quotations: represent people in their own terms. 
 Focus on pulling together a useful synthesis as [the work] draws to a close. 
Move from generating possibilities to verifying emergent patterns and 
confirming themes. 
 Separate description from interpretation and judgment‘ (Quinn Patton, 2002: 
331). 
In this research into robust human rights governance in the New Zealand state sector, 
every attempt has been made to follow these guidelines. For instance, information was 
gathered from a wide range of perspectives: books, reports, journal articles, UN 
documents, and primary material (letters, memoranda, reports, briefing notes, Hansard 
debates and Cabinet papers). There has been extensive quotation of authors from all 
these sources. The first year of the research was spent largely reading, with an openness 
to the patterns and themes that were emerging. Description has also been separated from 
interpretation and judgment as follows. Chapters 1 and 2 contain detailed background 
and contextual information and are therefore descriptive. Chapters 3 to 6 are also 
largely descriptive – they show the build-up of the human rights framework in New 
Zealand and problems are raised, but analysis and interpretation is starting to be 
tentatively made. Chapter 7 about what constitutes criteria for effective human rights 
implementation finally contains detailed analysis and interpretations. Chapter 8 on the 
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case studies is descriptive until the final two sections, which contain analysis and 
interpretations. Chapter 9 contains the final overall conclusions. Reflexivity was also 
important in carrying out the case studies in this research as will be seen in Section 
1.7.2 below. 
In terms of my own reflexive position, an interest in the topic of what it means to have 
robust human rights governance developed through my involvement in several human 
rights-related initiatives over the last 10 years. During 1999-2000 I helped organise 
international human rights seminars at Victoria University of Wellington for staff, 
students, NGOs and government agencies. At this stage I had an MA in political theory, 
and human rights theory was starting during the 1990s to become an increasingly 
recognised academic field overseas. In 2000-2001 I taught a 300 level course in human 
rights history, theory and practice to political science, law and philosophy students at 
Victoria. From 2003 I have been academic co-editor of Human Rights Research, a 
multi-disciplinary journal, also based at the university. The journal draws on 
contributions from fields as wide as sociology, criminology, law, political science, 
education, religious studies and philosophy and is based on the proceedings of an 
annual human rights symposium held at the university. It became clear to me as I heard 
and read perspectives from a number of disciplines and agencies that New Zealand‘s 
human rights framework had grown up in a rather ad hoc fashion: that there were areas 
of coherence but also of fragmentation. Also, looking at this country‘s human rights 
history as one large block did not seem helpful, and on reflection there were a number 
of stages that could be discerned. This led me to further reflect on criteria to assess 
robust human rights governance in the New Zealand state sector. The formation of the 
two research questions (the staged history and the evaluative criteria) has therefore been 
a direct result of these experiences. 
1.7 Methods 
As a result of the research design, a two-method approach started to develop, involving 
document analysis and cases studies. The two methods also relate to each other, because 
the case studies were underpinned by documentary analysis.  
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1.7.1 Documentary analysis  
In this research written documents (both primary and secondary material) were gathered 
and assessed. As noted much of the primary material was sourced from books, reports 
and journal articles, along with other primary material. The literature is reviewed more 
extensively later in this chapter in literature in Section 1.11. The research process also 
included gathering information under Official Information Act (OIA) 1982 requests.
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Lewis-Beck et al noted that: ‗A document is any kind of physically embodied text, and 
a handwritten or printed text on paper, such as a letter or government report is the 
archetypal document … Documents can be classified most usefully in terms of their 
authorship and the conditions for access to them‘. They went on to categorise 
authorship in the ‗personal sphere‘ or the ‗public, official sphere‘ and access is about 
what conditions the document are available under: ‗open‘, ‗restricted‘ or ‗closed‘: (a) 
open access is when they are available through ‗archiving‘ or publication‘; (b) restricted 
is when ‗they are accessible to a wider group, but under limited conditions‘; and (c) 
closed refers to when only a ‗very limited group of people‘ can access them (Lewis-
Beck et al, 2004: 282).
23
 In New Zealand this would equate to: (a) general publically 
available information; (b) publically available information released under the OIA; (c) 
and OIA information that is not approved for release. These authors also noted that 
government documents are ‗the single largest type of document available to social 
researchers‘ (Lewis-Beck et al, 2004: 282). 
There are, however, strengths and weaknesses in using documentary analysis as a 
method. In terms of strengths, Henn et al perceived it to be a ‗valuable research tool‘ 
(Henn et al, 2006: 110). Because documents can contain ‗direct accounts of people 
involved in their social situations‘, they also see it as important because ‗there is no 
intermediary to influence this account, to report it, or change it. Rather such documents 
provide a first-hand account from the ‗inside‘, and more than this documents potentially 
provide a ‗rich seam‘ of data (Henn et al, 2006: 110). In this research, the NZ Police 
documents provided a first-hand account from inside the state sector when the Baigent 
                                                 
22 Helpful material came from the HRC, the Ministry of Justice, the NZDF, MFAT, the State Services Commission, the NZ Police, 
the Department of Corrections, the Immigration Service of the Department of Labour, and the reference staff of two libraries (the 
Victoria University Library UN Room and the Law Library).
  
23 Henn et al had a similar classification: ‗public and private documents; primary and secondary documents; and solicited and 
unsolicited documents‘ (Henn et al, 2009: 113-114). 
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decision was first made, and in general provide a rich seam of data that has previously 
been unpublished. 
Regarding weaknesses, the material may not be genuine, or accurate, or represent this 
type of document well, or have its meaning readily identified. Lewis-Beck et al 
therefore set out four criteria for the ‗effective use of documents‘: ‗authenticity, 
credibility, representativeness and meaning‘ (Lewis-Beck, 2004: 283).24 Authenticity 
relates to having a verifiable original or a copy obtained from a reliable source, as well 
as ‗soundness‘ that the authorship is correct. Credibility relates to such factors as the 
accuracy of the document, and whether it is presenting ‗information‘ or persuasive 
argument. The documents must also be ‗representative‘ of their type and have been kept 
original from their date of writing, compared with an edited version of a report that gets 
changed over time and the original report is no longer stored (Lewis-Beck, 2004: 283).  
The document can also be assessed in terms of meaning: ‗literal and interpretive‘. 
Literal means whether the document can actually be read or is the text too faded? 
Interpretation, on the other hand, is about what the researcher brings to the text in their 
own unique way of finding meaning from it (Lewis-Beck, 2004: 284); this links to the 
concept of ‗reflexivity‘ discussed in the next section. It is obviously necessary with 
documentary analysis for the researcher to carefully check documents before including 
them in the research. In this research the Rt Hon Doug Graham, for instance, is quoted 
from material such as briefing notes and memoranda. Having been sourced from OIA 
material, the documents were verified as authentic, and their type and context is clearly 
set out in the thesis before the author is quoted. This technique was used for each 
primary document used in the research, most notably in the case studies where most of 
this material can be found. 
1.7.2 Case studies 
Case studies have a particular function in social science research. Mabry noted they 
‗provide deep understanding about specific instances‘ (Mabry, 2008: 216). Importantly 
for the doctoral research, they add to ‗knowledge and understanding‘ because they 
‗contribute substantively to social science by offering intense focus on cases of interest, 
                                                 
24 Henn et al also made a similar point that potential weaknesses of documentary analysis are whether the text is accurate and 
representative (Henn et al, 2009: 121). 
 25 
their contexts, and their complexity‘ (Mabry, 2008: 216). Stake highlighted the 
difference between an ‗intrinsic case study‘ and an ‗instrumental case study‘: the first 
being undertaken because ‗the case itself is of interest‘; the second because ‗a particular 
case is examined to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization‘ (Stake, 
2005: 445). He also noted there can be single cases or more than one study, the latter 
sometimes carried out for comparative purposes (Stake, 2005: 445-446, 457). Cases 
also need to have a ‗conceptual structure‘, and this ‗conceptualizing‘ helps the study 
confirm that: ‗There is [actually] something to be described and interpreted‘ (Stake, 
2005: 458, 459). 
Cases are first identified, and this will depend on factors such as ‗the researcher‘s 
interest‘ and their ‗industry in identifying a case informative enough to be worth 
studying‘ (Mabry, 2008: 217). As already mentioned in the reflexivity section above, 
the problem of subjective bias is present in any research. However, Mabry said that in 
case studies ‗each reader and each researcher will construct a unique personal 
understandings of a case‘ (Mabry, 2008: 221). As a safeguard, it is therefore imperative 
that: ‗Rather than searching for data to confirm or disconfirm an a priori theory or 
hypothesis‘ researchers should ‗notice opportunities and to follow data wherever they 
lead‘ (Mabry, 2008: 218). Openness was also seen by Mabry to be key to the research 
(Mabry, 2008: 224): 
With deep understanding of a case as the prime goal of case study, an attitude of 
openness may be the most fortuitous item in a case study researcher‘s toolkit. … 
Curiosity to know more and to understand better encourages delving deeply into the 
meaning of a case. Link by link, case by case, construction of meaning by the 
researcher, by the reader, and by the research community is how case study contributes 
to social science and to society.  
Once the data is collected (and aware of their own bias) the researcher can then embark 
on ‗thematic analysis‘, which includes identifying ‗emerging patterns and categories 
from iterative reviews of the dataset‘ (Mabry 2008: 218). It is out of this process that 
findings develop. Once the findings are clear, narrative reporting can begin: ‗the final 
step in a long analytic process‘ (Mabry 2008: 219). Mabry suggested that: ‗A case study 
researcher can promote understanding by collecting and organizing information, 
focusing attention on meaningful aspects, and providing an external analytical 
perspective that may be helpful even to insiders intimately familiar with the case‘ 
(Mabry 2008: 220).  
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The two case studies in this research were chosen because they illustrate not only the 
different impact of reactive and proactive approaches for the state sector, but also 
complementarity in the marriage of the law+litigation and policy fields to address the 
breach (or potential breach) raised in each instance. In the first study (Baigent‘s Case), 
existing law was further amplified by the court with the granting of damages, and for 
fiscal reasons many departments had to check their policies and practices to ensure the 
breach did not happen again. In the second study (the military justice system), many 
years of legal and policy analysis resulted in both an amendment Act and extensive re-
structuring of the organisation, policies and practices of that system.  
This correlates with Mabry‘s ‗deep understanding about specific instances‘. The studies 
were both intrinsic (in that the cases were of interest themselves) and instrumental 
(because they provided more insight into the issues just mentioned). A comparison 
between the two cases was chosen, primarily because they would illustrate both (a) the 
proactive and reactive distinction; and (b) differences in mainstreaming when an issue 
is expected or unexpected in the state sector. A conceptual structure was imposed on 
each case so that it was examined for its impact at several levels – Cabinet, judicial, 
legislative, departmental, the individual – and this was another way of making 
comparisons. Also, each case has a similar overall structure in that background 
information is given first, the specifics of the case are set out, and then the 
mainstreaming tables (11 and 13) are developed.  
As a safeguard against researcher bias, the case studies were entered into with an open 
approach, so that no a priori theory or hypothesis was searched for. Rather, it was 
through gathering material about each of the cases that the reactive and proactive 
dimensions, and the mainstreaming differences, became evident. This is why the case 
studies are given at the end of the research: the thesis is not ‗based‘ on the cases; rather, 
the studies unfolded‘ out of the research. Mabry‘s ‗thematic analysis‘ started to develop 
during the reading stage, where ‗emerging patterns and categories‘ became evident and 
then findings were made. Stake had also made the connection between case study and 
public policy: that the former can be ‗a disciplined force in setting public policy‘ (Stake, 
2008: 460). In these studies, the connection between case study and public policy is 
strong because both Baigent and the military justice system studies show how changes 
in public policy occurred as a result of each case. 
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1.8 Transparency and ethical considerations 
Clough and Nutbrown had commented that transparency is important in the research 
process (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002: 29). The combined effect of many of the issues 
raised in the sections above results in greater transparency, that is, results in best thesis 
practice. For instance, as noted above Alvesson and Skoldberg claimed that reflexivity 
encourages transparency. Lewis-Beck et al above had noted that careful document 
analysis also requires the researcher to be sure of the authenticity and credibility of the 
data being analysed. Mabry had also suggested that openness is required for data 
collection and data analysis (Mabry, 2008: 218). The advice from Quinn Patton about 
keeping a separation between the researcher and the research is also relevant: to gather 
material from many perspectives and be open to new paths emerging as the research 
unfolds; to use quotations so that people are represented in their own terms; and to 
separate description from judgment. As noted in the previous two sections on 
documentary analysis and case studies this research was carried out with these 
safeguards in mind.  
A statement is now given about ethical considerations. During the initial scoping and 
enrolment stage, the issue of whether the research needed VUW Human Ethics 
Committee approval was discussed with my supervisors. It was felt that because there 
was no intention to adopt a methodology involving gathering information by interviews 
or by any other ‗research of human subjects‘ under the VUW Human Ethics Policy 
(Research Policy Group, 2010), the research was not being carried out in any manner 
contrary to the university‘s ethical standards. The research was seen to be covered 
especially by Section 4.4(b) of the guidelines about matters that do not need approval, 
in particular Section 4.4(b)(iv) that information obtained from ‗existing publically 
available documents or information‘ did not need approval. My understanding has been 
that information in the public domain includes comments and discussions arising in a 
conference presentation or public forum question and answer sessions.  
An important aspect of the research process was Official Information Act (OIA) 1982 
requests for publically available material (Section 6 of the VUW Human Ethics Policy 
mentions OIA information in more detail). All use of such material, including emails, is 
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therefore referenced to its source and relates to official information. I also acknowledge 
the value of impromptu discussions with a range of people on the research issues in the 
course of attending conferences and meetings. One some occasions, for instance, at 
breaks people suggested references that might be helpful for the research. I also 
attended several public conferences, forums and seminars where there were open panel 
discussions and questions from the audience. One particularly relevant forum (the NZ 
Diversity Forum 09) is mentioned several times throughout the thesis. In a few 
examples, points are illustrated by reference to (anonymised) comments that were made 
publicly in the course of this forum. These comments can be found in Sections 5.2, 5.3, 
5.5.1 and 5.6. 
1.9 Timeliness 
A New Zealand study in this area is important because of this country‘s high profile 
international positioning in the post-war phase and because successive governments 
continue to be committed to creating a world-leading human rights environment.  
Across the period of this research (2007-2010) there has been a noticeable increase in 
government focus on international human rights by both Labour and National-led 
government administrations and three examples illustrate this. First, as mentioned, New 
Zealand was instrumental in developing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities
 
and ratified this in 2008, and secondly New Zealand presented its first 





 initiatives that were carried out in New Zealand in the 15-year period 
between 1994 and 2009 are coming to an end. Attention is now turning to the issues that 
                                                 
25 Briefly the evaluation initiatives were: (1) The HRC‘s Consistency 2000 project, which started in 1994 and was an examination 
of all legislation, policies and practices to check consistency with the anti-discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993 
(HRC 1998); (2) Compliance 2001, an audit carried out on the same area by the Ministry of Justice in 2001; (3) The Re-evaluation 
of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand independent ministerial report, commissioned by then Associate Minister of 
Justice and Attorney-General Margaret Wilson because New Zealand‘s human rights laws and institutions had grown organically 
and it was seen as a timely point to take stock and review these in a systematic way (Ministry of Justice, 2000a); (4) Four years later 
the HRC published Human Rights in New Zealand Today as the first comprehensive status report on human rights in this country 
and flagged what work needed to be done in the future (HRC, 2004a); (5) This further evaluation report had a focus away from the 
domestic arena. Inquiry into the Role of International Human Rights in Foreign Policy, carried out by the Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade Committee, looks at human rights from another angle and has a good section on the human rights training available at the 
time (NZ House of Representatives, 2005).  
26 The most important planning document is the New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights 2005-2010 which contained goals for 
more effective human rights implementation during that time period. As this is coming to an end a version for the years 2011-2016 
is being drafted by the HRC
 
(HRC, 2005a). Another document which highlighted areas that need improving is New Zealand‘s UPR 
report (UNGA, 2009a).  
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comprise chapters in this research – embedding a human rights approach into the state 
sector, raising the status of second generation rights and more clearly understanding the 
human rights implications of the Treaty, and understanding reactive and proactive 
approaches. These developments make this research timely and current not only in 
charting developments, but in contributing (modestly) to them. The military justice 
system case study in Chapter 8 also illustrates the currency of this research. This issue 
had a long incubation through various phases: research into the problem starting in 
1996; slow restructuring of the military disciplinary system after an internal NZDF 
review in 2001; eventual development of amending legislation enacted in 2007; and 
judges sworn in on 10 July 2009 in readiness for the new military judicial system. To be 
carrying out this research at the tail end of this 13-year history means that a more 
complete picture can be viewed as the process has come full cycle.  
It has therefore been opportune to carry out this study at the end of a period of 
assessment, restructuring and planning and at the beginning of a phase of renewed 
commitment to the more effective implementation of ratified international human rights 
treaties.  
1.10 Generations of rights 
It is useful briefly at the beginning of this research to begin with the concept of 
‗generations‘ of rights. As the word itself implies, the suggestion is of progressive 
‗generational‘ development, covering evolving concepts of rights and the correlative 
differences in the responsibilities of states and citizens. Although this thesis mainly 
focuses on the first three generations of rights, for the purposes of seeing them in 
context it is useful to consider five possible generations: 
 First generation: These are classic civil and political rights associated with 
liberal democracies, such as the right to life and freedom of speech, assembly 
and religion. They protect the individual from abuse by the state and are found 
in Articles 3-21 of the UDHR and in the whole of the ICCPR. In general terms, 
these ‗negative‘ rights envisage limits to state action i.e. governments and 
legislatures ‗staying out of‘ interference with basic rights. Examples include not 
passing laws or adopting practices which interfere with freedom of worship, or 
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political expression, or which discriminate against people on various grounds. 
 Second generation: These focus on economic, social and cultural issues, such as 
the right to adequate medical care or to an education. They ensure citizens 
within states have equal treatment and are found in Articles 22-27 of the UDHR 
and in the whole of the ICESCR. Again, in general terms, the responsibilities of 
the state are more active in that they envisage the state at least creating the 
conditions for the progressive development of these ‗positive‘ rights, and 
perhaps even actually funding and supplying them.
27
 
 Third generation: These are also known as group, collective or solidarity rights 
– such as the rights of indigenous peoples to protect their culture or to self-
determination. The role of the state has aspects of both limiting power (i.e. not 




 Fourth generation: These are essentially environmental or ecological rights – 
they focus on the responsibility of humans to protect the environment and again 
have both limiting and positive obligations on the role of the state.
29
  
 Fifth generation: These are still very much in development and flow from all of 
the above. They relate broadly to the rights of unborn or future generations to 
inherit a sustainably managed earth. Again, the responsibilities of the state and 




It will be clear that first generation rights are the most commonly accepted, closely 
followed by second generation rights. There is abundant commentary on these rights in 
                                                 
27 Liebenberg (2006: 109-113) examined the positive obligations of states, and Section 6.1.2 of this research also contains a 
discussion on this topic. 
28 See for instance Saito (1996: 395-397) on the development of third generation rights in USA law, and for a brief discussion of 
these rights generally see Conde (2004: 258-259). 
29 See Shelton (1991: 103) on human rights and environment rights, and Boyle and Anderson (1996) on human rights approaches to 
environmental protection. The latter authors made the comment, however, that these are areas of competing rights: ‗Like human 
rights, environmental law houses a hidden imperial ambition; both potentially touch upon all spheres of human activity, and claim to 
override or trump other considerations‘ (Boyle and Anderson 1996: 1). 
30 Weiss (1990: 198) for instance discussed the rights and obligations of the current generation to future generations in relation to 
the environment. 
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standard human rights texts.
31
 Third generation rights is a newer term, with some 
reasonably-widely acknowledged aspects (including developments in relation to the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). Fourth and fifth generation rights are 
at even earlier stages of development and are not commonly accepted. However, they 
have been cited for instance by Marshall who also noted that: ‗the categories of second-, 
third-, and further-generation rights have been the source of considerable controversy‘ 
(Marshall, 2002: 31-32).  
One reason for the emphasis on second generation rights in this thesis is that HRC 
statements show there are many areas where this country is falling below international 
standards related to the lack of provision of such rights.
32
 Because these rights by 
definition envisage a more active role of the state, it is therefore helpful to use them to 
explore the concept of implementation. Chapter 3 shows how these rights were central 
to the concerns of the New Zealand delegation led by Prime Minister Peter Fraser to the 
UN in the mid-1940s. As will also be seen in that chapter, the importance of these 
second generation rights in New Zealand‘s human rights history actually started in the 
late 19
th
 century. The first part of Chapter 6 focuses solely on the issue of raising their 
status, while the second part on third generation Treaty rights also examines this issue 
because of the ongoing poor statistics for Māori in this area. Implementing such rights 
thus requires particularly proactive engagement by all aspects of government.  
1.11 Relationship to the field 
This thesis draws on the fields of international human rights (including international 
human rights law) and public policy. This research is building on what others are doing 
in these areas by taking a New Zealand approach that looks at this country‘s 
international and domestic engagement with human rights over the last several decades, 
albeit in outline, and picking up key themes. The work of authors from these fields is 
discussed throughout. This section briefly illustrates how this thesis locates itself in 
                                                 
31 See for instance Donnelly (2003: 27-30), Steiner, Alston and Goodman (2008: Chapters 3 and 4) and Vasak (1982: 48-53).  
32 For instance the HRC report Human Rights in New Zealand Today cited the following pressing issues: ‗the poverty and abuse 
experienced by a significant number of children and young people; the pervasive barriers that prevent disabled people from fully 
participating in society; the vulnerability to abuse of those in detention and institutional care; impact of poverty on the realisation of 
the most basic human rights; the entrenched economic and social inequalities that continue to divide Māori and Pacific people from 
other New Zealanders; the challenge of the place of the Treaty of Waitangi now and in the future‘ (HRC, 2004a: 379). 
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these fields and how it adds to them. International human rights law and public policy 
are looked at in order to develop the construct of complementarity, which for reasons 
that become apparent needs to draw on both.  
The first broad field of international human rights is well occupied by many authors 
who show how the human rights system fits into the general international law 
framework.
33
 A good example is a major text authored by three New York legal 
academics (Steiner, Alston and Goodman, 2008) which backgrounded many of the 
primary themes in the area such as human rights issues and discourse, types of 
generational rights, the human rights organisations (UN and NGOs), states as protectors 
and enforcers of human rights, and current topics (such as Truth Commissions, the 
growth of self-determination movements, development and globalisation).
34
 These 
authors stated that the international ‗human rights movement now forms an indelible 
part of our legal, political and moral landscape‘ and further suggested that the impact of 
this movement is now so strong that it affects many fields.
35
 They used the term 
‗movement‘; part of this thesis will be that the human rights endeavour is so large 
globally and so pervasive in the government policy programme that it can possibly be 
considered a set of underpinning principles in the state sector.
36
 
The human rights endeavour is not only pervasive in the policy programmes of 
governments; it also has as one of its major effects the erosion of the doctrine of state 
sovereignty. International law specialist Malcolm Shaw noted that the basic principle of 
domestic jurisdiction has over time: ‗been subject to a process of reinterpretation in the 
                                                 
33 See for instance Ian Brownlie (2008, Chapter 25); Antonio Cassese (2005, Chapter 19); Malcolm Evans (2006, Chapter 25); and 
John O‘Brien (2001, Chapters 15 and 16).  
34 Steiner, Goldman and Alston have also written widely in other texts on this area. For instance see: on the relationship of human 
rights to democracy and their international protection (Steiner, 1999, 2006); a critical appraisal of the UN system (Alston and 
Megret, 2009); and the role of non-state actors (Alston, 2005). Professor Philip Alston has been a practitioner as well as an 
academic in the field, having been the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial summary or arbitrary executions since 2004 and he 
has also helped the UN General Assembly with the reform of the UN human rights treaty monitoring system.  
35 These fields include: ‗… law, government, international relations and institutions, moral theory, public health, world financial 
institutions, ecology, economic development, ethnic conflict, religion, education, cultural studies and anthropology‘ (Steiner, Alston 
and Goodman, 2008: v).  
36 While the two major parties in New Zealand, for instance, have tended to
 
accept this human rights endeavour, it is not 
necessarily uncontested in other liberal democracies. The Conservatives in the UK had canvassed the idea of repealing the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) 1998 if they won the 2010 election. However, one problem with this stance is that it would require withdrawing 
from the European Convention on Human Rights, as not doing so would leave UK citizens able to take claims to Strasbourg-based 
judges. As it is unlikely that the UK would withdraw from this convention, the repeal is unlikely to happen. Labour, on the other 
hand, had gone in a seeming opposite direction by developing a discussion paper in 2009 on a bill of rights which would extend the 
protection of economic and social rights. For a discussion on these Conservative and Labour approaches to human rights see Conor 
Gearty (2010: 27-29). 
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human rights field‘ (Shaw, 2003: 254). However, he also cited another well-known 
principle in international law (the exhaustion of domestic remedies rule) where states 
are given the chance to sort out their own problems before international intervention 
occurs.
37
 An area of ‗blended sovereignty‘ has therefore emerged since World War II 
where the international and national arenas share mutual responsibility for ensuring 
human rights protection.
38
 However, given the increase in globalisation generally, it is 
not only the human rights area which is wearing down the traditional notion of state 
sovereignty. Countries come under international law across a large range of issues (such 
as postal regulations, international monetary policy and maritime law), so the human 
rights field is only one part of the eroding aspect of internationalism on a state‘s 
power.
39
 The sovereignty issue is therefore a very important element of another type of 
complementarity: international-domestic. 
In his analysis of the issue of sovereignty at the beginning of the 21
st
 century New 
Zealand Supreme Court and International Court of Justice (ICJ) Judge Sir Ken Keith 
asked: ‗Can we sensibly think of states being sovereign in relation to one another? Does 
not the standard meaning of sovereignty incorporate within it supremacy, of ruling over 
or from above? How does that fit with the coexistence and cooperation of 191 or more 
states in the world community?‘ (Keith, 2004: 595). He noted that the UN Charter: 
‗does not include State sovereignty within its purposes and principles. Rather its first 
principle is that the organisation is based on the principle of sovereign equality of all its 
members‘ (Keith, 2004: 596), and goes on to describe the elements of this equality 
found in UN General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV).
40
 He then reflected: ‗That text 
incorporates real tensions. It is a text prepared through a testing political-legal 
diplomatic process which required wording acceptable to all United Nations members‘ 
(Keith, 2004: 596). Although this is not an easy ongoing issue in international law, it 
                                                 
37 This rule also relates to the Optional Protocol route discussed more fully in Section 2.3. An individual is only able to make a 
complaint to a UN treaty body committee using this mechanism after they have tried to have the matter dealt with at the national 
level. See UN General Comment No. 9 on the exhaustion of domestic remedies (UNCESCR 1998). 
38 See, however, Henkin (1995: 31) who suggested deconstructing the concept of state sovereignty altogether. He did not believe it 
was a useful concept and felt that it was ‗a mistake built upon mistakes‘, which in his view had caused it to be ‗a barrier to 
international governance, to the growth of international law, and to the realization of human values‘.  
39 For a discussion on the impact of an increasingly globalised economy on state sovereignty see Kobin (1997). 
40 The elements include: ‗(a) States are juridically equal; (b) Each State enjoys the rights inherent in full sovereignty; (c) Each State 
has the duty to respect the personality of other States; (d) The territorial integrity and political independence of the State are 
inviolable; (e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social, economic and cultural systems; (f) Each 
State has the duty to comply fully and in good faith with its international obligations and to live in peace with other states‘ (Keith, 
2004: 596). 
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can be said that the international human rights framework has been one of the factors 
causing a major reconceptualisation of the nature of the state in the international and 
domestic orders, and this thesis is a sub-set of that. 
The above authors gave a broad brushstroke about international human rights and issues 
of state sovereignty generally, but this research also relates to the sub-field of the 
domestic transfer of these rights. That is, this thesis is looking at the more effective 
implementation of ratified treaty rights that enter New Zealand‘s legal/policy 
framework via obligations set out in the covenants that have been signed. This look at 
the domestic transfer of international human rights leads to a public policy connection 
because laws in New Zealand are of course underpinned by government policies.  
There are many aspects to this transfer including the way states are affected by and 
monitored in this area (see Clark, 2000), enforcing these rights through national courts 
(see Francioni and Conforti, 1997), and the problems of aligning international and 
domestic law (see Kirby, 1997). These authors showed that the transfer of international 
rights into domestic law is not straightforward: it is definitely pervasive in any national 
legal system, it can be taken more or less seriously by the judiciary in each state, and 
tensions can result at the national court level from the increasing interpretive use of 
international treaties in domestic decision-making. Roger Clark, for instance, showed 
that international law has multiple effects on the state.
41
 This is a good point because, 
like a domino effect, once a country ratifies a new human rights treaty the impact on the 
domestic sphere is manifold and far-reaching at every level. This is an area in which 
this thesis adds to the field, by using the Baigent and military justice system case studies 
to illustrate the domino-like penetration of ICCPR obligations into the New Zealand 
state sector.  
The issue of enforcing rights in national courts is explored by Italian legal academics 
Francesco Francioni and Benedetto Conforti. They looked at what is happening in a 
number of countries, and the peculiarities of the legal system in each of these states 
mean they face different problems in implementing international obligations through the 
courts. This text assessed the common obstacles and then suggests different judicial 
                                                 
41 Roger Clark, a New Zealander based at Rutgers University, is a leading writer in the field of international law and criminal law. 
He stated that in signing multilateral human rights treaties countries come under some sort of supervisory or monitoring system, 
which will cause changes in administrative practice as they try to comply with obligations. The legal systems of states are also 
expected to take into account major treaties in domestic law-making (Clark, 2000: 185-186).  
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models that could iron out these issues. They looked at the jurisprudence of 
international human rights enforcement through various national courts and noted the 
several methods available to them to effectively enforce these rights.
42
 However, despite 
all these options these authors had grave concerns about the obstacles to effective 
implementation that can occur at the national level, such as the inefficiency of the 
judicial machinery and the old-fashioned attitudes of some judges in certain countries to 
human rights obligations (Francioni and Conforti, 1997: 33-34). In their view: ‗The 
hiatus between the international recognition of rights and their actual implementation by 
domestic courts, and by public organs generally, is still one of the most disturbing 
aspects of the international effort to ensure respect for human dignity‘ (Francioni and 
Conforti, 1997: 15). Their findings confirm the view put forward earlier that the 
law+litigation formula is never enough i.e. that there is obviously no simple equation of 
‗treaty ratification = improved human rights‘. The complementarity model is suggested 
in this research which links the legal and policy fields to more effectively implement 
ratified rights.  
Justice Michael Kirby is another author who had explored international-domestic law 
alignment.
43
 In a penetrating article on the domestic implementation of international 
human rights he looked at the ever-increasing reconciliation between international and 
domestic law and the challenges this places the courts under. He discussed the line 
between providing robust enough recognition of ratified treaty rights in domestic law 
and what he saw was the unwise use of international treaties to affect domestic 
decision-making. Justice Kirby believed that in Australia: ‗litigants and lawyers are 
turning to international law in the quest for a peg on which to hang arguments designed 
to persuade Australian courts that part of international jurisprudence has been, or should 
be, incorporated by judicial decision‘ (Kirby, 1997: 2). He was also concerned that 
laypeople ‗commonly expect international law to override domestic law and to be 
capable of doing more than ordinarily it can‘ (Kirby, 1997: 5). The first case study on 
                                                 
42 These methods include: ‗… constitutional provisions or principles of national jurisprudence requiring the application of 
customary international law in domestic litigations; the technique of incorporation or direct application of international treaties; the 
various interpretative devices, such as the presumption of conformity of national law with treaties in force, and sometimes even the 
supremacy of international law over inconsistent domestic law‘ (Francioni and Conforti, 1997: 17). The Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights also provided a manual to assist judges in interpreting international human rights law (OHCHR, 
2003).  
43 Justice Kirby is a former Australian High Court judge and chairperson of the Australian Law Reform Commission, with 
considerable experience in the international human rights field, for example as Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Cambodia.  
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Baigent will show that international law such as the ICCPR can be used as a lever to 
alter domestic law on behalf of individuals. 
A further sub-field is that of human rights history and theory and there is a large 
literature in this area. This sub-field is mentioned briefly just to note the historical and 
theoretical underpinnings of the modern post-World War II human rights system. 
Leading authors in the area are human rights historian Paul Lauren (1997, 1998, 2003) 
and human rights theorist Jack Donnelly (2003, 2007).
44
 Lauren‘s work showed, for 
example, that concerns about human rights and how to put in place societal rules around 
them is not a recent phenomenon. He started by looking at the human rights principles 
underlying all the major religions of the world, thus tracing the human rights tradition 
back thousands of years, and examined the views of a number of philosophers including 
non-Western cultures (Lauren, 2003: 5-10, 10-21). It is from this very long historical 
perspective that he then discussed the 20
th
 century human rights movement, particularly 
the UN Charter and the UDHR. He also analysed current issues such as globalisation, 




Jack Donnelly‘s (2007) general international human rights theory text examined the 
evolution of international human rights regimes, links with foreign policy, case studies 
on state violations, genocide, terrorism and globalisation. He had earlier authored a 
more specific text on universal human rights which examined many of the primary 
themes in this area: the concept of human rights and their foundations, how they work 
and how they link with human nature, different types of rights (from individual rights to 
state rights), as well as looking at how rights have traditionally been aligned with liberal 
democratic welfare states and how they fit with market economies (Donnelly, 2003: 7-
21, 22-37, 57-69). As the title suggests, one of the broad themes of the text is the 
universality vs cultural relativity debate (Donnelly, 2003: 37-58).
46
 However, this 
                                                 
44 Lauren‘s major 2003 text on the evolution of international human rights was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize. 
45 See also New Zealand work in this area such as: MFAT (2003: Chapter 1) on the nature and history of human rights; and 
Marshall on the historical emergence of human rights, and a very useful section which precedes this on semantic and conceptual 
problems with the term ‗rights‘ (Marshall, 2001: 27-30).  
46 Conde gave useful definitions of these terms. Universality: ‗A doctrine/theory that says all human rights are held by all persons 
in all states and societies regardless of race, color, nationality, religion, language, or ethnic traits and must be applied and interpreted 
in the same way in all states and regions, regardless of the legal system or political ideology‘. Universality is often set in 
counterpoint to those who believe in cultural relativism: ‗A theory that holds that all human rights must be looked at, applied, and 
interpreted according to different cultures and cultural values. … [and] is raised as a defense mostly by developing and third-world 
countries who claim that the international human rights regime must be applied relative to a given culture, whose actions would be a 
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debate (or any of these theoretical human rights issues just mentioned) is not the focus 
of this research, except to briefly say that it remains one of the most contentious issues 
in human rights theory.
47
 Domestic implementation occurs broadly against the 
background of this history and theory, but the concern in this thesis is with the more 
specific processes and mechanisms of New Zealand‘s international human rights and 
how they could be improved to more effectively implement ratified rights. 
The study is also about taking a fresh look at the field, acknowledging that the 
law+litigation area has been well canvassed, but exploring how a public policy 
approach might be complementary to this. Examining this area from a non-legal 
perspective should help clarify the processes of how international rights are not only 
formally adopted in treaties, but how they are transformed in the domestic arena. Much 
of the research in the international human rights field emanates from legal academics. 
This also true in New Zealand, and some of the key authors writing about the juncture 
of international-domestic human rights are Andrew and Petra Butler (2005), Grant 
Huscroft and Paul Rishworth (Huscroft and Rishworth, 1995; Rishworth, 2003, 2004) 
and Philip Joseph (2007). They have all written extensively about the implementation of 
NZBORA 1990 (with its long title link to the ICCPR) through the domestic courts. 
When the Act had been in place for five years Huscroft and Rishworth (1995) edited a 
volume on both NZBORA and the Human Rights Act. Many questions had been raised 
by the new Act as legislators and the judiciary found themselves in an increasing rights 
environment. Their volume clarified both the larger relationship between international 
and domestic law and gave a detailed examination of how the two Acts have affected 
New Zealand law. Comparative analyses were also made with other jurisdictions. 
Butler and Butler (2005), writing 15 years after the enactment of NZBORA, provided 
the largest and closest textual legal analysis of the Act. A large part of their commentary 
looked at substantive rights contained in the Act and the remedies available under it. 
They particularly looked at the issue of the justified limits on these guaranteed rights, 
and also made detailed comparisons between this Act and similar provisions in other 
                                                                                                                                               
violation in one culture but not in another‘ (Conde, 2004: 268, 55-56). See also Sajo (2004), which examined universalism and a 
number of other related issues such as localism and paternalism. 
47 For example some extreme cultural relativists argue for the ‗right‘ to preserve practices such as female infanticide and arranged 
marriages despite lists of universal human rights such as the UDHR which asserted the right to life and the right to marry freely. The 
language of a ‗right to cultural differences‘ is therefore used as a counter-argument to the rights that have been identified in the 
West as acceptable. There is a vast literature on the tensions caused by this debate including Steiner, Alston and Goodman (2008: 
Chapter 5), Lauren (2003: 216, 226, 263-264, 285, 298), Marshall (2001: 35-42) and Leiser and Campbell (2001: 87-104; 285-302). 
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jurisdictions. The more recent text by Joseph (2007), which focused on constitutional 
and administrative law in New Zealand, contained a final chapter on NZBORA. He also 
looked at similar themes: the application of the Act, justified limitations, the impact of 
various bills of rights cases, the link with international standards, and the remedies 
available. 
The case studies in this thesis take a slightly different approach to these authors. The 
research into this area is not legal analysis, but an illustration of how Baigent‘s Case 
and the review of the military justice system affected the state sector in different ways. 
That is, this research is looking at the public policy and human rights implications that 
sit behind the legal issues these authors focus on. In both case studies NZBORA was 
being looked at in conjunction with the ICCPR and it was their combined effect on New 
Zealand domestic jurisprudence – one questioning sufficient remedies and the other 
highlighting international-domestic law inconsistencies – that resulted in changes to law 
and policy.  
The second broad field of public policy seeks essentially to provide theory and practice 
about how governments might achieve their objectives. Since the implementation of 
human rights is one such objective, it follows that there should be considerable room to 
learn from public policy literature. Here it is noted the definitions of public policy given 
by UK author Wayne Parsons (1995), as well as New Zealand academics Richard Shaw 
and Chris Eichbaum (2005), are used to help analyse the similarities and differences 
between human rights and public policy. Parsons for instance said public policy is 
broadly about ‗the public and its problems‘ (1995: xv). The implementation in this area 
is as much about the way government ‗works‘ to deal with the public and its problems 
as it is about human rights. It highlights that government works across a wider area than 
just law+litigation.  
It is true that, in the practical operation of government, boundaries might be continually 
contested concerning the intrusion of the state into the rights of citizens. But sometimes 
those rights demand state action, not inaction. This is, of course, mirrored in the role of 
international human rights bodies who are also contesting the parameters of intrusion or 
not into the sphere of state sovereignty. The notion of parameters to intrusion is part of 
the classic first generation protective rights, e.g. search and seizure, which are about the 
government passively not intruding into the personal space of citizens. What this 
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research suggests is that governments need to actively implement second generation 
rights, i.e. have a positive obligation to citizens, but these rights are not about intrusion 
but about provision (resources permitting). This proactive role of governance requires 
different techniques, often away from the law+litigation model. Effective regional 
healthcare, for instance, might occur through a range of policies and practices and not 
primarily through legislation. 
Throughout the thesis three links are made to the policy literature: 
 
 The first is about suggesting that the growing international attention to whole-of 
government approaches would be helpful for more effective human rights 
implementation domestically. In New Zealand this is reflected in the joined-up 
government work of Ryan et al (2008) and the coordinated state agencies work 
of the State Services Commission (2004, 2008). As yet explicit connections to 
human rights in this literature cannot be found, and this is an area of potential 
further development.  
 The second is looking at the literature that does exist (e.g. Geiringer and Palmer, 
2007) on human rights and ‗social policy‘ in New Zealand.48 Their article seems 
to be one of the few attempts to tackle the linkage between these fields, although 
it is about a rights-based approach to social policy (not public policy generally) 
and therefore mostly focuses on more precisely defining New Zealand‘s 
obligations in relation to economic and social rights. On reflection it is not 
surprising that there is no strong link between say public policy generally and 
civil and political rights, as the latter are broadly protected in legislation. Also if 
the human rights field potentially has different relationships to ‗social policy‘ 
and ‗public policy‘, this suggests there is room for there also to be unique 
relationships between human rights and other types of policy: defence policy, 
economic policy, education policy, foreign policy, health policy, housing policy, 
macro-economic policy, population policy and privacy policy. This research is 
                                                 
48 This article is a ‗revised and abbreviated version‘ of a 2003 issues paper by these authors that had been commissioned by the 
HRC (see Geiringer and Palmer, 2003). They defined social policy as ‗the principles and mechanisms by which government seems 
to affect the development of society, particularly in relation to health, education and welfare‘ (hence their emphasis is on second 
generation rights), and a rights-based approach to policy as ‗one that ensures that policy is formulated within the parameters set by 
New Zealand‘s human rights obligations, as found in domestic and international law‘ (Geiringer and Palmer, 2007: 15). A similar 
UK article written in the same year looks at re-thinking the engagement between social policy and human rights, and also had this 
focus on how second generation rights can be implemented more effectively (Dean, 2007: 1-2).  
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about trying to make links between public policy and human rights, because the 
several issues that will be raised later in the thesis at the beginning of Chapter 4 
relate to public policy and the implementation of New Zealand‘s human rights 
system and not social policy which (as Geiringer and Palmer noted) mainly 
relates to health, education and welfare.  
 The third is a synthesising exercise, drawing together all the brief mentions of 
public policy/work of policy makers in the evaluation and planning 
initiatives/documents set out in Table 4 (see Section 4.2). This has enabled a 
clearer picture to be gained of the relationship between public policy and human 
rights. Policy work is important in the human rights field because ‗done well‘ 
(i.e. robustly) it takes the international treaty obligations and looks wider than 
their incorporation into law and at all the possibilities that could be relevant to a 
particular treaty right. Also, done well policy making come to grips with the 
obligations of states to citizens, but if this role is compartmentalised instead of 
being thoroughly integrated with the law+litigation approach it adversely affects 
the effective implementation of rights. 
This research therefore adds to this literature base in a number of ways. It echoes the 
human rights history field by suggesting that the development of the sixth stage of 
robust human rights governance is not the end of this history, but that it will evolve and 
continue over time as new challenges arise. The thesis further adds to the literature 
above by: developing the notion of robust human rights governance (if fully functioning 
it would give appropriate weight to policy and legal approaches); and suggesting there 
can be differing reactive and proactive approaches – which can be policy or legal – to 
human rights issues (with case studies to support this). The concept of complementarity 
is intended to be the core addition to the field, and it is hoped it will produce some 
useful insights for both areas. The broad thematic sweep is therefore that with ‗best 
practice‘ the implementation of human rights tends towards a more whole-of-
government way of operating where policy approaches work alongside law+litigation, 
and where international and domestic become increasingly ‗interwoven‘. These 




This thesis explores how international human rights obligations have been given effect 
in the New Zealand state sector. This research looks at how human rights considerations 
are becoming central to domestic and international policy making and government 
generally, and how this has steadily impacted on the state-citizen relationship. There is 
no single beginning (or end) to this process. However, for the purposes of this research, 
the UN Charter 1945 can be taken as commencing the current system for international 
protection of human rights, with New Zealand amongst the founding members. Other 
developments quickly followed internationally with the UN General Assembly‘s 1948 
UDHR leading the way towards the current international human rights architecture. 
New Zealand‘s acceptance of the obligations of the resulting human rights covenants 
and conventions began the interaction that is the essence of the complementarity 
process. Since New Zealand helped form the international system, its own domestic 
environment was welcoming for human rights implementation. Yet even in this country 
there has been a considerable learning process. This chapter has started to look at the 
convergence between the law+litigation and policy approaches, and this will clarify 
throughout the research. Before going further it is necessary in the next chapter to 
clarify the key contexts applicable to this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2: KEY CONTEXTS 
 
The processes of giving domestic effect to international human rights obligations take 
place in the real world of states with their own histories and traditions. The concept 
identified as complementarity has unique features reflecting historical and constitutional 
contexts. This includes the inter-relationship between international human rights and 
public policy, which should enrich the theory and practice in both areas. All this must 
be understood within the historical context of this country as it relates to human rights, 
which is therefore outlined here. Much of what is in the research, however, is not New 
Zealand-specific – the ideas of complementarity and effectiveness are not limited to one 
country. This chapter starts with New Zealand‘s constitutional framework as this is 
relevant to understanding the domestic scene.  
2.1 Constitutional framework, Westminster parliamentary 
tradition and rights 
Giving effect to international obligations, especially if these involve basic rights, by 
definition involves constitutional issues. The processes involve direct limitations on 
state power, direct obligations for how state power must be used, and the entire 
operation of the international legal and political system in which states function. All this 
is well discussed in the general literature on states in international law and in domestic 
constitutional law in various jurisdictions. The parallel in the New Zealand experience, 
even accepting its differences, can be seen in key texts (Butler and Butler, 2005; 
Huscroft and Rishworth, 1995; Rishworth, 2003; Joseph, 2007). For the purposes of this 
research the focus is on the interaction with international obligations and on how the 
state has actually worked (and should operate) to foster complementarity. Examining 
these processes requires a brief explanation of the formal processes by which New 
Zealand governments ‗accept‘ international obligations, and some of the background to 
this country‘s constitutional framework. 
Giving domestic effect to international obligations typically happens via two primary 
mechanisms: legislating the obligations into domestic law; and government 
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consideration of policies and practices for better ‗implementation‘. As will become 
clear the first is foundational and well examined (for instance in the key texts just 
mentioned), but the second of government policies and practices is less so. As regards 
legislating, there is no automatic uptake of UN instruments into New Zealand‘s 
domestic legislation. In some countries, however, treaties automatically become part of 
domestic law once ratified.  
An example of this automatic incorporation into domestic legislation is South Korea 
where under Article 6(1) of the Republic of Korea Constitution ‗generally recognised 
international law‘ has the same effect as the domestic laws of that country (NZ House 
of Representatives, 2005: 55). On the other hand in New Zealand ‗treaty-based 
international law only becomes part of the domestic law by an Act of Parliament‘ (New 
Zealand House of Representatives, 2005: 56). Martin Scheinin called the Korean-type 
approach ‗a treaty-specific incorporating statute‘ as opposed to the Swedish situation 
(similar to New Zealand), which is a ‗transformation‘ instead of an ‗incorporation‘ 
method‘, and the transformation occurs by amending domestic legislation in line with 
treaty obligations (Scheinin, 2001: 49, 50). Elisabeth Eid names the Korean-type 
approach ‗self-executing‘ and noted that in Commonwealth countries (e.g. New 
Zealand, Australia, Canada and the UK) there is no automatic uptake of international 
treaty obligations through the domestic courts and that a dualist incorporation process 
occurs. This dualist approach is where international human rights treaties ‗do not form 
part of domestic law but serve as an important interpretive tool for domestic legislation‘ 
(Eid, 2001: 2-3, 10). That is, they sit to the side of domestic law as a powerful 
interpretive influence that judges must consider. 
As noted in the last paragraph, the formal legal position in New Zealand is that treaty-
based international law only becomes part of the domestic law if implemented by an 
Act of Parliament. However, there are four related areas in which treaty-based 
provisions might have some domestic effect even without incorporation in a statute. 
First, the common law presumption that Parliament does not intend to legislate contrary 
to its international obligations so courts interpret legislation to give effect to the treaty 
obligations if that is plausible. Secondly, courts can respond to explicit adoptions of 
international treaty obligations by expanding the judicial scope in relevant cases. This 
was one of the reasons for the court‘s adoption of a damages remedy in Baigent, but 
NZBORA explicitly stated anyway that one of its objectives was to give effect to the 
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obligations under the ICCPR.
49
 Thirdly, it has always been part of the common law, that 
‗customary international law‘ is part of the common law and given effect to in domestic 
courts.  
Fourthly, and of key importance for this thesis, the same presumptions of intention to 
comply with international obligations (as the comments from the Minister of Justice that 
opened this thesis illustrate) increasingly operate in relation to the public sector. For 
example, even for a non-treaty standard, such as the United Nations Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the Corrections Department must not breach these 
irrespective of whether these have any domestic statutory base. Similarly, irrespective 
of whether NZBORA had been in effect, it is arguable that changes to the military 
justice system (in Chapter 8) should have been made to comply with the obligations 
under the ICCPR. The critical difference from the other three examples, however, is that 
administrative policy and implementation could take place without having to be 
litigated in a court. The combination of progressive legal and administrative ‗effect‘ in 
New Zealand law and policy therefore stems from the same expectation: that the 
Crown‘s acceptance of international law obligations requires not only courts, but all 
organs of state, to give effect to the obligations if possible. In this thesis, the focus is on 
the public sector, but as acknowledged, the legal issues are interconnected. 
As noted by the Minister of Justice, Simon Power, at the NZ Diversity Forum 09, New 
Zealand takes a very cautious approach and ratification only occurs once domestic 
legislation, at least, complies with the international treaty in question:  
… unless we are able to fully back it and do it with integrity in a domestic setting [we 
do not sign them. This involves making] the hard calls at home to be fully compliant, 
compared with some other member states that approach ratification from a slightly 
different tack (Power, 2009).  
                                                 
49 In Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 1 NZLR 257 (about an Immigration Service removal order), the court expressed 
similar sentiments that might be said to have anticipated these developments, but without any specificity in that particular case. In 
Tavita the Court looked at whether the Minister of Immigration should have taken account of the ICCPR and UNCROC (as there 
was a child involved) in making the removal decision. The Court noted in this request for judicial review that: ‗since New Zealand‘s 
accession to the Optional Protocol the United Nations Human Rights Committee is in a sense part of this country‘s judicial 
structure, in that individuals subject to New Zealand jurisdiction have direct rights of recourse to it. A failure to give practical effect 
to international instruments to which New Zealand is a party may attract criticism. Legitimate criticism could extend to the New 
Zealand Courts if they were to accept the argument that, because a domestic statute giving discretionary powers in general terms 
does not mention international human rights norms or obligations, the executive is necessarily free to ignore them. This emerges as 
a case of possibly far-reaching implications. … Universal human rights and international obligations are involved‘.  
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Diplomatically, he was drawing attention to the varied record of effective 
implementation of international obligations throughout the world. One might surmise 
that policies and practices should automatically fall into line with the law, on the 
assumption that the rule of law functions as theory suggests. But even in this country, 
more is needed for effective implementation.  
All states have their own traditions and these inevitably affect the processes by which 
international obligations become part of domestic law and practice. In New Zealand‘s 
case, it is necessary to understand the historical role of Parliament in protecting rights, 
initially against the monarchy, because this history has continued to shape how this 
country has given effect to its international obligations. There are two aspects to the 
Westminster tradition as it developed in New Zealand. The first concerns who is seen in 
the monarchy/parliament/court triangle to be the principal defender of citizen‘s rights. 
Following this, the second explains why parliamentary-based protection has been relied 
upon instead of an entrenched bill of rights in this country.  
The relationship between Parliament, its legislation and the courts is discussed in this 
research, particularly in the Baigent case study. This relationship links historically to the 
1215 Magna Carta and the 1689 English Bill of Rights, elements of which are still part 
of this country‘s law. New Zealand‘s second periodic ICCPR report to the UN Human 
Rights Committee in 1990 for instance stated that fundamental statutes from UK law 
such as the Magna Carta continue ‗to control important aspects of the relationship 
between individuals and the state‘ (MFAT, 1990: 3). The Magna Carta ensured the king 
could not arbitrarily imprison people or deprive them of property, and the 1689 English 
Bill of Rights also asserted that the monarch could not interfere with the law, establish 
new courts or act as a judge, impose taxes by royal prerogative, or impede free speech 
or proceedings in Parliament. Over centuries in England, Parliament took on the mantle 
of defender of the people against the monarchy – and the settler governments in New 
Zealand picked up this tradition (Joseph, 2007: 3). 
This role is not, however, static or unending. For instance Sir Geoffrey Palmer in 
Unbridled Power argued that in New Zealand, Parliament had in the late 1970s become 
too powerful. In the doctrine of the separation of powers the legislature, executive and 
judiciary form three branches of government that are supposed to be separate. He 
argued that ‗in New Zealand the Government in office effectively controls both the 
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legislative and executive branches‘ (Palmer, 1979: 5). This was originally written prior 
to the introduction of NZBORA and MMP – a bill of rights and a different electoral 
system both being suggestions he had made in that book to redress this concentration of 
power. The doctrine of the separation of powers is meant to act as a checks and balances 
system. Another feature of the parliamentary tradition is summed up by the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty, which in essence means the courts cannot override Acts of 
Parliament. This ‗parliamentary supremacy‘ also helps explain the status of NZBORA 
in New Zealand constitutional law as an ordinary Act of Parliament that can be 
amended by any other Act, rather than as ‗supreme law‘ which ordinary Acts have to 
comply with. 
The parliamentary tradition is so strong in New Zealand that despite fears of the 
parliamentary dominance suggested in Unbridled Power, there appeared to be little 
public (or parliamentary) support in New Zealand for an entrenched bill of rights when 
the opportunity arose. The debate heightened in this area in the mid-1980s, and a White 
Paper was finally written with the help of the Legislation Advisory Committee 
(Department of Justice, 1985).
50
 Canada, South Africa and the USA have entrenched 
bills of rights but three Westminster system countries (New Zealand, the UK and 
Australia) do not. Instead the first two now have unentrenched legislative bills of rights. 
Australia has none at the national level, although the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
and Victoria have unentrenched legislative bills of rights similar to the New Zealand 
model. So why did New Zealand steer away from an entrenched bill? Despite pressure 
from the UN treaty body committees over several reporting cycles, one reason was that 
the historical traditions of ‗faith in Parliament‘ were too strong. Successive New 
Zealand reports therefore argued that human rights were sufficiently protected 
legislatively and in other ways within this country‘s constitutional traditions. The 
second periodic ICCPR report for instance stated: ‗Human rights continue to be 
afforded protection by the long established and well entrenched precepts of the common 
law and by legislation‘ (MFAT, 1990: 3).  
Another reason relates to the Treaty of Waitangi and the need for its careful placement 
in any new constitutional framework. Butler and Butler have written about the 
                                                 
50 For a discussion on the White Paper and the events leading up to the enactment of NZBORA see Butler and Butler (2005: 25-
33). 
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arguments for and against an entrenched bill of rights and what factors needed to be 
taken into account. They noted that Matthew Palmer had asserted at the time (1985) that 
the Treaty would need to become part of the proposed entrenchment, because if not 
included ‗a bill of rights could be seen as relegating the Treaty and the rights of the 
Maori under it to a second class status‘ (Butler and Butler, 2005: 27). The NZ 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee that reviewed the issue of the balance of 
powers in 2005 also noted the Treaty and its constitutional importance: ‗it became clear 
to us that a core issue at the heart of New Zealand‘s constitution was the balance of 
authority between the judicial and legislative branches of government and the authority 
of Parliament in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi‘ (NZ Constitutional Arrangements 
Committee, 2005: 15). In their view one of the key questions to be asked in the future 
was about the relationship between the three branches of government, and whether 
courts could override legislation if fundamental rights were breached (the very issue at 
the heart of the balance of powers discussion). Another issue they believed could be 
further explored was ‗… the relationship between New Zealand institutions of 
government and international law-making bodies, including questions about the way in 
which the government can enter into international commitments; and whether 
international laws can become part of the New Zealand domestic law directly, without 
parliamentary involvement‘ (NZ Constitutional Arrangements Committee, 2005: 16). 
These comments stress the importance of a balanced constitution, and as these issues 
are not fixed for all time there will of course be ongoing discussion about the 
appropriate balance. 
However, five years after that 1990 report a deeper reason was given to the UN Human 
Rights Committee about not going down the entrenchment route. By the time of the 
third periodic ICCPR report in 1995 the committee was still concerned that NZBORA 
‗has no higher status than ordinary legislation‘ (MFAT, 1995: 69). The reason given by 
the New Zealand delegation back to the committee was that after five years of debate on 
the subject it was decided that ‗New Zealand was not ready for an entrenched Bill of 
Rights‘ (MFAT, 1995: 39). Public opinion was wary of entrenchment because of the 
possible redistribution of power from elected representatives to an appointed judiciary. 
In the final analysis it was fear of ‗judicial supremacy‘, not parliamentary dominance, 
which shaped the New Zealand approach i.e. there was insufficient support for 
overturning the historical balance of power between Parliament and the courts. 
Although raised at times throughout the research, this theme of ‗judicial 
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supremacy‘ (sometimes termed judicial activism or juristocracy or the power of the 




Having seen that various countries approach ratification in their own way, it is also the 
case that implementation in each country occurs in a national context. Each state has its 
own ideological underpinning (liberalism, socialism, fascism etc), which can be more or 
less ‗receptive‘ to the human rights endeavour. Human rights theorist Jack Donnelly 
captures this well when he stated the link between liberalism and human rights and its 
relationship to their effective implementation: 
The idea of human rights received its first mature expression in, and remains deeply 
enmeshed with, liberal social contract theory, the only major tradition of political 
theory that assumes that individuals are endowed with equal and inalienable rights. And 
the contractarian notion of the state as an instrument for the protection, implementation, 
and effective realization of natural rights is strikingly similar to the conception of the 
state in international human rights instruments. Both measure the legitimacy of the state 
largely by its performance in implementing human rights (Donnelly, 2003: 35). 
The New Zealand state has been particularly receptive to human rights for some 
decades. The domestic political culture and a public philosophy here at the time of the 
UN Charter 1945 may not have articulated such concepts in terms of formal human 
rights laws, but clearly the concepts were reasonably well formed. In this way key 
policy and legislative changes affecting what later became basic rights were evidenced 
well before the international human rights framework had begun to influence New 
Zealand in the 1940s. By the period where this research picks up (the mid-1940s), this 
country already had a tremendous base upon which to build its framework i.e. it was 
steering in that direction of its own accord. Many historical struggles and social 
dynamics have generated rights demands in New Zealand. These have included that 
economic and social rights were hard won in this country and advancements had been 
made well before the efforts of Prime Minister Walter Nash at the 1944 ILO Conference 
in Philadelphia, and Prime Minister Peter Fraser at both the UN Conference in San 
Francisco in 1945 and discussions about the UDHR in 1948. For instance, universal free 
education was introduced in 1877, and the Old Age Pensions Act passed in 1898. The 
                                                 
51 See for instance: Butler (2004) which looked at whether the Court of Appeal has been activist in its decisions about human 
rights; Thomas (2005) about judicial activism in relation to human rights and judicial constraints on judges; Kirby (2005), a defence 
of the judiciary against charges of activism; Arnold (2005) which also claimed that judicial activism is misconceived; Waldron 
(2005), a response to the Hon Michael Cullen‘s comments on the role of the judiciary; and Allan and Geddis (2006) which 
responded to Waldron‘s article and made comparative comments about the Westminster and USA systems.  
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1935 Labour Government also began work on a comprehensive social welfare system 
coupled with increased labour standards (MFAT, 2008: 12; UNGA, 2009a: 4).  
Other rights issues have included controversy about participation in the Vietnam War in 
the 1960s and 1970s, and the effect this was having on the social and economic rights of 
civilians. Further controversy arose about sporting contacts with South Africa, 
especially around the time of the 1981 Springbok Tour. Sanctions were carried out by 
the UN and the Commonwealth towards South Africa and the former Rhodesia over this 
issue. There has also been vocal opposition to French nuclear weapons testing, with the 
sinking of the Greenpeace ship The Rainbow Warrior in Auckland in 1985 as one 
chapter in this history. Again, in the late 1970s and early 1980s there was growing 
concern about the abuse of central executive power during the office of Prime Minister 
Robert Muldoon.
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 Other areas also gained high profile and the list in Table 3 of 
human-rights related legislation (see Section 4.2) gives a glimpse of the important 
issues developing in this period and through to the 1990s: civil liberties; privacy; gender 
and same sex rights, including equal pay; disability rights, parental leave, abolition of 
the death penalty, children‘s rights, domestic violence. Other concerns have been the 
effects of state deregulation and privatisation; increasing economic and social 
inequalities; and environmental rights. 
New Zealand, then, is a country with a long and varied rights history that has shaped its 
own unique national human rights context. However, not only the national context, but 
the type of government and constitutional arrangements, can result in different levels of 
complexity in terms of implementation. For instance New Zealand (with a unicameral 
parliament and an unentrenched legislative bill of rights) has fewer factors involved 
than other common law states such as Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA. Each of 
these countries has different constitutional factors in the mix, including bi-cameral 
parliaments, entrenched constitutions, internal federal state systems, and ratification of 
more or less enforceable regional human rights treaties. The UK for instance now has a 
very complicated human rights constitutional framework with four factors involved. 
Like New Zealand there is an unentrenched UK Human Rights Act 1998, which was 
partly modelled on NZBORA. However, there is a bicameral Parliament so all Bills 
have to pass through both an upper and a lower house. A further layer is the close 
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See, for example, Unbridled Power (Palmer, 1979).
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alignment between UK human rights domestic law and the European Convention on 
Human Rights that came into effect in 1953. This is an enforceable regional treaty that 
is overseen by the Council of Europe based in Strasbourg. The Council also administers 
the full-time European Court of Human Rights. The UK ratified the convention in 1998 
and it was incorporated into British law almost completely. Jonathan Black-Branch, an 
international and comparative law professor who has recently visited New Zealand 
believed the UK Human Rights Act 1998 is in effect the European Convention on 
Human Rights plus two modifications (Black-Branch, 2009). This means that if UK 
citizens exhaust remedies in that country they can appeal further to the European Court 
of Human Rights. This set-up makes for an extremely complex human rights framework 
in the UK, a situation that is likely to be replicated in other countries if they directly 
incorporate enforceable regional treaties into domestic legislation. 
Federal systems and regional organisations have layers of rules and laws that can make 
implementation more complex. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to look into this, but 
comparative research could produce rich insights about how the type of government and 
constitutional arrangements affects how difficult or easy it is to implement international 
treaty obligations. The literature on this appears to be quite sparse, although it is worth 
consulting papers by Elisabeth Eid (2001), a Senior Counsel in Human Rights Law with 
the Canadian Department of Justice, and USA doctoral students Caroline Payne and 
Kaitlyn Sill (2008). Eid noted that international treaty ratification normally only occurs 
if the Canadian provinces and territories support this. She believed the Canadian system 
is therefore ‗one of the most difficult places in the world‘ to implement these treaties, 
partly because of this system of federalism and other constitutional factors (Eid, 2001: 
2-3). The exploratory paper written by Payne and Sill looked at constitutional 
implications from a slightly different angle. They isolate three domestic constitutional 
factors – constitutional supremacy clauses, judicial independence, and the separation of 
legislative and interpretation powers – to see if any of these result in a state having more 
respect for the rights of their citizens and not (as this research is suggesting) their effect 
on the implementation of ratified treaty rights (Payne and Sill, 2008: 4). Their 
preliminary findings were that while the last two fail to have any significant impact, the 
first factor is important because with a constitutional supremacy clause ‗… the 
government cannot simply nullify or circumvent them through its traditional law-
making actions‘ (Payne and Sill, 2008: 7). This, they felt, is particularly important when 
a country goes through a regime change. Research such as this confirms an earlier 
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point made that the uptake of human rights occurs in a different context in each country. 
It is not a simple equation that ‗treaty ratification = improved human rights‘. Payne and 
Sill suggested that further study was necessary to look at the effect of these three 
constitutional factors more carefully (Payne and Sill, 2008: 22-23).
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Having noted these comments about the Canadian system, it also the case that the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) is almost identical in wording to 
NZBORA. Butler and Butler stated that the relevance of: ‗the Canadian Charter … to 
BORA is clear. Much of the drafting of the proposed supreme law Bill of Rights in 
1985 was based on the provisions of the Canadian Charter, while the accompanying 
commentary drew significantly on the experience in Canada …‘ (Butler and Butler 
(2005: xi).  
 A final clarification is that the focus on implementation of human rights standards takes 
as given some very basic aspects of constitutional governance, including criminal law-
punishment and the all-encompassing concept of the rule of law. Thus, it will be 
obvious that in the development of the common law alongside democratic government 
over the centuries, some aspects that relate to protecting-implementing human rights 
were shaped by the criminal law and associated judicial procedures. For example 
criminalising homicide is one aspect of protecting the right to life. Similarly, the writ of 
habeas corpus (and the enforcement aspects of contempt of court) is a judicial 
procedural protection of the right to liberty (no detention without lawful cause). Jack 
Donnelly (2003: 34) made a related point that: ‗This focus on state-citizen relations is 
also embedded in our ordinary language. The human rights of a person who is beaten by 
the police have been violated, but it is an ordinary crime, not a human right violation, to 
receive an otherwise identical beating at the hands of a thief or an irascible neighbour‘. 
At its most general, however, it can be argued that the development of the rule of law 
across centuries has shaped public sector conduct to protect citizens against arbitrary, 
unjust, unfair and unlawful actions. 
                                                 
53 The New Zealand Values Study 2005 has asked the same question about respect: ‗How much respect is there for individual 
human rights nowadays in New Zealand?‘ Their findings were that 22% felt there was ‗a lot of respect‘, 59% ‗some respect‘, 18% 
‗not much respect‘, and 2% ‗no respect at all‘ (Rose et al, 2005: 8). The study concluded that there was an age factor in the 
responses, with those ‗… 45-54 more likely to consider there is a lot of respect or some respect compared with respondents 25-34 
and 65+ years‘ (Rose et al, 2005: 8). Similarly, education was a factor, because ‗more educated respondents perceived that there is a 
lot or some respect for individual human rights compared with less educated respondents‘ (Rose et al, 2005: 8). Given that over 




Accepting the importance of such broad perspectives, the focus in this thesis is on more 
specific and current methods by which the state sector is taking an increasingly 
proactive and comprehensive role in relation to human rights. While the criminal 
aspects of the implementation of human rights are noted where they are relevant (e.g. in 
the Baigent case study and the reform of the military justice system), the focus here is 
on the responses from state actors. For instance, there is an examination in the first case 
study of how the NZ Police responded to the Baigent decision. Also the second case 
study about the military justice system essentially shows that because of analysis and 
policy advice, an entire justice process in breach of international human rights 
obligations was proactively reformed in advance of challenge before the courts. The 
technique of making a particular conduct an offence has been abundantly well studied 
(e.g. Simester and Brookbanks, 2002; Robertson, 2010), as has the importance of the 
rule of law both historically and currently (Thompson, 1985; Palombella and Walker, 
2009).  
2.2 Relationship between human rights and public policy 
The relationship between human rights and public policy is now clarified because the 
interaction between these fields is a key context for the research. The way terms are 
used across disciplines can be different, and Victor Conde‘s definition of 
‗implementation‘ from a human rights perspective has already been given earlier in 
Section 1.2.3 (Conde, 2004: 118-119). While the human rights literature uses the term 
‗implementation‘ in this way to refer to legislation and similar policy actions, it is quite 
conventional to also see implementation in the policy literature as the 
‗operationalisation‘ of legislation: if a right is implemented in a law, then the law is 
implemented when resources are mustered to carry it out.  
With a ‗human rights implementation lens‘, the focus is on how treaty rights (e.g. 
UNCROC) actually work in the international arena, across the entire state sector, and in 
society at large. More broadly the term ‗implementation‘ is central to the field of public 
policy, summarised as the theory and practice of how government objectives are 
achieved (or not achieved). The general guidance given to public servants on their 
obligations to the law and to the elected government of the day can be found in Crown 
Law Office (CLO, 2005) and State Services Commission (SSC, 2004, 2008) guides. 
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These latter two dealt with the problem of complex inter-departmental issues – and 
human rights implementation can be seen as such an issue.
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This raises an important question that is useful to discuss at an early stage of the 
arguments of this thesis: (1) ‗Is human rights implementation just another public policy 
puzzle for officials/government?‘ Put differently: (2) ‗Is there something about 
international human rights obligations that at least puts implementation in a special 
category of public policy challenges?‘ This research answers are ‗yes‘ and ‗yes‘ to both 
questions. Why the answer to the first question is ‗yes‘ is discussed, and then in relation 
to the second question it is shown that there are aspects of the human rights focus that 
are ‗special‘. Explaining the reasoning early in the research helps to set out the 
conceptual foundations for the arguments throughout and I now answer these two 
questions in detail. 
(1) Is human rights implementation just another public policy puzzle for 
officials/government? 
Processes that should ensure that New Zealand upholds its international human rights 
obligations (and of course other international obligations) are today more or less 
ingrained in ordinary government business. This is not to say that all aspects of policy 
are always identified through international human rights obligation ‗lenses‘. Some 
domestic policy goals might be pursued irrespective of their connection with these 
obligations. Two examples illustrate this. Preventing (or at least reducing) child abuse 
has been a public policy goal for successive New Zealand governments. Obviously one 
aspect of this goal relates to obligations under UNCROC, but achieving the goal 
involves very complex domestic public policy interventions across the whole-of-
government including health, education, social welfare, employment, housing and 
justice/police/courts. Having said that, much day-to-day policy discourse is already 
framed in rights terms. Does it add anything to this complexity of policy goals to focus 
on human rights obligations? This question will be returned to below.  
A second example is that (again) successive governments have also set goals for 
reductions in how many people die each year on the roads, summarised as ‗the road 
                                                 
54 The State Services Commission (2008), for instance, gave guidance to departments needing to implement new initiatives. 
However, see Ruth Herbert (2009) who looked at the difficulty of implementing strategic policies across multiple government 
departments and asserted that there needs to be much more direction given in this area. In her view the Australian Government gives 
a better lead to their state sector agencies and she claimed their model is useful for New Zealand. 
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toll‘. In terms of human rights it is possible to point to the right to life in the ICCPR and 
NZBORA. But primarily this goal is also best seen within the standard public policy 
techniques available such as allocations of funding alongside changes in policing, road 
construction, advertising, random testing, concentrating on the biggest risks, and 
punishment for those who create most risk (like speeders). In both examples (child 
abuse or the road toll) the complexity of issues suggests that whole-of-government 
approaches are likely to be most useful, including cross-agency officials committees to 
come to grips with multi-faceted problems and objectives. This clearly suggests that 
human rights issues are therefore everyday reflections of the general problems of 
‗governing to achieve objectives‘. Further support comes from the core features of the 
public policy literature. Wayne Parsons for instance noted that:  
Public policy focuses on what Dewey (1927) once expressed as ―… the public and its 
problems‖. It is concerned with how issues and problems come to be defined and 
constructed and how they are placed on the political and policy agenda. But it is also 
the study of … ―what governments do, why they do it, and what difference it makes‖ 
(Parsons, 1995: xv).  
Using Harold Lasswell‘s terms he stated that the policy orientation can be summarised 
as:  
… multi-method; multi-disciplinary; problem-focused; concerned to map the 
contexuality of the policy process, policy options and policy outcomes; and whose goal 
is to integrate knowledge into an overarching discipline to analyse public choices and 
decision-making and thereby contribute to the democratization of society (Parsons, 
1995: xvi).  
Much of this can also relate to the human rights field, which involves the public and its 
problems. Rights issues go on and off the government agenda and the field is obviously 
about what governments ‗do‘. It involves multi-method and multi-disciplinary 
approaches (law, politics, policy, education, health etc). It is problem-focused. It is 
concerned to find the appropriate processes, options and outcomes. Public choices and 
decision-making are involved and so is public funding, and all aspects are intimately 
connected to the democratisation of society. The connections can also be seen in 
Parsons‘ summary that public policy involves problem solving in the following 
sequence:  
Issue (people sleeping on the streets); Problem (homelessness); Policy (more housing) 
(Parsons, 1995: 87).  
A human rights lens would similarly identify the ‗issues‘ (right to housing being either 
denied or not delivered) and pose ‗problems‘ (risk of legal suit, international 
embarrassment in reporting a high degree of homelessness, political pressure from 
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voters/Parliament) that may need ‗policy‘ responses (task force). Richard Shaw and 
Chris Eichbaum also defined four broad aspects of the public policy field:  
… it involves government, decisions to act (and decisions not to act), entails the 
commitment of resources, and has a normative dimension (Shaw and Eichbaum, 2005: 
3-7). 
In short, the goals and methodologies of public policy generally clearly apply to the 
field of human rights.  
However, Mark Considine gave another view on public policy that represents a less 
instrumentalist approach. He distinguished between the standard view of public policy, 
similar to that set out above, and an alternative one. The first is summarised as: ‗A 
public policy is an action which employs governmental authority to commit resources in 
support of a preferred value‘ (Considine, 1994: 3). With the alternative approach there 
is an:  
… interdependence between key social actors such as parties, corporations, unions, 
professions and citizens. It is suggested here that it is the character of these systemic 
dependencies which shapes behaviours, problems and solutions. … policy is [therefore] 
the continuing work done by groups of policy actors who use available institutions to 
articulate and express the things they value. The significance of these systemic 
activities cannot be under-rated. Public policy is one of the central processes through 
which our communities respond to major social, economic and environmental 
problems. They shape and determine the health, welfare, education and the 
developmental opportunities of every citizen. The flexibility and creativity found in 
policy systems are therefore of interest and significance at every level of social life 
(Considine, 1994: 2,4). 
The standard view he likened to examining ‗policy as a purely technical matter‘, where 
the analyst seeks to estimate the strength and weakness of the available mechanisms for 
achieving a stated goal (Considine, 1994: 7). This could be applied to the homelessness 
problem just raised. In his view, however, the process is more like ‗a succession of 
episodes‘, all occurring within larger ‗policy systems‘ (Considine, 1994: 7, 8-9). These 
systems have four components: the policy actors and policy institutions mentioned in 
his definition above, but also political economy (broadly ‗the structure of key 
relationships‘) and policy culture (broadly values) (Considine, 1994: 9). Drawing these 
four components together: ‗As a result policy systems need to be understood as 
complex structures for political learning and memory‘ (Considine, 1994: 47).  
Public policy issues therefore arise, the key actors become involved, and institutions are 
used to obtain results that are consistent with the values underlying the policy culture. 
As each episode arises, there is much learned and this political memory stays in place 
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for when similar episodes occur in the future. Considine‘s theory is more complex than 
Parsons‘ ‗issue/problem/policy‘ approach and it becomes helpful for the discussion in 
Chapter 7 on the emergence of a human rights governance level. Here, the standard 
public view, which is linear and non-complex, does not adequately deal with the multi-
directional aspects of this governance level, but Considine‘s approach provides a better 
way of understanding it. 
(2) Is there something about international human rights obligations that at least 
puts implementation in a special category of public policy challenges? 
As regards this second question, human rights implementation has characteristics that 
give it a ‗special‘ dimension in the field of public policy. Because of the increasing 
interconnection of international law in all dimensions of public policy, the aspects that 
make up that special dimension are matters of degree rather than clear distinctions. Here 
five of these aspects are outlined, and discussed in more detail below: 
 the global extent and historical depth of the human rights enterprise 
 the pervasive influence at the domestic level  
 the extra layers over and above domestic policy goals  
 the progressive timing involved, and  
 most simply, the legal framework of ‗rights‘.  
In terms of the first characteristic, the human rights system is an enormous global 
endeavour that has involved many countries since the 1940s. This scope is different 
from much of the domestic public policy programme of any individual state. But 
‗globality‘ is not of course confined to human rights and might today also be said to be 
true of many areas of apparently domestic activity such as postal and 
telecommunication services, trade or climate change issues. As well as philosophy and 
international law, the human rights field also has a deep historical background reflected 
in the frameworks set up in most western liberal democratic states as the result of wars 
and changes that redefined the relationship between government and citizen. These 
included struggles against oppression (either by the state or other actors) at one time or 





 centuries were thus responsive to the respective historical developments of 
their times. They were also forerunners to the extensive human rights architecture set up 
as a direct response to the global atrocities carried out during World War II, as well as 
to many state constitutional arrangements all over the world. The background to the 
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New Zealand interaction of international human rights standards and the state sector 
therefore reflects this vast historical canvas.  
The human rights system is so large and pervasive globally that it can be conceived of 
as one step down from asking: ‗Is it possible to make an entire state liberal?‘ That is, 
human rights is not a political ideology (a type of government such as liberalism, 
fascism, socialism), but it is very close to that. It could even be considered to be one 
level down from an ideology, perhaps even a set of principles that constitute a 
component of the holistic underpinning fabric of the state. The post-World War II 
human right enterprise has been a very ambitious attempt to say that the entire 
international law system and individual states should function according to core human 
rights standards. It was always the intention that the principles set out in the UN Charter 
and the UDHR would be implemented as parts of state policy, and when the core 
treaties were developed from the 1960s onwards and countries ratified them this 
became a reality. In other words it was a post-war ambition to create an entirely 
different type of state ever: a ‗human rights compliant state‘. The problem therefore 
becomes how to the implement the whole of this endeavour.  
A second aspect giving human rights a particular dimension in public policy issues is 
that the multi-faceted parts of the international human rights system reach into almost 
every element of state policy. The notion of the dignity of the human being, the 
importance of community, and the way that a state responds concerns the ‗social 
contract‘ affecting everything that government does. Hence human rights are not only 
policy prescriptions about how to achieve particular objectives (reducing child abuse or 
the road toll), but they are about how all government activity is conducted across the 
board. In the end these are of course constitutional issues. 
A third characteristic is that there are extra layers with the human rights field that are 
not as pervasive in all elements of the domestic public policy arena e.g. treaty 
ratification, treaty body reporting, the domestic implementation of international rights 
via three possible mechanisms (laws, policy or practice), and additional state sector 
work around ensuring consistency with international standards and domestic laws. This 
pervasiveness is highlighted by the Cabinet vetting requirement that every new Bill or 
Regulation has to be considered for compliance against international human rights 
obligations and this applies to areas as seemingly unrelated as fisheries and postal 
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regulations. Again, however, these examples illustrate that this characteristic is only 
relative. These regulations are today also interwoven with international obligations from 
different sources and New Zealand domestic policy and trade issues affect the economy 
and much of government policy. In all cases laws, policies and practices are expected to 
comply with all international obligations, not just those of human rights.
 
Roger Clark 
(2000: 185, 186), for instance, had commented on the effects of international law on the 
domestic arena. In his view it could ‗set an agenda that obliges states to move 
programmatically in a particular direction‘ and changes might ‗include both a general 
policy agenda and, from time to time, specific implementing legislation‘. This links 
with the point in Section 2.2 that the human rights and public policy fields do have 
points of connection and are mutually influential.  
A fourth aspect is that the international human rights regime envisages a somewhat 
different time-scale of implementation from absolute obligations to progressive 
achievement (this is especially the case for economic and social rights). In some areas a 
state makes a commitment ‗over time‘ to ensure treaty-ratified rights can be better 
realised. But even where there are no such qualifications for implementing obligations, 
the system of regular reporting pushes states to ensure that across the reporting cycles 
real progress can be demonstrated. This concept might be particularly helpful for 
developing states as they struggle to implement obligations. It is also a useful concept 
for developed nations, such as New Zealand, because there may be ongoing changes 
needed to ensure better implementation of rights. Progressive implementation is of 
course also true of domestic policy goals. For example the policy goals of reducing 
deaths from road accidents or child abuse can be spread over decades. So again the 
implementation of human rights obligations is different only in scale, not in absolute 
terms, from the field of public policy broadly conceived.  
Fifthly, and perhaps most obviously, the entire legal framework of human rights is 
distinctive. It is one thing to try to reduce child abuse or deaths on the road; it is another 
to frame the state as being obliged in law to do so, failing which there are legal 
consequences for the state including the possibility of financial penalties. However, 
human rights laws are enacted as a consequence of policy making (government policies 
underpin laws) so there is a complementarity between these fields as public policy 
already pays attention to rights.  
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Matthew Palmer, in a paper written for the NZ Law Commission and the Crown Law 
Office, examined the differences between legal analysis and policy analysis. In his view 
lawyers and policy analysts each ‗use an entirely different mode of analysis‘ and each 
group needs to fully understand what it is that the other actually does (Palmer, 2006: 3). 
He also made a point which echoes that of the complementarity understanding in this 
research: ‗the inherent differences between the paradigmatic versions of legal analysis 
and of policy analysis can cause problems if they are unappreciated. If they are 
appreciated, the strengths of each approach can be valuably applied‘ (Palmer, 2006: 3). 
That is, the law+litigation and policy models work well when in alignment. 
To link the human rights system to the public policy field it is therefore perhaps useful 
to conceive of it not only as a set of important underpinning principles, but also as a 
foundational system with various levels: macro, meso and micro. It might also be useful 
to consider ‗small p‘ and ‗big P‘ policies as a way of understanding public policy better:  
 At the macro level, containing the most broad-based norms and ideals, it is a 
system in which individual rights are recognised and valued and the government 
aspires to ensure that these are maximised given resource considerations. At this 
level human rights are the overarching principles under which the government 
tries to operate. This would be the ‗big P‘ policy area, and it may be the ‗big P‘ 
policy of a state, for instance, to decide that in principle child abuse must not be 
tolerated. 
 At the micro level, the system is about a particular child‘s right in a particular 
case. Here there is a need to know where the responsibility of the state starts and 
ends. 
 At the meso level, containing the transition between those ideals, it is the level 
of law and regulation because then there are standards against which to judge 
the micro case. These would be the ‗small p‘ policies that underpin this level of 
law and regulation. 
The movement between the three levels is a process over time and it draws together a 
range of elements in the woven pattern that has been termed complementarity.  
Alongside the distinctive features of the two fields, implementing human rights can be 
seen as an integral part of the government‘s public policy programme. 
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Full advantage is not being taken, however, of some of the tools of the public policy 
field that could help inter-agency coordination on human rights issues. Later in the 
thesis in Section 5.3.2, there will be discussion on how the joined-up literature and 
coordinated stage agencies work from this field could be extremely helpful in this 
respect. 
2.3 Taking account of international and domestic human 
rights in policy making 
Having looked at these two fields brief mention is now made of the requirement for 
officials to take account of both international and domestic human rights in policy 
making. The Ministry of Justice guidelines on NZBORA for the public sector point out 
to officials in a section entitled ‗International Scrutiny‘ in relation to reports to UN 
committees:  
You should therefore be aware that, if your agency has developed policies or practices 
that appear to be inconsistent with these [human rights] standards, those practices will 
be subject to international scrutiny. You will also be asked to prepare a response to 
those questions (Ministry of Justice, 2004: 6).  
NZBORA affirms New Zealand's obligations under the ICCPR, so both the Covenant 
and the Act need to be taken into account.
55
 But the requirements for policy advisers to 
take account of international human rights law runs far wider than the ICCPR because 
such a wide range of policies and practices will be subject to international scrutiny 
under various reporting requirements. Apart from individual treaty reporting systems, 
the scope of reporting-scrutiny has been significantly widened by the four-yearly UPR 
reporting requirement to the UN Human Rights Council. This has added a peer review 
system for all ratifying countries. For instance, 36 states commented on New Zealand‘s 
summary of its human rights situation in the first UPR report presented in Geneva in 
May 2009.
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 This international scrutiny arguably goes well beyond other treaty body 
reporting. For policy advisers in New Zealand, this adds significantly to the duties to 
protect a Minister from embarrassment, both locally and internationally.  
                                                 
55 Other related guidance includes Crown Law Office (2005), a paper entitled ‗The Judge Over Your Shoulder: A Guide to Judicial 
Review of Administrative Decisions‘. 
56 See www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Human-Rights/Universal-Periodic-Review/human-rights-review.php 
(accessed on 10 January 2010). 
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The second more specific aspect of international scrutiny relates to the existence of an 
Optional Protocol mechanism for some treaties. At the time of the development of the 
UDHR in 1948 New Zealand exerted pressure to have a mechanism for individuals to 
appeal directly to the UN about infringements of their rights. In his speech to the UN 
General Assembly in December 1948, Colin Aikman said that this was a further method 
of ensuring implementation along with robust legally binding Covenant obligations. He 
asserted:  
… there is a clear need for the establishment of satisfactory procedures and machinery 
for receiving and dealing with petitions. We ourselves believe that petitions should be 
entertained from individuals, groups, associations or states (Department of External 
Affairs 1948: 1).  
Although this idea was dismissed at the time, it was eventually developed two decades 
later as the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR (adopted by the UN in 1966), a 
complaints mechanism for individuals to petition the UN Human Rights Committee of 
that treaty on civil and political right violations. Optional Protocols are considered 
necessary because they help individuals seek justice when their claims have been denied 
in their domestic jurisdiction. New Zealand did not accede to this Optional Protocol 
until 1989. A Second ICCPR Optional Protocol on the abolition of the death penalty 
was also adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1989, and New Zealand was the first 
country to accede to that instrument in 1990.
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 There is therefore a growing ability for 
individual citizens to make a direct complaint to the UN. The first case study (Baigent‘s 
Case) illustrates the effect this has had on the development of this country‘s domestic 
mechanisms of implementation.  
                                                 
57 Three other conventions now also have Optional Protocols: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD). Two other conventions have related systems in place: the Convention against Torture (CAT) enables 
individual communications to be made and for the committee to launch investigations into grave breaches; and the Convention on 
the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) committee can receive individual communications and set up urgent 
action processes and warning notices if necessary. What is clearly missing is that individuals cannot directly petition the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in relation to breaches of the ICESCR. This leaves the state‘s own reporting 
system as the primary method of pressure in cases of systemic breaches. However, given the mechanisms available for the other 
conventions there is building momentum for an Optional Protocol to the ICESCR. For the latest developments on this see 
www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/escr/intro.htm. Francioni and Conforti also raise two factors that can mean an individual citizen in a 
country might not have full recourse to remedies under international human rights treaties. The first is that many countries have not 
signed Optional Protocols to treaties, and it is these mechanisms that give individuals the right to make a complaint directly to the 
committee of some treaty bodies such as the ICCPR. The second is that even if these Optional Protocols have been signed, there is a 
‗full exhaustion of domestic remedies‘ clause which the authors believe can be used as a blocking mechanism by national courts 
(Francioni and Conforti 1997: 15). As well as individual citizens using the Optional Protocol route, there has also been a case of a 
class action under the ICCPR. The Mauritian Women Case (UNHRC Communication No. 35/1978) involved 19 Mauritian women 
who objected to newly enacted immigration laws on gender discrimination grounds. The laws caused loss of residence status for 
foreign husbands (but not foreign wives), and the UNHRC judged the legislation to be in breach of the ICCPR. 
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Policy advisors working in this climate therefore need to be cognisant that New Zealand 
citizens are also potential actors in an international environment, particularly if 
domestic legislation offers insufficient protection of ratified treaty rights. This is not 
therefore just a story about the New Zealand human rights framework with its structures 
and legislation and placement alongside other jurisdictions. It is also about the 
placement of the New Zealand citizen in the context of their ‗international‘ human 
rights (accessed through the Optional Protocol route) vs their ‗domestic‘ human rights 
(accessed through the local courts) and about the efforts of the state sector to smooth 
out the inconsistencies between these two areas. The more inconsistencies there are, the 
less legal protection citizens have and the more open the government is to international 
criticism by the UN and other countries. 
2.4 Summary 
Complementarity represents a multi-layered weave between the dimensions of 
international-domestic and the process of implementation as it operates in each 
jurisdiction. For all the international commonality, it will be clear that the New Zealand 
human rights framework has evolved through a specific public policy context and thus 
will show some differences from even close historical and political comparators. Such 
differences will undoubtedly affect the treatment of human rights in/by the state sector. 
This specificity is important to bear in mind when noting continuities from historical 
antecedents relevant to New Zealand. For instance NZBORA has aspects that draw on 
the histories and resulting documents from the Magna Carta (1215) and the English Bill 
of Rights (1689). This history and the evolving relationship between the monarchy, 
Parliament, the courts and citizens affects current constitutional arrangements which in 
turn impact on the New Zealand human rights framework. Also, because all policy 
advisors increasingly work in an environment greatly affected by human rights in the 
domestic and international versions, it has been important to clarify in this chapter the 
relationship between the public policy and human rights fields. As noted, the human 
rights field itself has various facets as an advocacy movement, a comprehensive 
worldview, an area of scholarship, and a category of public policy. Having examined 
these contextual issues, Chapter 3 now turns to New Zealand‘s interaction with the 




CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
 
The concepts and contexts outlined in the previous chapters need now to be located in 
the international framework. New Zealand has always taken part of its identity from 
internal sources (its people) and part from external sources – meaning the recognition 
by neighbours and the rest of the international community that this is a distinct entity. 
The interplay between local and international has been present for many decades, and 
this chapter explores how the two spheres have become interwoven.  
Especially from World War II onwards, this country contributed significantly to the 
formation of the UN and to the ambitious international human rights agenda. By the end 
of the 20
th
 century, New Zealand‘s own human rights landscape had been transformed 
by its acceptance that the framework thus created demanded the ratification and 
implementation of human rights treaties. This chapter therefore outlines the 
development of the ever-growing international human rights architecture since the mid-
1940s to show the background to New Zealand‘s human rights framework. This 
expansion included the development of the treaty reporting and ratifying processes that 
states adhere to. The UN has spawned both large internal institutional structures and 
processes, but also further limbs, such as regional mechanisms and national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs), deep inside the domestic architecture of ratifying nations. 
The chapter ends with a section on UN guidance to states about human rights and looks 
at four ways this is occurring. Finally the issues in this chapter relate to Phase One of 
the six phases outlined in Table 1 (see Section 1.4), which is marked by three key 
themes (international collaboration, structural development and international law-
making), and these will be identified throughout this discussion. 
3.1 New Zealand at the UN: 1944-1948 
3.1.1 Atlantic and UN Charters 
This period was a time of intense international collaboration, especially amongst the 
Allies in World War II. The international human rights architecture that was set up after 
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the war was seeded from the Atlantic Charter signed in 1941 by Roosevelt and 
Churchill. Before the 1940s there was no systematic international framework for human 
rights (MFAT, 2008: 11). Various 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century treaties, mostly related to 
slavery and armed conflict, had attempted to address these issues which now come 
under the broad human rights umbrella.
58
 The Atlantic Charter was ‗an early pointer to 
a new world order more oriented towards a rights-based system‘ (MFAT, 2008: 13). 
New Zealand had been involved in ILO work since before the war and it was from this 
standpoint that Prime Minister Peter Fraser was asked to contribute to British War 
Cabinet discussions about the Charter, especially in the area of labour standards and 
social security.  
The fifth point of the Charter noted that nations should help to secure ‗improved labour 
standards, economic advancement and social security‘ (Royal Institute, 1947: 10). 
Twenty-six countries (including New Zealand) then signed a UN Declaration in 1942, 
and the resulting Dumbarton Oaks draft of 1944 was an attempt by some countries to 
establish a UN Organisation (Templeton, 1995: 13). The declaration was in part about 
agreeing to ‗preserve human rights and justice‘ in the countries of the signatories and 
‗in other lands‘ (Royal Institute, 1947: 11). New Zealand influenced the nascent 
international human rights environment in four ways between 1944 and 1948 as 
pressure from this country:  
 altered wording in the Dumbarton Oaks draft 
 affected the principles behind the UN Charter 
 strengthened the overall position of the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC) at the UN and increased its human rights mandate, and 




                                                 
58 These included the Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery 1926, the Geneva Conventions of 1864 and 1906, and 
the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. After World War I the founding of the International Committee of the Red Cross (1876), 
and the League of Nations and the International Labour Organisation (both in 1919) were key precursors to the eventual 
establishment of the UN (MFAT, 2008: 11).  
59 It should be noted that only one covenant was envisaged, but because of lack of agreement in drafting the content of a single 
document work started on two separate instruments in 1951 – the first civil and political (ICCPR) and the second economic, social 
and cultural (ICESCR). It then took until 1966 for the UN to adopt the two covenants, partly because of the rapidly increasing 
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A fifth pressure from New Zealand – to have a mechanism for individuals to appeal 
directly to the UN – was dismissed at the time. However, as noted already the idea was 
eventually developed as the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR in 1966, the 
complaints mechanism for individuals to petition the UK Human Rights Committee of 
that covenant on civil and political right violations.  
In regards to the first influence, the 1944 Dumbarton Oaks draft was not heavily 
focused on human rights and New Zealand, Australia and other smaller powers called 
for a greater emphasis on this area. The following year the UN Conference on 
International Organisation (UNCIO) was held in San Francisco to draft the UN Charter, 
with 50 nations meeting to discuss the proposal. This Charter eventually mentioned 
human rights three times.  
The first instance in the Preamble asserts that: 
We the people of the United Nations … reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and 
of nations large and small. 
The second instance relates to the chapter on Principles in the UN Charter, and it is here 
that New Zealand exerted its second influence. The aim of this Charter was similar to 
the Atlantic Charter – to maintain international peace and security and promote the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples – and human rights were seen as a key 
part of this (Royal Institute, 1947: 149). During the development phase of the UDHR in 
the immediate post-war period Prime Minister Fraser worked hard to ensure human 
rights were taken seriously by the Great Powers. He pressed for traditional civil and 
political rights to be inserted into the Declaration and, despite much opposition, 
economic, social and cultural rights. At the 1945 UNCIO conference to draft the UN 
Charter, New Zealand, Australia and other smaller powers called for a greater emphasis 
on human rights. Although not in the first draft wording, the Charter eventually 
mentioned human rights three times and this was in large part due to pressure from 
Prime Minister Fraser who insisted on this inclusion. In the New Zealand report on the 
UNCIO he stated that: 
… the Conference succeeded in generally widening the scope of the Organisation to 
include not only questions of peace and security, but those relating also to human rights 
                                                                                                                                               
membership of the UN and Cold War tensions. For more details about this see Helen Fawthorpe (1995: 98-99) and MFAT (2003: 
15). 
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(Department of External Affairs, 1945: 14).  
More specifically he was concerned that governments should be responsible for 
economic, social and cultural rights as well as civil and political and his pressure in this 
area was pivotal. In the same report when talking about the actual structure of the UN 
he stated:  
By elevating the proposed Economic and Social Council to the status of one of the 
―principal organs‖ of the United Nations, by broadening its scope of activity, and by 
setting in front of every nation certain positive objectives, the Charter recognises the 
very great bearing that economic and social conditions have on the peace, security and 
progress of the world (Department of External Affairs, 1945: 14).  
The rights-based approach seeded in the Atlantic Charter was easily married to other 
critical international issues of the time. A fundamental triangle for the new world order 
now emerged – collective security/economic growth/human rights – which Fraser 
understood and articulated very well. Human rights, as a key part of this triangle, were 
now seen to need special protection. As part of the pressure to increase the status of 
human rights in the UN Charter the New Zealand delegation suggested that a new 
paragraph be added to the chapter on Principles: 
All members of the Organisation undertake to preserve, protect and promote human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular the rights of freedom from want, 
freedom from fear, freedom of speech and freedom of worship (Department of External 
Affairs, 1945: 23).  
These words were not eventually used, but the chapter on Principles did contain a new 
paragraph: 
To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, 
social, cultural or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for 
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion. 
The third instance occurred in Article 55 of the Charter: 
… the United Nations shall promote … universal respect for, and observance of, human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion. 
Malcolm Templeton noted that the New Zealand delegation was aware of and 
concerned about the tensions between the provisions of Article 2 of the Charter (the 
principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states) and Article 55 (where 
states pledge to promote human rights for all without discrimination) (Templeton, 1995: 
17). Helen Fawthorpe also commented that the Article 2 vs Article 55 provisions had 
created problems when this country was developing its policy on apartheid in South 
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Africa. She stated that eventually: 
… New Zealand came to accept the analysis that the Charter was intended to enable 
UN members to take action on blatant human rights abuses in individual countries 
without this being construed as a breach of the principle of non-intervention 
(Fawthorpe, 1995: 103).  
In terms of the third influence, during the UN Charter discussions the New Zealand 
delegation (along with several other countries) also pressed for a more robust ECOSOC. 
This included giving it clear responsibility for international human rights under Articles 
62 and 68. This was in contrast to the weaker role for the Council that had been 
proposed by the great powers during the Dumbarton Oaks discussions. The Charter 
eventually elevated ECOSOC to one of the five principal organs of the UN on an equal 
footing with the UN General Assembly, the Security Council, the Trusteeship Council, 
the ICJ and the Secretariat (Department of External Affairs, 1945: 33, 51). Behind this 
pressure was Prime Minister Fraser‘s concern that governments should be responsible 
for these rights as well as civil and political and he articulated the clear linkage between 
the provision of second generation rights and international peace and security 
(Department of External Affairs, 1945: 14). This pressure began a long-standing interest 
for New Zealand in the implementation of these types of rights, and raising their status 
70 years later in the 2000s is the topic of Chapter 6. 
3.1.2 UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR 
The UN Charter also mandated the establishment of the UN Commission on Human 
Rights which was asked to draft an International Bill of Rights containing three parts: a 
declaration of human rights to be adopted by a resolution of the UN General Assembly; 
an international Covenant on human rights binding on States Parties; and measures for 
their implementation (MFAT, 2008: 13). By 1948 the UDHR had been adopted. Prime 
Minister Fraser set up a Human Rights Committee back in New Zealand to assess the 
draft declaration and he led the 1948 delegation to the three-month long General 
Assembly UDHR debates in Paris. Colin Aikman, the New Zealand diplomat who was 
part of the delegation, reiterated Fraser‘s UN Charter concern about the importance of 
economic and social rights. In a speech to the UN General Assembly on 9 December 
1948 he asserted that: 
… we regard with particular satisfaction the place which is given in the Declaration to 
social and economic rights. Experience in New Zealand has taught us that the assertion 
of the right of personal freedom is incomplete unless it is related to the social and 
economic rights of the common man. … only with social security in its widest 
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sense can the individual reach his full stature. … These social and economic rights can 
give the individual and normal conditions of life which make for the larger freedom. 
And in New Zealand we accept that it is a function of government to promote their 
realisation (Department of External Affairs, 1948: 1).  
This very small team of the committee members and the delegation itself showed the 
relatively shallow public policy base from which New Zealand, having a big voice for a 
small country, influenced the international framework. Today there would be much 
more support and many advisors across multiple agencies behind any such delegation. It 
is also a good early example of the proactive approach that this country has taken in the 
human rights area. 
The final fourth influence was about developing a legally binding covenant. Richard 
Wild noted that the UDHR debate centred on the worth of the document and whether it 
was practical to have legal sanctions. The New Zealand position was that the 
Declaration should:  
… state the philosophical basis of human rights and fundamental freedoms, define the 
essence of each, and state, in a form comprehensible to the peoples of the world, the 
objectives of the United Nations in the field of human rights … [it] cannot in itself 
impose any legal obligations … although it may … provide a guide to the interpretation 
of the United Nations Charter (Wild, 1968: 5).  
New Zealand had, however, originally argued for a legally binding UDHR but after 
discussions the UN General Assembly made the Declaration a resolution with the 
intention that the proposed covenant would be binding (MFAT, 2008: 13; Fawthorpe, 
1995: 98). Colin Aikman reinforced this in his December 1948 speech stating that 
‗legally binding international conventions are … essential‘ over and above the 
Declaration which he saw as a statement of principles with moral force only 
(Department of External Affairs, 1948: 1). During the UDHR discussions New Zealand 
had sponsored Resolution E of the Report of the Third Committee of the UN General 
Assembly, stressing that the Commission on Human Rights needed to urgently draft a 
covenant with forceful measures for implementation. The UN General Assembly 
adopted both the ICCPR and ICESCR nearly 20 years later in 1966, along with 
procedures for measuring compliance, and these were eventually ratified by New 
Zealand in 1978. The two covenants are legal treaties and states need to make formal 
reservations at the time of ratification if their domestic law does not comply with their 
obligations.  
The first four influences during the 1940s helped ensure a strong human rights regime at 




anniversary of the UDHR Helen Fawthorpe noted that ‗New Zealand played a 
significant part in improving the text‘ of the UN Charter (Fawthorpe, 1995: 97). In 
2000, the Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand report stated 
that during UN Charter and UDHR drafting ‗New Zealand played a leading role in the 
development of a new branch of international law‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 20).  
The fifth influence did not come to fruition for another four decades with the 
development of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR in 1966. Colin Aikman‘s 
December 1948 speech on the UDHR urged that individuals should have the ability to 
petition the UN directly (Department of External Affairs, 1948: 1). One result of the 
marriage of international and domestic human rights standards – the Optional Protocol 
to the ICCPR – has also linked the UN-New Zealand positions very closely. As Helen 
Fawthorpe noted, the Court of Appeal suggested in 1994: 
… since New Zealand‘s accession to the Optional Protocol, the UN Human Rights 
Committee is in a sense part of this country‘s judicial structure, in that individuals 




However, the New Zealand courts have preferred that individuals find redress and 
remedies through the domestic courts without needing this route (see Section 8.1.1 for a 
fuller discussion). 
3.2 The international human rights system 
This section sets out the various features of the international human rights system. Its 
base is the UN, but through treaty-making, ratification, reporting, the development of 
regional mechanisms and NHRIs, and efforts at good governance, its effect is 
widespread throughout the domestic sphere of ratifying countries. This section also 
describes a period of intense structural development and international law-making 
which are Phase One themes. 
 
 
                                                 
60 In Tavita v Minister of Immigration [1994] 1 NZLR 257. 
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3.2.1 Bi-fold organisational/legislative international framework 
From the above it can be seen that foundational pillars of the emerging international 
human rights framework were laid during the 1940s. The Atlantic and UN Charters had 
led to the development of the UN in 1945. The main body dealing with human rights 
matters, the UN Commission on Human Rights, had been set up in 1946 under 
ECOSOC and the UDHR was adopted by 50 countries in 1948. All five organs of the 
UN – Secretariat, UN General Assembly, ECOSOC, the Security Council and the ICJ – 
were given some human rights role whether direct or indirect.
61
  
A Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights was set up in 
1947. It has established a number of working groups, e.g. on slavery or indigenous 
populations, and has rapporteurs working in specialised areas (Shaw, 2003: 285-286). 
The UN General Assembly is directly mandated under Article 13 of the UN Charter to 
promote the realisation of human rights and also adopts human rights treaties and passes 
resolutions. The Third Committee (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the UN 
General Assembly has specific responsibility for human rights matters. The Security 
Council (as executive organ) and the ICJ (as judicial organ) have no formal mandate 
under the Charter in this area. However, the Security Council‘s role is to maintain peace 
and security and humanitarian concerns are often related. Similarly, the ICJ has ruled on 
human rights and humanitarian issues such as apartheid and genocide (MFAT, 2008: 
28). In 2008, Matthew Palmer articulated New Zealand‘s commitment to the 
international human rights system: 
… for a small state like New Zealand, economically dependent on international trade 
and historically committed to international human rights, it makes political and 
economic sense to adhere to the rule of international law and to independent judgments 
of its content. New Zealand argued that ICJ jurisdiction should be compulsory when it 
was being established and New Zealand has always accepted the court‘s jurisdiction as 
binding. This view of international law is so entrenched I believe it has become a 
feature of New Zealand‘s own constitution (Palmer, 2008: 154). 
After a long interlude of five decades three further developments strengthened the UN 
human rights framework. The first, the post of UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (UNCHR), was established as an outcome of the 1993 Vienna World Conference 
                                                 
61 ECOSOC‘s mandate in this area is wide ranging: overseeing the Commission on Human Rights, drafting conventions, organising 
international conferences, obtaining reports from States Parties, and appointing special rapporteurs who focus on individual country 
violations or wider themes such as torture or the sale of children. Having the main responsibility for human rights at the UN, the 
Commission is further able to draft human rights instruments, investigate claims about violations and liaise with major international 
NGOs in the area (MFAT 2008: 29).  
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on Human Rights with a view to improved coordinated management of the UN‘s efforts 
in this area.
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 The second was the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) in 1998. It is a permanent independent international court able to try individuals 
for some serious issues such as war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.
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The third development was that the UN Human Rights Council was established in 2006. 
This is an inter-governmental body within the UN comprising 47 states responsible for 
the promotion and protection of human rights.
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As can be seen from the above, over a 60-year period a UN human rights framework 
has therefore been set up based on a number of foundations: a unifying leadership 
(UNCHR); substantial powers given to the Commission on Human Rights; a reporting 
and violations investigation process; a standards-setting ability through drafting 
conventions and instruments; a research and educative capacity; an international 
criminal court which can try certain human rights abuses; and a Human Rights Council 
more able to deal adequately with violations. The creation of these institutional 
structures solidified what this research terms the first ‗organisational level‘ of the 
emergent international human rights architecture (see Table 2).  
What this research terms a second ‗international law level‘ began developing in parallel 
with the organisational level and resulted in the creation of several major human rights 
legal instruments. The primary instruments are those which form the International Bill 
of Human Rights (the UDHR, ICCPR and ICESCR). From the mid-1960s to the late 
1980s four major conventions were also established on key single-issue topics: the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1965 (CERD); 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
1968 (CEDAW); the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCROC); and the 
                                                 
62 The Commissioner is directly responsible to the UN Secretary General but works closely with the UN General Assembly, 
ECOSOC and the Commission on Human Rights. The UN Secretariat has direct responsibility for the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), which supports the Commissioner and carries out research, education and fieldwork 
(Shaw, 2003: 34).  
63 The court contains 18 judges ‗representative of all regions and legal systems‘. The ICC‘s jurisdiction is ‗complementary‘ to 
national court systems and it only takes over as a ‗court of last resort‘ when the appropriate state is ‗unwilling or unable‘ to 
investigate an issue (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 43). Many human rights abuses occur during armed conflicts and the 
establishment of the ICC was an important step in ensuring these cases are brought to justice.  
64 The main purpose of the UN Human Rights Council is to address situations of human rights violations and make 
recommendations on them. In June 2007 the Council adopted an Institution Building Package which included: the new UPR 
mechanism, which assesses human rights in the 192 member states of the UN over and above the periodic reporting for the core 
treaties; a new ‗think tank‘ Advisory Committee which provides advice on thematic human rights issues; and a revised Complaints 
Procedure mechanism so that individuals and organisations can raise issues directly with the Council. See 
www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil for more information on the Council. 
 72 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 1984 
(CAT). The next one, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD), was adopted by the UN over 20 years later in 2007. New Zealand has ratified 
all of these covenants and conventions after extensive reviews of law, policy and 
practice.
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 It should be noted that the growing domestic human rights architecture in 
New Zealand has been influenced by UN comment through the cyclical reporting 
process for the core treaties. Ratifying countries are required to submit an initial report 
for the core treaties (and then a five-yearly periodic report), and the UPR process is in 
addition to this. The Concluding Observations, as the UN‘s feedback to states, give a 
historical picture over time about the UN‘s views on New Zealand‘s compliance or not 
with human rights obligations and help states to prepare future reports.
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The UDHR, the two covenants and the five conventions are the eight core international 
human rights instruments. Each covenant or convention has its own treaty monitoring 
committee, for example the UN Human Rights Committee oversees the ICCPR and the 
UN Committee Against Torture is responsible for CAT. Through regular periodic 
reporting these committees try to ensure ratifying states comply with the obligations set 
out under each treaty. During the report preparation process government agencies are 
given a concrete opportunity to consider the relevant instruments as a yardstick for their 
policies and practices. There is also a role for NGOs, as they are consulted during the 
preparation and are encouraged to submit parallel or shadow or alternative reports. The 
UN treaty body system is seen to be ‗a cornerstone of the international human rights 
                                                 
65 Apart from the ratified covenants and conventions mentioned above, the UN sometimes develops ‗soft law‘. The implementation 
of ratified international law into domestic legislation is hard law or internationally binding law. It is useful at this point to briefly 
raise the distinction between hard and soft law. The latter includes declarations of the UN General Assembly or minimum standards 
in an area which states are invited to comply with. Examples are the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples or the UN 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. These can operate perhaps more on a moral basis, as countries do not want 
to be seen in breach of them. It is therefore possible to talk about hard law and soft standards: the first legally binding, and the 
second at most morally binding although sometimes carrying much weight. Soft law is therefore still important in the international 
human rights compliance framework. In New Zealand implementation and public policy issues can arise out of minimum standards 
because the Government tries hard to adhere to them. Again, this is a well-researched area and is not a part of the scope of this 
thesis. Victor Conde‘s definition of soft law is: ‗A term describing a doctrine of international law that describes the legal status of 
certain human rights related declarations, resolutions, guidelines, and basic principles. They are created by international, 
intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, as nonbinding norms, setting forth nonobligatory but highly recommended 
standards of state conduct that should be followed. It is ―soft‖ law because it is not legally binding, as is ―hard law‖ ‘ (Conde, 2004: 
242). For more discussion on the distinction between the two types of law and the way they are used by different actors (state, non-
state) see Abbott and Snidal (2000), and for a discussion on the transformation of soft law into hard law (as sometimes happens) see 
Chinkin (1989). 
66 See Section 5.6 for more information on Concluding Observations. 
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machinery‘ (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 46). Independent experts sit on the 
treaty bodies and have a number of roles.
67
  
The UN-New Zealand interplay has been well documented in the ICCPR and ICESCR 
New Zealand state party reports and Concluding Observations over the last three 
decades.
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 They form an historical account of this country‘s compliance and uptake of 
rights into law, policy and practice. There has been a robust debate between the New 
Zealand delegations and the committees for each covenant during this period. Related to 
this area is the literature surrounding treaty body reporting. Frauke Lisa Seidensticker 
(2005), Deputy Director of the German Institute for Human Rights, has looked at both 
the strengths and weaknesses of this system in an analysis of state reporting by human 
rights treaty bodies. Part of what hinders the effective human rights implementation at 
the state level is that huge problems have occurred over time with the treaty body 
reporting system. Much has been written about the need for treaty body reform by 
authors such as Alston and Crawford (2000). This research will not explore this area 
except to mention that the major areas of concern are: some state parties are slow to 
report and do not meet deadlines, sometimes because of inadequate resources to 
satisfactorily file a report; the large backlog of reports waiting to be assessed by 
committees who are also under-resourced; and the lack of follow-up of issues raised by 
committees (Seidensticker, 2005: 9).  
3.2.2 Towards a tri-fold international framework: guidance level 
A bi-fold organisation/legislative framework has been outlined, and it is now possible to 
see that a tri-fold framework is also developing because of the emerging UN guidance 
level. Now that the first two aspects have settled down, and several decades have passed 
since the establishment of the UN organisation and resulting international law, it has 
become clear that simply having the treaty body system in place does not necessarily 
improve human rights in all countries i.e. there is no simple equation of ‗treaty 
ratification = improved human rights‘. Implementing international treaty rights is 
difficult for developed nations such as New Zealand, let alone developing states that 
                                                 
67 These roles include: ‗monitoring the implementation of the core human rights treaties; raising awareness of violations of these 
treaties and human rights norms; interpreting the rights and obligations in the treaties and promoting a greater understanding of 
these; encouraging better implementation and compliance through advice to states parties and identifying needs for additional 
technical assistance‘ (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 46). 
68 New Zealand‘s state party reports can be found on the OHCHR website (www.ohchr.org).  
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have far less resources, and possibly more corruption and less respect for the rule of 
law. This third guidance level has become larger and larger as the UN attempts to steer 
states in a direction that is more human rights compliant. Four of the methods that the 
UN is using to guide states more clearly are now discussed below: harmonised 
guidelines (including requiring states to submit Core Documents); encouraging states to 
set up appropriate institutional frameworks; national human rights protection systems; 
and good governance requirements. 
In 2008 the UN distributed harmonised guidelines to states on how to report on the 
major treaties (UN, 2008). This includes the development of a Core Document for each 
state which is submitted to each treaty body, along with the usual treaty-specific report 
to the relevant committee, and this document is seen as a way of reducing duplication of 
material to a number of committees.
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 The Core Document sets out information about 
the demographics, geography, legal system and politics of each country (Seidensticker, 
2005: 7). As each treaty committee should now be applying a consistent approach, the 
treaty monitoring system should also be more effective. Also as part of the new 
coordinated approach to preparing reports for treaty bodies the UN has urged states to 
consider setting up ‗an appropriate institutional framework‘ for their preparation – this 
could be an inter-ministerial drafting committee and/or delegated officials within 
relevant government departments (UN, 2008: 5). In New Zealand MFAT has oversight 
over the treaty body reporting process with assistance in particular from the Ministry of 
Justice and the Crown Law Office. The UN expect that the framework within which 
human rights are promoted within each state should penetrate several levels: national 
and regional parliaments and assemblies; NHRIs; government officials and other 
professionals; human rights education programmes; mass media; NGOs; and overseas 
development assistance programmes (UN, 2008: 12).  
The Commonwealth Secretariat had also produced a report on best practice for NHRIs 
which highlighted their important involvement in the reporting process, given their role 
in monitoring state compliance with international obligations (Commonwealth 
Secretariat, 2001: 30). The report stated the need for each NHRI to have a ‗cooperative 
relationship with the international treaty machinery‘ and that national reports need to be 
prepared by the executive taking into consideration comments from the NHRI 
                                                 
69 New Zealand‘s Core Document was sent to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2006 (see MFAT, 2006a).  
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(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 30). In New Zealand this function is carried out by 
the HRC (the NHRI), who have the opportunity to comment on treaty reports before 
they are sent to the UN. Apart from trying to streamline the reporting process the UN 
has also tried to give more guidance about how to protect human rights within states. In 
2003 the UN Economic and Social Council identified key features of national human 
rights protection systems: 
 Democracy: democratic institutions and processes that enable participation 
 The rule of law: including the incorporation of international human rights standards in the national 
Constitution and laws 
 An independent and corruption-free judiciary: that applies international human rights standards and 
jurisprudence 
 Good governance: effective structures of government at central, regional and local levels that 
recognise, respect and apply human rights standards 
 Specialised human rights institutions and accountability mechanisms 
 Human rights information and education 
 An active civil society: citizens who engage, organise and participate 
 A focus on the most vulnerable parts of the population (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003: 
403). 
One of the most important features is seen to be ‗good governance‘. A definition of this 
is given below, and the key point here is that it is identified as a ‗right‘ of the citizen 
against the state.
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 In 2007 the OHCHR published Good Governance Practices for the 
Protection of Human Rights to help states close the gap between human rights standards 
and their actual implementation, which is what this research is about. In other words, 
this was about putting the theory of being a compliant human right state into practice in 
a realistic way. The OHCHR has recognised that unless good governance practices are 
in place, it is difficult for human rights to be fully realised and they define it as ‗the 
exercise of authority through political and institutional processes that are transparent 
and accountable, and encourage public participation‘ (OHCHR, 2007: 2). It can be 
carried out through a range of mechanisms from laws, policies and programmes to 
                                                 
70 Conde identifies good governance as: ‗An evolving principle that roughly means that the inherent dignity of individuals and their 
collective holding of human rights entitle them to ―good governance‖, within state societies, meaning they deserve a government 
characterized by the rule of law, having a democratical political basis (elected by plebiscite), and responsive to the people. Good 
governance also includes adequately structured state institutions with efficiency and transparency of institutions and procedures and 
respect by all governmental authorities for the human rights of all persons within the territory of the state; with access by individuals 
to means of redress for violations of law; accountablity of public officials for misconduct, malfeasance, and human rights violations; 
and a public sector with an active and free civil society‘ (Conde, 2004: 102). 
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‗political, managerial and administrative processes‘ (OHCHR, 2007: 1-2). In this model 
human rights are linked with good governance in four ways which will be discussed 
below: (1) strengthening democratic institutions; (2) improving delivery of state 
services; (3) the rule of law; and (4) combating corruption. 
Democratic institutions are strengthened by involving the public in policy and law-
making and ensuring that elected officials are accountable. It also means that a wide 
range of groups are represented, including disadvantaged groups, in discussions about 
rights. The four strengthening planks suggested by the OHCHR are: democratic 
elections, transparency, accountability, inclusion and participation. It is hoped that this 
inclusive approach will result in better laws and policies (OHCHR, 2007: 9). State 
service delivery is improved through better education, health and social welfare 
services. The OHCHR believed these services need to be ‗available, accessible and 
culturally acceptable‘ and protect the rights of vulnerable groups (OHCHR, 2007: 29). 
Strengthening the accountability of public officials is key to upholding the rule of law. 
This accountability can be carried out through: 
… the adoption of sound legislation, the establishment of institutional checks and 
balances, the establishment of systems providing redress to victims of violations, and 
the training of state officials on human rights and good governance (OHCHR, 2007: 6). 
Officials also need to be human rights trained in order to understand the rights they are 
upholding. Other ways of strengthening the rule of law include: the right to free legal 
assistance, legal and policy reforms to ensure international human rights obligations are 
met, and the reform of state justice systems (OHCHR, 2007: 45)  
The OHCHR also stated it is important that the public has access to rights-related 
information in order for transparency to occur, so a strong public education effort is 
vital in tandem with moves to hold public officials accountable (OHCHR, 2007: 5). 
They also encouraged a collaborative effort among a wide range of actors to improve 
good governance practices: national and local governments, the media, non-state actors, 
NGOs and civil society. Again this illustrates the Phase One theme of collaboration. 
The OHCHR further believed that corruption has a myriad of effects: bribery ensures 
services are given to those with money instead of the most vulnerable; it undermines 
democratic institutions and public participation; and citizens cannot easily get their civil 
and political rights upheld when all levels of the judicial system – ‗judges, lawyers, 
prosecutors, police officers, investigators and auditors‘ – are corrupt (OHCHR, 2007: 
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59). In relation to anti-corruption, Transparency International is an international civil 
society organisation with 90 national chapters (one exists in New Zealand). Their aim is 
to ‗bring together relevant players from government, civil society, business and the 
media to promote transparency in elections, in public administration, in procurement 
and in business‘.71 The organisation produces an annual Corruption Perceptions Index 
on their website measuring how public sector corruption is perceived in 180 states. On 
the 2009 index, New Zealand is perceived as the least corrupt with a score of 1, and 
Somalia was considered the most corrupt at 180.
72
 These strategies of transparency and 
accountability help ensure state officials are upholding human rights instead of violating 
or curtailing them.  
The OHCHR‘s 2007 guidelines are therefore not just about ‗good governance‘; they are 
also about ‗good guidance‘, the third level suggested in Table 2 which follows. Sending 
countries strong messages about what constitutes a human rights compliant state gives 
them better indicators to aim for and helps them on the path towards robust human 
rights governance. The tri-fold structure of Figure 2 relates to the macro (or big P 
policy) level discussed in Section 2.2. Here the international framework (with its 
organisations, charters, instruments and guidance) clearly sets out the principles 
underpinning the human rights endeavour. Governments are also encouraged to 
prioritise resources to implement human rights standards. In Chapter 5.8.1, at the end of 
the discussion on embedding a human rights approach into the state sector, it is 
suggested that a four-fold domestic human rights framework is emerging. 
The discussion now turns to regional mechanisms and NHRIs, and both involve the 
Phase One themes of structural development, collaboration and law-making. Law-
making occurs at the regional human rights level because there are enforceable treaties 
such as regional conventions and charters. 
                                                 
71 See www.transparency.org. 
72 Other countries on the spectrum include: Australia and Canada (8), Germany (14), the UK (17), the USA (18), France (24), Spain 
(32), South Africa (55), Cuba (61), Greece (71), Brazil (75), China (79), India and Thailand (84), Vanuatu (95), Tonga and Zambia 
(99), Argentina (106), Egypt, Indonesia and Kiribati (111), Lebanon and Libya (130), Russia and Zimbabwe (146), Papua New 
Guinea (154), Haiti and Iran (168), and the five most perceived as corrupt just below Somalia – Chad (175), Iraq and Sudan (176), 
Myanmar (178) and Afghanistan (179). This issue is so large that the UN adopted a Convention Against Corruption in 2003.  
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International Committee Red Cross 1876 
League of Nations 1919 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 1919 
 
 
1 ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL 
 
ATLANTIC CHARTER 1941 
↓ 
UN DECLARATION 1942 
↓ 
DUMBARTON OAKS DRAFT 1944 
↓ 
UN ORGANISATION 1945 
↓ 
UN CHARTER 1945 
↓ 
Mandated five organs of UN 
(UN Secretariat, UNGA, ECOSOC, Security Council, ICJ) 
↓ 
2 INTERNATIONAL LAW LEVEL 
 
Eight core international human rights instruments: 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1976) 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1976) 
UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (1969) 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1981) 
UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (1990) 
UN Convention Against Torture (1987) 
UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008) 
 
 
3 GUIDANCE LEVEL 
 
UN harmonised guidelines 
Appropriate state-level institutional framework initiative 
National human rights protection systems 
Good governance requirements 
 79 
3.3 Regional and national human rights instruments and 
mechanisms 
Regional mechanisms and instruments have been most highly developed in four parts of 
the world – Europe,73 Africa,74 the Americas75 and the Middle East.76 South-East Asia is 
improving in this respect,
77
 but there is nothing available as yet for this region (the 
Asia-Pacific). These mechanisms are key intermediary human rights protection points 
between the international UN system and the domestic human rights framework. There 
can be four levels involved: a regional body (such as the Council of Europe or African 
Union), a regional commission (such as the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights), a regional charter or convention (such as the European Convention on Human 
Rights), and a regional court (such as the European Court of Human Rights). If there is 
a regional court, individuals can get redress through this once they have exhausted 




                                                 
73 Europe has the most developed system of regional protection, probably because the Council of Europe was established in 1950 
only two years after the development of the UDHR. There are two inter-related strands to the European set-up. One is the Council 
with 47 member states, which oversees both the European Court of Human Rights and the implementation of the enforceable 
regional treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights (1950), which mainly protects civil and political rights. A further 
European Social Charter was set up in 1965 to protect economic, social and cultural rights (MFAT, 2008: 60). Another strand of 
human rights protection is related to the European Union (EU) and there is a close association between the Council of Europe as a 
regional human rights mechanism and the EU. The 27 member states have to be fully or nearly fully compliant with the European 
Convention on Human Rights before they can join the EU.  
74 The African framework is based on the African Charter of Human and Peoples‘ Rights 1981. It contains first and second 
generation rights and ‗created‘ the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights (OHCHR, 2003: 72). This Commission 
operates under the equivalent of the Council of Europe, the African Union of 53 states. The African Court on Human and Peoples 
Rights 2004 has yet to hear a case and is possibly merging with the similar African Court of Justice.  
75 In the Americas the Organisation of American States is the umbrella organisation at the same level as the Council of Europe. Out 
of this has developed the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. Like the European system there is a court and a charter: 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and an American Convention on Human Rights 1969. As the Convention rights are first 
generation, an Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights was adopted in 1988 covering economic, social 
and cultural rights (OHCHR, 2003: 80).  
76 In the Middle East, The League of Arab States has been in existence since 1945, making it the oldest existing regional body in 
the Middle East. A Human Rights Committee which comes under the umbrella of the League has been established, and an Arab 
Charter on Human Rights developed (OHCHR, 2003: 78). So far, however, no regional court has been established.  
77 The South-East Asia region is now closer to having a human rights commission. National working groups from ASEAN 
(Association of South East Asian Nations) states have formed The Working Group for an ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism and 
this group is working towards developing a declaration of principles and a regional commission and court. The 10 countries 
involved are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam. See www.aseanhrmech.org for more information.  
78 For a full discussion of the European, Inter-American, African and Arab regional mechanism systems see O‘Brien (2001: 
Chapter 16).  
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Gerd Oberleitner is a commentator on the large number of international, regional and 
NHRIs that have spawned since World War II. His comprehensive review of these 
institutions examined their rise and efforts by the UN since about 1997 to mainstream 
human rights into its organs and bureaucracy. As an international law and international 
relations specialist he has been described as a ‗biographer‘ of human rights institutions, 
which suggests they have each taken on their own personality and life (Oberleitner, 
2007: x). He also noted that global human rights institutions combine with regional 
human rights institutions, and they experience similar ‗failures and achievements‘ 
(Oberleitner, 2007: 177). It is suggested in this thesis that NHRIs could also experience 
similar failures and achievements as they attempt to act as intermediary bodies between 
the UN and their own country. Not only this, whole domestic human rights frameworks 
can experience growth, then fragmentation and re-integration phases, and this research 
shows that this pattern has occurred in New Zealand. His other view is that global 
human rights institutions are an important bridge in the gap between vision and reality. 
That is: 
They allow the move from the acknowledgement of values to their realization on the 
international level: agreeing on community norms, casting them in legal form, and 
inventing tools, mechanisms and instruments. … Global human rights institutions can 
transform ideas into law, and law into change, in a way that is less haphazard and 
unpredictable than the actions of states (Oberleitner, 2007: 189, 190).  
According to the OHCHR the major treaties for Europe, Africa and the Americas: ‗have 
contributed to important changes in the laws of many countries … and this case-law 
constitutes an important source of information and guidance for judges and lawyers‘ 
(OHCHR, 2003: 111). Noticeably there is no regional human rights mechanism that 
New Zealand and Australia are able to join at present. New Zealand has had an NHRI 
since 1977 and was one of the first countries to set up this national mechanism. 
3.4 National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) 
NHRIs are the bodies which monitor and protect human rights in various countries and 
can vary in name: ‗human rights commissions and consultative councils to human rights 
ombudsmen, public defenders and people‘s protectors‘ (Pohjolainen, 2006: 1). 
However, as pointed out by Danish researcher on NHRIs, Anna-Elina Pohjolainen, they 
share common features because they are: 
… expected to work independently from the government; cooperate with relevant 
actors at home and abroad; and contribute to the implementation of international 
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human rights standards by acting as ―guardians‖, ―experts‖ and ―teachers of human 
rights‖ (Pohjolainen, 2006: 1).  
Most of these institutions are established via human rights legislation or a constitution 
and are considered by the Commonwealth Secretariat report on NHRI best practice to 
‗play a role complementary to that of the courts‘ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 10, 
29). The report also noted that NHRIs are more likely to thrive in democracies and 
where ‗there is a high degree of human rights literacy‘ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 
2001: 39), and this literacy is important for robust human rights governance. 
The concept of NHRIs was most firmly developed at the first International Workshop 
on National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights held in Paris 
in 1991. The principles relating to the status of NHRIs became known as ‗the Paris 
Principles‘ and members need to be compliant with them and can seek ‗A‘ status 
accreditation. This highly organised network also illustrates the Phase One 
collaboration theme. The NHRIs work closely with the OHCHR which noted that: 
Paris Principles compliant NHRIs stand out as partners that are central to national 
human rights protection systems and are important counterparts for the OHCHR. They 
can play a crucial role in promoting and monitoring the effective implementation of 
international human rights standards at the national level; a role which is increasingly 
recognized by the international community.
79
 
Commenting on the effectiveness of NHRIs Pohjolainen also suggested that: ‗It is quite 
extraordinary that one institutional model – albeit a flexible one – has reached such 
prominence both on the international human rights agenda and in the domestic structure 
of states‘ (Pohjolainen, 2006: 118). However, at a 2009 Australian and New Zealand 
Society of International Law conference, commentators on a session on ‗Regional and 
National Human Rights Protection: Creating a New Model in the Pacific‘ noted that 
Pacific states may well prefer to use other models that do not involve the Paris 
Principles (Renshaw et al, 2009). That is, they may find a system which is more 
culturally appropriate instead of trying to make the Paris Principles work as a ‗one size 
fits all‘ template.  
The NHRIs have formed regional bodies of which there are four: African National 
Human Rights Institutions; Asia Pacific Forum (APF) of National Human Rights 
Institutions; European Group of National Institutions; and the Network of National 
Institutions in the Americas. It may well be that over time these bodies form their own 
                                                 
79 See www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/NHRI/Pages/NHRIMain.aspx (accessed on 14 October 2009). 
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NHRI models because of their region-specific requirements and culturally different 
ways of approaching this. The Commonwealth Secretariat report noted that NHRIs are 
in a unique local position ‗to monitor the human rights performance of governments‘ 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 3). This is a further example of the layering of 
function from the international UN monitoring role to a national level which can more 
easily identify circumstances or challenges that are state-specific. Because they are 
based on the ground they are seen by the UN and committed governments as: ‗one of 
the most important ways to improve domestic human rights records in emerging 
democracies and countries recovering from internal conflicts or times of extreme 
oppression‘ (Pohjolainen, 2006: 1). 
There has been a huge increase in the number of NHRIs since the establishment of the 
Paris Principles (from just a few to the current approximately 110), and Pohjolainen 
asserts that the last decade has therefore seen the emergence of NHRIs as ‗a new 
international human rights actor‘ (Pohjolainen, 2006: 1). Not only do NHRIs act 
domestically, they are in constant liaison with the UN, governments and other 
international human rights organisations, including NGOs. Because of this wide sphere 
of influence she said that ‗newly-democratised states‘ are setting up NHRIs to show 
their willingness to comply with international human rights obligations (Pohjolainen, 
2006: 2). The creation of an NHRI has therefore become a sign that a government is 
firmly committed to the international human rights framework, and their existence is 
important for robust human rights governance. 
NHRIs therefore have a dual protection-implementation role and this is illustrated 
nicely by the work of New Zealand‘s NHRI, the HRC. The Commission investigates 
complaints of discrimination on 13 grounds and its functions and responsibilities are set 
out below.
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 Broadly these can be described as advocacy-mediation-adjudication-
                                                 
80 The 13 grounds are: sex, marital status, religious belief, ethical belief, colour, race, ethnic or national origins, disability, age, 
political opinion, employment status, family status and sexual orientation (see section 21 Human Rights Act 1993). Under section 
5(1) of the Human Rights Act 1993 the HRC has two primary functions: ‗(a) to advocate and promote respect for, and an 
understanding and appreciation of, human rights in New Zealand society; and (b) to encourage the maintenance and development of 
harmonious relations between individuals and among the diverse groups in New Zealand society‘. In order to carry out these 
functions the HRC has a number of other responsibilities under section 5(2) of the Act relating to: human rights education, 
programmes, activities, research, better understanding the Treaty‘s human rights dimensions, publishing guidelines and codes of 
practice, taking part in certain court or tribunal hearings, reporting to the Prime Minister about inconsistencies between domestic 




 However, the Commission‘s 
role was not always that broad and has changed over time. Like the whole international 
human rights framework (and as has happened domestically as well), this NHRI has 
changed its direction and angles of focus. It was initially set up as an independent 
agency by the Human Rights Commission Act 1977, with a complaints mechanism 
focus and advisory and recommendatory powers only, but since the Human Rights 
Amendment Act 2001 it has become quasi-judicial and can make orders and costs. The 
evolution therefore over the last 30 years has been that the key human rights mechanism 
has moved from being a body that had an exhortation role (to Parliament and the state 
sector in the same way that the Ombudsman does) with a focus on non-discrimination 
and complaints, to having legal enforceable power and a move towards more policy-
based approaches.  
This is an illustration of the complementarity theme of the research: the HRC has a role 
that is starting to combine the law+litigation and policy approaches to human rights 
implementation. Complementarity is therefore about the entwining of these two threads 
so together they make a strong rope.  
3.5 Summary 
Well before the UN was established in 1945 other international labour, peace and 
humanitarian bodies had acted as precursors for this emerging organisation. New 
                                                 
81 A little known function of the HRC is about intervening in court cases, which is mandated under section 5 of the 1977 Human 
Rights Commission Act. This enables them: ‗To apply to a court or tribunal, under rules of court or regulations specifying the 
tribunal's procedure, to be appointed as intervener or as counsel assisting the court or tribunal, or to take part in proceedings before 
the court or tribunal in another way permitted by those rules or regulations, if, in the Commission's opinion, taking part in the 
proceedings in that way will facilitate the performance of its functions stated in paragraph (a) of this subsection‘. What this means in 
essence is the Commission makes submissions on the relevant points of law without advocating for a particular party. It only 
intervenes where the case involves a matter of importance and they can add value to the legal argument. Chief Commissioner Ros 
Noonan noted at the recent NZ Diversity Forum
 
09 that: ‗The Commission is increasingly intervening in court cases where we think 
we need to be promoting, explaining and providing advice on relevant human rights standards‘ (Noonan, 2009). The most recent 
case has been McAlister v Air New Zealand Limited SC 49/2008 [2009] NZSC 78 brought against the airline by a senior pilot on the 
grounds of discrimination because of age. There were interpretive difficulties with relevant provisions in both the Human Rights 
Act 1993 and the Employment Relations Act 2000, and a Human Rights Commission Intervener was involved in the case to clarify 
this. This changing jurisdiction is important, because in the eyes of government departments the Commission would have seemed to 
have more ‗teeth‘ than under its original 1977 mandate. The Commission had, however, already carried out Consistency 2000 as a 
result of its statutory obligation (also under section 5 of the 1977 Act). Here departments were required to self-audit and directly 
report back to the HRC, and this would have been the beginning of heightened departmental awareness that the implications of 
international human rights obligations mattered in everyday policy work. With its new 2001 powers the Commission became an 
even stronger spotlight on the work of individual departments, although not as suggested, in Section 5.5 of this research, strong 
enough in relation to the Cabinet vetting process. 
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Zealand‘s involvement with these bodies, along with its advanced social and electoral 
policies and legislation, gave this country an edge in the world arena. Prime Minister 
Fraser‘s delegation was able to take that experience to the international table, directly 
influencing international public policy by helping develop the principles behind the 
Atlantic Charter, the UN Charter and the UDHR, and the way institutional structures 
such as ECOSOC were set up. The New Zealand delegation had a clear and thoughtful 
vision of how the UN human rights framework should be constructed. Pressure on 
certain issues was therefore persistent over time. During the 1940s New Zealand urged 
three themes: the elevation of economic, social and cultural rights and the assertion that 
it was the function of government to promote their realisation; the need for the legally 
binding nature of covenant obligations so that states would be held strongly accountable 
for human rights abuses; and the necessity for individuals to be able to petition the UN 
directly. During this nascent human rights period three developments also occurred. The 
principle of universality was acknowledged, which meant that human rights were 
recognised internationally for the first time. The Atlantic Charter had acted as a 
direction post towards a rights-based system. Once this system was in place the second 
development followed – the linking of the collective security/economic growth/human 
rights triangle – and the human rights component started to be taken very seriously as a 
key linchpin in the new world order. The third development of this period was the 
establishment of the Article 55 UN Charter principle of non-discrimination which now 
gave the international community the ability to investigate human rights abuses in 
member countries if this principle was being violated. While it eroded the doctrine of 
state sovereignty, it was a watershed concept which came to form the basis of domestic 
human rights legislation, policy and practice in this country.  
This chapter has also shown that without the intermediary institutions of regional 
mechanisms and NHRIs it would be very difficult for the UN to monitor human rights 
from a distance. Increasing guidance from the UN helps states that might be struggling 
to comply with international obligations. Even for developed countries such as New 
Zealand, any streamlining or guidance is useful in the growth area of the domestic 
transfer of international human rights. How effective that transfer is, and what 
mechanisms are used as ratified treaty rights penetrate into the state sector, is the next 
part of this research as it turns from the international to the domestic arena in Chapter 4.  
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CHAPTER 4: STOCK-TAKE AND PLANNING 
This chapter and the next start to elaborate the detail behind complementarity. To do 
this, the various evaluation and planning initiatives that were carried out in the period 
1994-2009 are outlined. These initiatives tried to streamline the ad hoc build-up of 
human rights structures, legislation and policies that had arisen over several decades. 
Chapter 5 that follows looks in detail at what has been done as a result of the 
recommendations flowing from some of these initiatives, and what can still possibly be 
done to further ensure that a human rights approach is deeply embedded into the public 
sector. As with the international framework, it is suggested that New Zealand‘s 
domestic human rights architecture has been based on a bi-fold structure: organisational 
and legislation. This research further suggests that there is now a tri-fold human rights 
framework emerging in New Zealand based on a third policy level (see Table 3), and in 
the next chapter it is suggested that a further fourth level for the domestic sphere (state-
level human rights governance). This chapter also illustrates two phases in New 
Zealand‘s human rights history: Phase Two (structural development, domestic law-
making) and Phase Three (reviewing, restructuring). 
4.1 Tri-fold domestic framework: organisational, legislative, 
policy 
At the first level in the domestic framework – organisational – there are a number of 
related agencies that have human rights oversight. The main organisation is the HRC 
whose role has already been discussed (see Section 3.4). The Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner has a watchdog role on privacy issues and can investigate complaints 
about breaches of individual privacy, while the Ombudsman‘s Office investigates 
complaints by citizens about state agencies. The Office of the Children‘s Commissioner 
and the Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner promote and ensure the 
welfare of children/young people and health and disability service consumers 
respectively. Three government agencies are also primarily responsible for domestic 
and international human rights legal advice to the government: MFAT, the Ministry of 
Justice and the Crown Law Office. Other departments whose policies and programmes 
have significant human rights implications are noted in Table 3 which follows. This 
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organisational level represents the Phase Two themes of structural development, while 
the legislative level discussed next relates to the theme of domestic law-making. 
At the second level – legislation – a number of human rights-related laws have been 
enacted since the early 1970s (also see Table 3). The cornerstone pieces of legislation 
for this country‘s domestic human rights architecture are the Human Rights Act and 
NZBORA. However, as noted by the Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in 
New Zealand report authors: ‗The evolution of New Zealand‘s human rights legislation 
has occurred in a rather piecemeal fashion‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 27). By 
ratifying the core international human rights treaties this country has opened its 
domestic legislation, policies and practices to international monitoring. This is a long 
way from the 1940s when there was no developed human rights framework. New 
Zealand now has bilateral and multilateral human rights involvement and three 
permanent missions to the UN (New York, Geneva and Vienna).
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There are separate processes pre- and post-ratification: the first to become party to a 
treaty and the second to participate in the UN reporting system.
83
 The treaty-making 
process is overseen by the legal division of MFAT, and as noted in Chapter 2.1 there is 
no automatic uptake of UN instruments into New Zealand‘s domestic legislation. A 
treaty incorporation takes place in similar manner to Australia and Sweden instead of 
the self-executing approach of, for instance, the USA and Korea. Cabinet approval is 
needed once a treaty text is ready and all multilateral and major bilateral treaties must 
be presented – along with a National Interest Analysis – to the House of 
Representatives. The treaty is then considered by the Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
                                                 
82 There is a full-time New Zealand delegate to the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly in New York which focuses on 
human rights issues and the Geneva representative also monitors this area. More recently New Zealand has developed a relationship 
with the new Human Rights Council. The UN Human Rights and Commonwealth Division of MFAT oversees the international 
human rights relationship with the UN. 
83 MFAT has given a list of general reasons for non-ratification, noting that many of them are relevant to Pacific Island states, 
which ‗may explain the relatively low level of human rights treaty ratifications‘ in these countries: ‗lack of political will to accord 
ratification priority relative to other priorities; inconsistencies between the treaty and domestic law and practice; opposition to 
certain provisions of a treaty by strong domestic interest groups (e.g. on the death penalty, women‘s rights to own land etc); the 
length of time required to work through the domestic political and legal implications of ratification to ensure compliance; concern at 
the resource implications of the requirement to report periodically to the respective UN treaty monitoring bodies; greater weighting 
given by some governments to the interests of the state, economic development and security over the pursuit of civil and political 
rights as exercised in Western countries; cultural influences: the view that some international treaties are not appropriate to a 
country‘s particular situation and needs; lack of democracy and/or rule by an authoritarian government; lack of a working 
government; sensitivity to international scrutiny and a desire to minimise such scrutiny; resource constraints; poverty and lack of 
literacy limiting wider understanding of, and support for, human rights; a general lack of awareness among policy- and decision-
makers‘ (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 50).
 
However, Pacific states can vary significantly between each other, even within 
states themselves, about issues such as land inheritance and entitlement.  
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Trade Select Committee. The Government defers taking binding treaty action until the 
provisions of the treaty are implemented in domestic law. Formal treaty action is known 
as ratification or accession and commits New Zealand to obligations relating to that 
instrument. The final step, once acceded or ratified, is that the treaty is deposited in a 
treaty depository and listed on a treaty register maintained by the legal division of 
MFAT.
84
 If countries do not feel ready to bring domestic legislation into alignment with 
international human rights treaty obligations, and this is holding up ratification, they can 
register a reservation. New Zealand currently has reservations registered for the 
ICESCR, CAT and UNCROC and ICCPR (UNGA, 2009c: 3).
85
  
4.2 Evaluation initiatives 
The need to assess the fragmented growth of New Zealand‘s human rights framework 
has resulted in much reflection since the mid-1990s. Table 4 shows a timeline of the 
major initiatives and this section will look at what they were about, how they relate to 
each other, and the key issues arising from this intensive attempt to streamline this area. 
This will then lead into an examination of some of the main suggestions arising from 
these initiatives. This section of the chapter illustrates the reviewing and restructuring 
key themes of Phase Three of New Zealand‘s human rights history. 
                                                 
84 For more information on the treaty-making process in New Zealand see www.mfat.govt.nz/Treaties-and-International-Law/03-
Treaty-making-process/index.php. 
85 Specifically this means that for: the ICESCR, New Zealand legislation about trade unions and industrial relations may not be 
fully compatible with Article 8; for CAT, the Government reserves the right to compensate torture victims (as per article 14) at the 
Attorney-General‘s discretion; for UNCROC, (a) because the Government considers that the rights of the child are adequately 
covered in current legislation, any further measures suggested in article 32(2) will not be carried out, and (b) the Government 
reserves the right to mix juveniles and adults if unavoidable, or if may be of benefit to the juvenile (see article 37(c); for the ICCPR, 
(a) article 14(6) has a reservation in relation to ex gratia payments for miscarriage of justice; (b) article 20 has a reservation about 





Table 3. Four-fold domestic human rights framework 
1 ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL 
INSTITUTIONS 
Human Rights Commission 
Office of the Privacy Commissioner 
Ombudsmen‘s Office 
Office of the Children‘s Commissioner 
Office of the Health and Disability Commissioner 
MINISTRIES AND AGENCIES 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Ministry of Justice 
Crown Law Office 
NZ Defence Force 
Ministry of Social Development 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Women‘s Affairs 
Ministry of Youth Affairs 
Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs 
Te Puni Kokiri 
NZ Police 
Immigration Service in Department of Labour 
Department of Corrections 
 
2 LEGISLATION/COURTS LAW+LITIGATION LEVEL 
HUMAN RIGHTS RELATED-LEGISLATION 
Cabinet vetting process: 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act (1990) 
Human Rights Act (1993) 
Privacy Act (1993) 
Other related legislation: 
Equal Pay Act (1972) 
Ombudsman Act (1975) 
Disabled Persons Community Welfare Act (1975) 
Human Rights Commission Act (1977) 
Official Information Act (1982) 
Constitution Act (1986) 
Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act (1987) 
Abolition of the Death Penalty Act (1989) 
Crimes of Torture Act (1989) 
Children, Young Persons and their Families Act (1989) 
Health and Disability Commissioner Act (1994) 
Domestic Violence Act (1995) 
Human Rights Amendment Act (2001) 
JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES (e.g. HRC) 
 
3 POLICY LEVEL 
Inter-departmental liaison and training 
Non-judicial policies and practices 
Early mainstreaming 
 
4 STATE-LEVEL HUMAN RIGHTS GOVERNANCE 
Human rights governance level 
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Table 4. Major evaluation and planning initiatives/documents 1994-2009 
DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION YEAR 
Evaluation   
Consistency 2000 HRC 1994-1998 
Re-evaluation of the Human 
Rights Protections in New 
Zealand 
Independent ministerial report, 
published by Ministry of 
Justice 
2000 
Compliance 2001 Ministry of Justice 2001 
Human Rights in New Zealand 
Today 
HRC 2004 
Inquiry Into the Role of Human 
Rights in Foreign Policy 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and 
Trade Committee 
2005 
Planning   
New Zealand Action Plan for 
Human Rights 2005-2010 
HRC 2005 
The Human Rights Approach  HRC  2008 




4.2.1 Consistency 2000 
The first initiative occurred very quickly after the Human Rights Act was passed in 
1993 and was a statutory obligation on the HRC set out in that Act. The project started 
in 1994 and a final report entitled Consistency 2000 was published by the Commission 
in December 1998 (HRC, 1998). Broadly Consistency 2000 was an examination by the 
HRC of all laws, policies and practices to check consistency with the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Human Rights Act. The new Act had extended the 
number of grounds of unlawful discrimination from four to 13. However, there was a 
period of exemption for the public sector until 1 January 2000 (HRC, 1998: 6-7). 
Section 5(1)(i-k) of the Act had given the HRC the statutory authority to carry out the 




 The Commission believed this self-audit ‗provided an unprecedented human 
rights educational opportunity in the public sector‘ (HRC, 1998: 17). The Consistency 
2000 report to the Minister of Justice was eventually produced in December 1998, 
despite the project suffering from lack of government support when in June 1997 the 
National Cabinet made a decision to abandon the project. The HRC continued on, albeit 
without funding, and noted in the final report that: 
The project was rather like a half-completed building – the plans had been drawn, the 
materials purchased, the builders contracted, the foundations dug and the superstructure 
erected. With the passing of time and a little more effort the walls, the roof and the 
interior would have been completed (HRC, 1998: 8).  
The report also noted that at the time the project was scaled down much groundwork 
had been completed and the results were starting to happen.
87
 The HRC had found that a 
number of common themes and issues had emerged, and took note of any generic issues 
as these could flag possible areas of ‗systemic discrimination‘ (HRC, 1998: 12).  
The reason given by Cabinet for abandoning funding of the Consistency 2000 exercise 
in June 1997 was that they wanted to try ‗a different approach to government 
compliance with the Human Rights Act‘ (HRC, 1998: 8). This meant it only felt liable 
to comply with the Act in areas where it acted ‗in essentially the same manner as the 
public sector, such as employment and access to public buildings‘ and except for these 
cases ‗it would remain exempt permanently in respect of legislation and other policies 
and practices‘ (HRC, 1998: 24). In a briefing note of 10 August 1998 the Rt Hon Doug 
Graham (Minister of Justice) stated that: 
                                                 
86 Sections 5(1) (i-k) of the Act read: ‗(i) To examine, before the 31st day of December 1998, the Acts and regulations that are in 
force in New Zealand, and any policy or administrative practice of the Government of New Zealand: (j) To determine, before the 
31st day of December 1998, whether any of the Acts, regulations, policies, and practices examined under paragraph (i) of this 
subsection conflict with the provisions of Part II of this Act or infringe the spirit or intention of this Act; (k) To report to the 
Minister, before the close of the 31st day of December 1998, the results of the examination carried out under paragraph (i) of this 
subsection and the details of any determination made under paragraph (j) of this subsection‘. The four phases were: (1) a self-audit 
by government agencies; (2) an external audit by the HRC; (3) an update report by government agencies; and (4) determinations 
made by Commissioners leading to a report to the Minister of Justice by 31 December 1998. After the initial planning had been 
carried out in 1994 officials were invited to self-audit their department‘s Acts, regulations and practices. The Commission was then 
to externally audit the self-audited data for any conflicts with Part II of the Human Rights Act or infringements of its spirit or 
intention. These infringements were reported as Part B: Instance Reports of the final report. If a conflict or infringement of rights 
was identified it was put on an electronic self-audit database programme developed by the HRC. The Ministry of Labour had agreed 
to act as a pilot agency in 1995, but the Department of Social Welfare also became ‗almost another pilot department‘ because of the 
sheer number of social security laws, policies and practices that had to be assessed against the anti-discrimination provisions (HRC, 
1998: 21).  
87 Work that had been carried out by the time of the Cabinet decision included: ‗Consultation had been undertaken, a methodology 
had been developed and tested, technology was in place, training of officials was almost completed, interpretation of key legal 
points had been clarified, self-audits were about half-complete and Commissioners had commenced making ―recommended‖ or 
provisional determinations‘ (Ibid 1998: 8).  
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The reason for repealing the Consistency 2000 project is that there is little more to be 
gained by continuing the very detailed audit process, having regard to the substantial 
resource commitment involved. Preliminary indications were that many inconsistencies 
found were repetitive or minor in nature. The Government decided that a better 
approach would be for Chief Executives of each government department to be 
responsible for assessing and managing their departments‘ legal risks in complying 
with the Human Rights Act. Legislation and regulations that conflict with the Human 
Rights Act will be addressed as they come up for review (Graham 1998: 2). 
Because the HRC had until then been working towards the 31 December 1998 goal set 
out as a statutory obligation, they were extremely concerned about the Cabinet decision. 
As a result the Commission noted in its final report: 
It was decided to concentrate on trying to persuade the government that the new 
direction it was taking was misconceived, retrograde, and highly unsatisfactory in 
human rights terms; and that it would lead to severe criticism both domestically and 
internationally. In its 1997 Annual Report the Commission stated that ―the implications 
of a broad, permanent exemption are serious. It would represent a significant step 
backwards in the observance of human rights in New Zealand‖ (HRC, 1998: 24). 
During the latter half of 1997 and until the Human Rights Amendment Bill was 
introduced into the House of Representatives in August 1998 discussions occurred 
between the HRC and the government ‗to obtain the best result possible in human rights 
terms‘ (HRC, 1998: 25). Three outcomes in this period leading up the introduction of 
the Bill were: meetings between the HRC and ministers and officials finally negotiated 
a situation where the exemptions were ‗generally narrower‘ than previously indicated 
by the government; it was decided legislation and regulations would be checked for 
inconsistencies with the Human Rights Act when they came up for review; and Chief 
Executives became responsible for ‗identifying and resolving compliance issues‘ for 
government policies and practices (HRC, 1998: 25). After a shaky period of trying to 
resolve these issues the HRC was able to assert in its 31 December 1998 final report: 
Compared with the proposals 18 months ago the model for governmental compliance 
with human rights in New Zealand, encapsulated in the Human Rights Amendment Bill 
and new official processes and responsibilities, is considerably improved (HRC, 1998: 
25).  
The Human Rights Amendment Bill 1998 (No 1) was not enacted due to a lack of 
support in the House, but instead the Human Rights Amendment Bill 1999 was passed. 
The HRC met its statutory obligations by submitting the determinations on the audit 
material gathered by the original deadline of 31 December 1998. In 2000 the Hon 
Margaret Wilson, Associate Minister of Justice and Attorney General, commissioned 
the independent ministerial report on human rights protections in New Zealand. The re-
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evaluation team made six recommendations about the Consistency 2000 project.
88
 In 
examining the project they concluded the following, and it is quoted at some length as it 
gave a comprehensive assessment of the project: 
… the Government of the day decided to review the Consistency 2000 project in light 
of the significant resources committed to the project, and preliminary indications that 
many of the main areas of inconsistency were minor or repetitive in nature. … there 
have been a number of real difficulties with the project in practice. In hindsight it was 
overly ambitious. The audit reported large volumes of material without any systematic 
method of prioritising the pressing issues, and on matters in the abstract, which were 
only potentially discriminatory. 
… the Human Rights Act only covers a number of limited areas – rather than the whole 
of government activity. Those statutes that conflict with the core areas of the Act are 
actually rare. The audit, however, took a very broad view of this (invoking the ‗spirit 
and intention‘ of the Act as required by s 5) … the proper standard by which to assess 
these broader forms of government activity is that set out in the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 and not the Human Rights Act. That is not to say that some of the 
information collected in the exercise is not valuable and that on occasion those 
standards will not overlap. Nevertheless a great deal of confusion has resulted.  
… The original purpose of the Consistency 2000 audit, or database, was to identify 
possible areas for second phase consideration. Enough has now been done by way of 
identifying problematic areas. Even though it was not as thoroughgoing as originally 
conceived, a legislative audit is never likely to be an exhaustive or definitive way of 
identifying areas of inequality. Significantly, the most pressing issue of equality 
recognised by the present government was not signalled by the Consistency 2000 
project at all. Undoubtedly the disparity in economic health and educational status 
between Māori and the rest of the population is a major issue facing New Zealand 
today. Neither did the audit particularly raise as a concern the issue of indirect 
discrimination against women. A legislative project such as this is no substitute for 
empirical research, monitoring effects of legislative changes, and good policy analysis 
(Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 40, 41, 45). 
This was an interesting phase in the history of New Zealand‘s human rights history. A 
cornerstone piece of legislation – the Human Rights Act 1993 – had been enacted, 
including the statutory provision in it for the HRC to review inconsistencies in all other 
Acts, policies and practices across the government sector. This was swiftly commenced 
in 1994, but by mid-1997 (18 months out from the deadline which the HRC was 
steadily working towards) a government decision caused funding to cease. The 
Commission did deliver on the incomplete project by providing a final report for the 31 
                                                 
88 These recommendations were: ‗(1) The Justice and Law Reform Committee should have a continuing role – and progress on 
specific themes should be reported to it on a periodic basis; (2) Subject to resolution of the relevant resource issues, officers from 
the Ministry of Justice Bill of Rights monitoring team should be allocated to help departments find solutions. Outside help might 
also be sought; (3) A pool of information should be made available to departments struggling with similar problems, which includes 
worked examples showing how the statutes could be made compliant; (4) Processes should be created by which committed lead 
agencies can mentor other agencies not yet up to speed; (5) Attorney General‘s opinions on Bill of Rights compliance should be 
made available to departments, and publicly, in order to build a jurisprudence and rights culture; (6) Chief Executives should be 




December 1998 deadline. However, a re-evaluation team writing the independent 
ministerial report in 2001 analysing the Consistency 2000 project had misgivings about 
the size of the task and even the way it was scoped, but found much value in the work 
that was done. This is a clear example of the development of New Zealand‘s human 
rights framework: the ad hoc build-up was acknowledged and an attempt was made to 
streamline the fragmentation. Even though this attempt (Consistency 2000) may have 
had its own difficulties, it was a major project in ironing out inconsistencies with the 
Human Rights Act. It was also, as noted earlier, a chance for departments to self-audit 
and was a unique human rights educational opportunity for the public sector.  
It should also be noted that while the re-evaluation team were mainly concerned about 
hard law inconsistencies, the HRC approach through its statutory obligations under 
section 5 of the Act started to look at the also important (and harder to detect) 
discriminations against the ‗spirit and intention‘ of the Act. This highlights the 
difference between a primarily law-based vs multi-disciplinary approach to human 
rights. This approach was confirmed in the HRC‘s 2004 Human Rights in New Zealand 
Today report which stated that it went beyond recording ‗the extent to which New 
Zealand‘s laws conform‘ and also attempted ‗to assess the extent of substantive 
compliance: to what extent people‘s experiences reflect an active respect for human 
rights, to what extent people are protected from human rights abuses and violations‘ 
(HRC, 2004a: 24). That is, it went beyond the law+litigation model. At the very least 
the Consistency 2000 project began the ‗conversation‘ the state sector had with itself 
about ensuring inconsistencies were ironed out at every stage in the process and started 
to mainstream the issue of compliance into everyday policy work. 
4.2.2 Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New 
Zealand (2000) 
This independent ministerial report has already been mentioned and a range of 
individuals and organisations were consulted by the re-evaluation team during the 
writing stage.
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 The report noted that: 
                                                 
89 These included: ‗a cross-section of NGOs, parliamentarians, academic and government departments, as well as the 
Commissioners and staff of New Zealand‘s human rights organisations‘, and 1,365 organisations and individuals made public 
submissions (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 18; 2001: 6).  
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New Zealand‘s laws and institutions dealing with human rights have grown organically, 
largely in response to the adoption of international standards we have helped to develop 
… there is strong support for the view that this is a timely point at which to take stock 
of our laws and institutions relating to human rights (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 6, 7).  
The re-evaluation team had been given six terms of reference.
90 
The fifth one about 
making sure international obligations are factored early in the policy-making process is 
most relevant to this research. The team made recommendations in four key areas, first 
about clarifying the status of New Zealand‘s human rights law. They examined the 
‗role, function and inter-relationship‘ between the Human Rights Act and NZBORA 
and found that ‗New Zealand‘s human rights obligations and the relationship between 
these two Acts are not well understood by the public, politicians and many government 
departments‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2001: 7). The team determined that the difference 
between the two Acts was that NZBORA‘s aim was: ‗to regulate and limit the power of 
government and public actors‘ i.e. it stated ‗the general anti-discrimination principle to 
which government acting as government should adhere‘ (largely a public sector 
focus).
91
 On the other hand the Human Rights Act was viewed as ‗a detailed working 
out of the government‘s duty to protect its citizens from discrimination perpetrated by 
fellow citizens‘ (largely a private sector focus) (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 27-28, 30). 
Secondly the team reviewed this country‘s domestic human rights institutions. They 
found problems with existing human rights agencies which tended to:  
… be complaints-driven; be small and fragmented resulting in efficiency problems; 
neglect their educational and advocacy roles because of this; current commissioner 
model means that commissioners become very involved in day-to-day work – losing 
sight of the education work and long-term goals (Ministry of Justice, 2001: 7).  
                                                 
90 The terms of reference were: ‗(1) To re-evaluate the nature and scope of the provisions of the Human Rights Act 1993, and if 
necessary, recommend amendments that would contribute to the further mainstreaming of human rights considerations in New 
Zealand. (2) To develop recommendations for the relationship of our domestic human rights laws to other legislation in a way that 
best promotes and protects the human rights of New Zealanders in accordance with international conventions. This should include 
consideration of the primacy or otherwise of human rights law to other legislation. (3) To re-evaluate the roles, inter-relationships, 
operation and structures of the Human Rights Commission, Race Relations Conciliator, the Privacy Commissioner and Complaints 
Review Tribunal, and if necessary, recommend changes that would enhance the effective promotion and enforcement of New 
Zealand‘s domestic human rights laws. This should include the re-evaluation of options for the resolution of human rights 
complaints. (4) To re-evaluate the inter-relationships of the above agencies with the Commissioner for Children and Health & 
Disability Commissioner, given their respective statutory roles. (5). To re-evaluate the adequacy of current mechanisms, and if 
necessary, recommend changes that would ensure that international human rights obligations are taken into account in the 
development and implementation of government policy, practice and New Zealand legislation. (6) To consider whether New 
Zealand would benefit from a National Plan of Action for the promotion and protection of human rights as recommended by the UN 
World Conference on Human Rights [held in Vienna in 1993], and if necessary, to recommend a process for the development of a 
New Zealand National Plan of Action‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 16-17).  
91 This raises the issue of how government attempts to improve the human rights framework are important because they head off 
possible concerns that New Zealand could be exposed overseas for domestic rights derelictions, especially when local lobby groups 
become involved in the exposure. Not only is there the politics of exposure, but the politics of pressure, where there is such intense 
lobbying on issues (such as New Zealand‘s stance not to support the UN Indigenous Rights Declaration) that decisions are reversed.
 
See Section 6.3 for more information on the Declaration. 
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The team recommended a new NHRI which included that it be: ‗strategically focused; 
have an increased education and advocacy mandate; maintain some complaints work; 
promote discussion of the Treaty of Waitangi and domestic and international human 
rights law‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2001: 7-8). This new NHRI would consolidate the HRC 
and the Race Relations Office together (the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 did 
amalgamate these two agencies). They also suggested that a Complaints Review 
Tribunal with more powers should deal with complaints and the Amendment Act 
eventually created the Human Rights Review Tribunal (HRRT). The team then looked 
at policy-making improvements. It was concluded that ‗the public sector understanding 
of human rights issues needs to be improved‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2001: 8), and 12 
recommendations were made.
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 Finally a national plan of action was discussed. The 
report recommended that the new NHRI should be responsible for leading the 
development of this plan, and four years later the HRC did produce the New Zealand 
action plan for human rights for the period 2005-2010.
93
 It was hoped that a plan would 
help in ‗planning the large systemic changes recommended in the re-evaluation report‘ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2001: 8). 
A Cabinet paper and a Cabinet Minute both endorsed the recommendations of the re-
evaluation report (Cabinet Office, 2001a, 2001b). The first, a paper on human rights-
related issues, proposed the establishment of an inter-departmental working group to: 
… achieve the goals of: fully integrating a human rights perspective into policy-
making; … rationalising departmental responsibilities including in relation to 
international treaty obligations (Cabinet, 2001a: 1-2).  
The Cabinet Minute was very specific in its directions: 
Mainstreaming Human Rights Considerations in the Policy and 
Legislative Process 
21 directed that an inter-departmental working group 
21.1 be established to assess the Re-evaluation report‘s recommendations for 
improving the mainstreaming of human rights considerations in legislation and policy-
making and to develop a workplan, including priorities, a timeline and required 
resources, to be reported back by 30 August 2001 to the Prime Minister, Associate 
Minister of Justice (Hon Margaret Wilson), Minister of State Services, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, Minister of Māori Affairs and Minister for Disability Issues; 
                                                 
92 For a fuller discussion on these recommendations see Chapter 5.1. 
93 The idea of a National Plan of Action (NPA) was a recommendation resulting from the World Conference on Human Rights held 
in Vienna in 1993. The HRC produced New Zealand‘s first one in 2005 (HRC, 2005a) and is working on the second plan covering 
the period 2011-2016. For a discussion about New Zealand‘s experience in developing the plan see Cubitt (2004).  
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21.2 be chaired by the Ministry of Justice; 
21.3 include representatives from the State Services Commission, Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade; and 
21.4 invite the Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Race Relations 
Conciliator and the key social policy and population agencies (Ministry of Social 
Policy, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Department of Labour and Te Puni 
Kokiri) to have a representative on the group (Cabinet, 2001b: 4). 
What eventually happened in relation to this Cabinet direction, including the high-level 
participation of Ministers and inter-agency staff in this process? Four years later MFAT 
noted in its 2005 submission to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 
about human rights and foreign policy that it was aware that:  
Cabinet has directed that the Ministry of Justice lead an interdepartmental group to 
assess the recommendations of the Re-evaluation report and to develop a work plan 
designed to improve the Mainstreaming of human rights considerations in legislation 
and policymaking [CAB Min (01) 17/6D, paragraph 21 refers]. The preliminary work 
on this project has recently begun (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 59).  
An inter-agency working group that the Cabinet paper and Cabinet Minute had 
endorsed was set up in 2002, but eventually focused on helping the HRC develop a 
national plan of action instead of early mainstreaming. The group has since faded in a 
formal sense, so there is now no official inter-departmental training for policy advisors 
and each department deals with this issue on a case-by-case basis. It is not surprising, 
however, that this work became diverted. The re-evaluation report raised many issues, 
including the need for a national action plan, and this involved a major effort between 
2002 and 2005 with the HRC working alongside relevant departments. The HRC had 
already been through the large Consistency 2000 project and the Ministry of Justice the 
Compliance 2001 audit. The action plan was published in 2005, and a year earlier the 
HRC had also published the large status report Human Rights in New Zealand Today 
(HRC 2004a). A lot was achieved in a very short space of time, and because of limited 
resourcing issues it is no wonder that the 12 recommendations of the re-evaluation team 
were not carried out precisely as instructed by the Cabinet Minute. However, as 
suggested in the next chapter some useful strategies became ‗lost‘ in the system and 
they could well need revisiting. 
The re-evaluation team‘s brief and recommendations were wide-ranging and reviewed 
all aspects of the human rights framework in New Zealand. It is also a useful document 
showing the fragmentation that has occurred in this framework, but also a pointer to the 
re-integration that has been happening and is still required. As well as this, the re-
evaluation report was a clear example of the reviewing and restructuring key themes of 
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Phase Two. It was a much more wide-ranging initiative than the Consistency 2000 
project which had a brief to focus on the law+litigation aspect of inconsistent 
legislation. The re-evaluation report, however, started to examine the specific processes 
and mechanisms of New Zealand‘s human rights framework as well as the 
law+litigation aspects. It also fed into the development of the Human Rights 
Amendment Act 2001.  
4.2.3 Compliance 2001 (and the Human Rights Amendment Act 
2001) 
A similar initiative occurred a year after Consistency 2000. The government had 
become so concerned about this topic that ‗compliance‘ features in the name of this 
second project. The international legal protection in having policy advisors literate in 
human rights obligations was starting to be taken very seriously, but it was also 
important to have compliant legislation for them to work from. The history of the 
initiative is that in December 2000 Cabinet agreed to a new auditing process for 
improving the compliance of legislation and government policies and practices with the 
Human Rights Act. The process, known as Compliance 2001, was managed by the 
Ministry of Justice but was not a revival of the previous Consistency 2000 initiative. 
Instead the new project relied on government departments to complete their own audits 
of legislation, policies and practices and self-determine whether any issues of 
inconsistency needed to be resolved.
94
 Following the two audits – Consistency 2000 and 
Compliance 2001 – the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 was enacted. Two 
legislative-related features of this Act, as detailed in New Zealand‘s fifth periodic 
ICCPR report in 2007, were:  
 Government activity (except in relation to employment, sexual or racial 
harassment and victimisation, which are subject to the general provisions of 
Part 1 of the Act) is now the subject to the single discrimination standard 
under s 19(1) of the Bill of Rights Act 
 The broad exemption from the Human Rights Act for certain government 
activities is removed (MFAT, 2007: 19). 
                                                 
94 The process was divided into four streams: 1) legislation, practices and policies concerning social delivery; 2) other significant 
legislative inconsistencies; 3) minor inconsistencies; and 4) general inconsistencies in policies and practices. The Ministry of Justice 
organised a series of seminars to assist officials undertaking the audit. A Human Rights Reference Group was also formed with 
members from the Ministry of Justice, the HRC, the Crown Law Office and the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Under 
the Compliance 2001 process all government departments were required to report to their Ministers and the Ministry of Justice by 2 
March 2001. 
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However, the Act also heralded institutional reform (consistent with the Phase Two 
restructuring key theme), including the disestablishment of the Race Relations Office 
and the creation of a Race Relations Commissioner position. A new Office of Human 
Rights Proceedings was set up to handle discrimination cases using public funding. 
Chief Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan commented on the changes resulting from the 
Human Rights Amendment Act 2001: 
If the only knowledge you had of the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 had come 
from listening to Parliamentary debates during the second reading and the Committee 
stages of the Bill, then you could well have believed that the new Human Rights 
Commission was going to be a frightening manifestation of Big Brother (or in this case 
Big Sister, which was apparently infinitely worse), thought police, social engineering 
and political correctness … However, despite the popular endorsement of the need for a 
Human Rights Commission aspects of the Parliamentary debate did reflect a partial 
public, and certainly media emphasized, perception that human rights are either: simply 
a device to enable the disgruntled and inadequate to blame someone else for personal 
failure; or a mechanism to allow sharp lawyers to win cases for otherwise undeserving 
clients; or that they are frequently used on trivial issues and to impose conformity. The 
first of a number of challenges facing the new Human Rights Commission was 
therefore to strengthen and extend knowledge and understanding about human rights 
and responsibilities – to take human rights out of the lawyers‘ offices and into the 
community; to encourage that human rights are about more than anti-discrimination 
laws, important though those are, and that they have real value for every person … 
(Noonan, 2008: 4-5).  
Another important feature of the Act was that the newly created HRRT could now make 
Declarations of Inconsistency (already discussed in Section 1.2.1) if discriminatory 
legislation was identified. In terms of this last point, both the Consistency 2000 and 
Compliance 2001 initiatives focused on clarifying inconsistencies between the Human 
Rights Act and other legislation. As already noted, since the Amendment Act came into 
force, if an enactment is found to be inconsistent with the Human Rights Act, the HRRT 
can issue a Declaration of Inconsistency. Just eight years after the Human Rights Act 
was passed, this fine-tuning of the human rights framework (both institutionally and 
structurally) with the Amendment Act clarified the roles of the various agencies and the 
government‘s anti-discrimination liability, and gave some real teeth to an inconsistency 
watchdog mechanism. The next initiative, however, took a stock-take not so much of 
the structures/institutions and mechanisms, but of how well they were actually being 
implemented to various (often vulnerable) groups in New Zealand. 
4.2.4 Human Rights in New Zealand Today (2004) 
This 2004 report was the ‗first comprehensive assessment of the status of human rights 
in New Zealand‘ (HRC, 2004a: 19) and was used as the basis of the action plan for 
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human rights for 2005-2010 (discussed more fully in Section 4.3.1). Like the re-
evaluation report which had already been carried out in 2001 this report was also a 
stock-take of ‗how well the rights so passionately acclaimed in 1948 are recognised and 
respected here in 2004‘ (HRC, 2004a: 19). The report also flagged the HRC‘s intention 
of developing human rights indicators: 
In the absence of agreed international or national indicators or measures of human 
rights outcomes, this report is the first New Zealand attempt to provide a basis for the 
development of indicators that are appropriate for our national context (HRC, 2004a: 
25).  
It is divided into six sections with the middle four focusing on: the rights of children 
and disabled people; civil and political rights; economic, social and cultural rights; and 
race relations. The report asked: ‗Where do we do well in New Zealand in terms of 
human rights? Where do we need to do better?‘(HRC, 2004a: 24). It also noted that the 
UN has identified key features of national human rights protection systems: democracy; 
the rule of law; an independent and corruption-free judiciary that applies international 
human rights; good governance; specialised human rights institutions and formal 
procedures for accountability; human rights information and education; an active civil 
society; and a focus on the most vulnerable parts of the population (HRC, 2004a: 22). 
This is therefore a good example of an NHRI acting in its intermediary capacity 
between the UN and a state, trying to educate domestically about UN guidelines. In the 
report conclusion it was stated that New Zealand has most of the elements essential for 




Finally the report looked at the challenge of developing a national plan of action. This 
included the early mainstreaming of these rights into central and local government 
policy making, and developing reliable human rights measures and indicators. This 
report represents the last of the stock-take initiatives for the HRC, and this thesis now 
turns to a health check of a different kind: the status of human rights in foreign policy. 
 
 
                                                 
95See Footnote 32. 
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4.2.5 Inquiry into the Role of International Human Rights in Foreign 
Policy (2005) 
In 2005 the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee published an inquiry report 
into the role of international human rights in foreign policy. This section, which 
straddles the international-domestic human rights framework, is included in the 
evaluation initiatives because it throws a wider than usual net about the impact of 
international human rights in the state sector. In particular, this issue touches on the key 
point for this thesis of human rights training. In the report the committee noted the 
complexity of the topic of human rights in foreign policy and the ‗tendency of 
international human rights issues to arise in highly-politicised circumstances‘ (NZ 
House of Representatives, 2005: 5). It also noted that human rights issues appear in 
New Zealand through a number of sources, and it is from this varied material that 




The committee also commented that ‗human rights considerations are central to New 
Zealand‘s foreign policy beyond compliance with international obligations‘ because the 
values contained in them already underpin society and are essential to world peace and 
security (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 5). The committee endorsed domestic 
measures in the area such as the then just published action plan for human rights for 
2005-2010. They were pleased to note that it contained a long-term strategy for 
fulfilling international human rights obligations (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 
6). It is good to see one set of report authors taking note of the existence of another 
report at the time, but this was not always the case between the various initiatives set 
out in Table 4. Because of the increasing role of human rights in foreign policy the 
committee felt it necessary to have a government strategy that would be realistic at New 
Zealand‘s three levels of engagement: multilateral, regional and bilateral.97  
                                                 
96 These include domestic diplomatic reporting, the UN, HRC work, NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, human rights reports from other governments such as the USA, and the media (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 
62).  
97 MFAT states that ‗New Zealand is a committed multilateralist in relation to human rights as in other areas of foreign policy 
activity‘ and that this country contributes to: ‗Multilateral human rights diplomacy, including the improved implementation of 
existing instruments; Engaging in new standard-setting exercises; Negotiating resolutions on both thematic and country human 
rights issues at the main international human rights meetings; Participating in regional human rights fora‘ (MFAT, 2005: 34). 
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From the committee‘s report the main areas of international human rights engagement 
New Zealand has across the various levels and relationships have been identified: 
 UN – New Zealand is an observer state on the Commission on Human Rights 
and a full member of the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly. Two of 
the posts (Geneva and New York) are especially focused on human rights issues. 
 Commonwealth – New Zealand signed the 1991 Harare Declaration that 
endorses human rights and democracy as basic principles of the Commonwealth. 
Human rights abuses among member nations are taken seriously and the 
Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group investigates these in countries such as 
Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Zimbabwe and Gambia. 
 Regional level – New Zealand is a participant in the Asia Pacific Forum (APF) 
of NHRIs. The New Zealand HRC and the Australian Human Rights and Equal 
Opportunities Commission (HREOC) were jointly ‗prime movers‘ behind the 
establishment of the APF. 
 Bilateral level – strategies have been developed to raise the issue of human 
rights concerns in other states (e.g. the Sudan, Iran, Myanmar and Iraq), 
including diplomatic and ministerial dialogue, on a sensitive case-by-case basis; 
and practical constructive help is given to developing countries wherever 
appropriate. 
 Multilateral trade relationships – trade is seen to be related to human rights 
protection. MFAT noted that: ‗The WTO system is part of the international 
architecture created after World War II to promote peace, security, prosperity 
and human rights‘. World economic prosperity is also seen to underpin political 
freedom. One area New Zealand has strongly supported is the promotion of core 
labour standards that protect workers in developing countries. 
 Military relationships – New Zealand does review its military assistance when 
there are clear abuses of human rights by regimes. It also screens the export of 
military equipment to avoid those countries where the weapons could be used to 
carry out human rights atrocities (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 22-27, 3, 
48, 58, 63). 
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New Zealand is therefore able to raise awareness of human rights at a number of levels 
e.g. Commonwealth, the APF, bilateral, trade and military.  
4.3 Planning for the future 
By the mid-2000s the stock-take was largely completed, the implications of the Human 
Rights Amendment Act 2001 had been worked through, and the focus had now turned 
to planning a way forward. An important part of this was identifying problematic areas 
that needed realistic strategies to ensure progress was in fact made over time and this 
fits with the Phase Three theme of long-term strategising. 
4.3.1 New Zealand Action Plan for Human Rights (2005-2010) 
Human Rights in New Zealand Today had taken a hard look at how effectively human 
rights were being implemented to various groups and this research became the basis for 
the topics in the action plan that was produced by the HRC. Looking at the broad 
concept of a national plan of action (NPA), MFAT stated: 
Essentially, an NPA represents a strategic plan for the long-term fulfilment of 
international rights obligations and implementation of domestic human rights policies 
or standards. NPAs can be important means of locking-in high-level political 
commitment to human rights in states. They are also a natural step towards national 
capacity building as they expose gaps in domestic law and practice (NZ House of 
Representatives, 2005: 61).  
The action plan sets out what is required to achieve measurable improvements between 
2005 and 2010 and it concluded that: ‗New Zealand meets international human rights 
standards in many respects, and often surpasses them‘ (HRC, 2005a: 2). It was 
produced after extensive government, NGO and public consultation and identified ‗key 
human rights outcomes and the actions needed to achieve them‘ (HRC, 2005a: 3). The 
plan took into account the pressing issues that had been identified in Human Rights in 
New Zealand Today. It looked broadly at issues for children, disabled people and race 
relations and then examined first and second generation rights and the policy and legal 
framework for the protection and promotion of human rights. Given the pressing issues 
mentioned a strong human rights framework was suggested which would involve: the 
place of the Treaty of Waitangi, the rule of law, good governance – applying human 
rights in the development of legislation and policy (hence complementarity), human 
rights education, and accountability – monitoring human rights (HRC, 2005a: 37-40). 
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The HRC has continued to work on this stronger human rights framework, and a 
concrete part of this is The Human Rights Approach discussed below. 
 
4.3.2 The Human Rights Approach (2008) 
The HRC distributes material and information about the Human Rights Approach to 
policy-making agencies. This approach is based on a methodology first set out in the 
UN Economic and Social Council‘s (2003b: 8) report on the promotion and protection 
of human rights and is designed for use in several areas: ‗policy development and 
advice, advocacy and lobbying, baseline surveys, monitoring and evaluation, public 
hearings, social audits, inquiries, litigation and education‘ (HRC, 2008a: 1). The HRC 
regards the Human Rights Approach as being best international practice and it involves 
six tools or elements.
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 These six elements had been applied to the underlying analysis 
contained in Human Rights in New Zealand Today. The HRC believed that adopting the 
Human Rights Approach will have many benefits, which reflect the concerns of this 
research:  
It will help to sustain democracy if this approach is taken to developing and delivering 
legislation, policy and practice; it will make human rights-protecting legislation more 
accessible and enable the incorporation of second as well as first generation rights; and 
it will help all rights-holders to assess how their rights can be put at the heart of the 
design and delivery of public services (HRC, 2008a: 1).  
The key principles are set out in Table 5 which follows. This approach therefore 
represents a deepening of human rights considerations into state sector activity and a 




                                                 
98 These are: (1) The linking of decision-making at every level to human rights standards at the international level as set out in the 
various human rights covenants and treaties. (2) Identification of all relevant human rights involved, and a balancing of rights, 
where necessary. When balancing rights the priority should be given to the most vulnerable. (3) Accountability for actions and 
decisions, which allows individuals and groups to complain about decisions that affect them adversely. (4) Empowerment of 
individuals and groups by enabling them to use rights as leverage for action and to legitimise their voice in decision-making. (5) An 
emphasis on the participation of individuals and groups in decision-making. (6) Non-discrimination among individuals and groups 




Table 5. Eleven key principles of a Human Rights Approach 
1 Universality Human rights belong to all beings 
2 Non-discrimination and equality Human rights are to be enjoyed by all 
3 Indivisibility Includes economic, social, cultural, civil 
and political rights  
4 Inter-dependence and inter-
relatedness 
Human rights reinforce and affect each 
other 
5 Accountability Human rights imply duties and 
accountabilities for those duties 
6 Attention to vulnerable groups Priority given to those facing special 
obstacles to the realisation of human rights 
7 Participation All people have the right to participate fully 
freely, effectively and voluntarily 
8 Independence of the judiciary As final arbiter the judiciary needs to be 
independent and impartial 
9 Rule of law and legislative capacity Human rights must be guaranteed by law 
10 Transparency Openness supports accountability 
11 Empowerment People should be strengthened to shape 
their own futures and support each other to 
shape theirs 
Source: HRC (2008a: 2) 
4.3.3 New Zealand’s Universal Periodic Review (2009) 
To recap on the UPR process, the reporting for New Zealand‘s human rights obligations 
is usually carried through periodic reports on the core human rights treaties (ICCPR, 
ICESCR, CEDAW, UNCROC, CAT, CERD and CRPD). As a further measure, the 
Human Rights Council, which had been established in 2006, has also mandated that the 
UN Human Rights Committee should carry out a Universal Periodic Review of each 
state on a four-yearly cycle. Consultation on the New Zealand draft was wide: over 70 
community-based organisations and NGOs; the general public; and interested Māori, 
Cook Islands, Niuean and Tokelauan groups (HRC, 2008b: 5). The UPR report that was 
finally presented at the UN in May 2009 by the Minister of Justice Simon Power looked 
at those areas where New Zealand is surpassing or meeting international human rights 
standards and balancing this against current challenges in meeting these obligations. 
The report was reviewed by the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review on 7 
May 2009 and the New Zealand delegation was left with a list of 64 recommendations 
raised by 36 states that had commented on this country‘s report (UNGA, 2009b). The 
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New Zealand Government considered these recommendations and reported back to the 
Human Rights Council on 7 July 2009 (UNGA, 2009c). The UPR review cycle 
therefore represents another layer of reporting that will help ensure the ongoing 
assessment of achievements against goals set. 
4.4 Summary 
What is clear is that the several documents and initiatives above do speak to each other 
in some content and concerns, even though some of the authors would not have known 
of the existence of all the reports. Despite their origin in different agencies – the HRC, 
Ministry of Justice, MFAT, independent ministerial report, select committee – common 
issues emerge and there is a build-up of similar strategies about what might address 
some of these problems. These issues include: affirmation for the work on inconsistent 
legislation; the need for the early mainstreaming of human rights into policy making, 
including training and better involvement of officials in this area; more parity between 
first and second generation rights; and improving human rights reporting. Along the 
way these initiatives have also had beneficial spin-off effects in raising human rights 
awareness across a number of groups in New Zealand – officials, NGOs, academics, the 
media and the public. The various initiatives also show an evolving process. There has 
been no linear progress, but instead trying one approach (e.g. Consistency 2000), then 
another, with different agencies in the lead. All the while broader structural problems 
and legislative issues have been addressed, the Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 
being a major component of this. This fragmentation should not be seen as a bad sign. 
Oberleitner used a phrase about the proliferation of these institutions which could well 
be applied to the fragmented expansion of the New Zealand human rights framework: 
Established ad hoc in response to concrete needs rather than as part of any master plan, 
such institutions have experienced sustained, yet mostly unplanned and uncoordinated 
growth and internal development (Oberleitner, 2007: 1).  
This process is therefore not uncommon, and could even be a necessary phase on the 
road to a state moving towards robust human rights governance. It is further suggested 
in this thesis that this tweaking of the fragmented and inconsistent human rights system 
over the last several decades is slowly moving to a point where a more cohesive 
framework for officials to work from is emerging. However, key components of this are 
still not yet in place, and the next chapter examines these deficiencies and looks at 
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possible solutions and how the complementarity of law+litigation/policy approaches 
could be helpful. 
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CHAPTER 5: EMBEDDING A HUMAN RIGHTS 
APPROACH INTO THE STATE SECTOR 
The evaluation and planning initiatives of the last chapter give many clues about how a 
human rights approach might be more effectively embedded into the state sector. 
However, the disparate ideas and recommendations have not been drawn together. This 
chapter looks at several factors that need to be clarified or improved in order to embed 
this approach more successfully: non-judicial approaches and early mainstreaming; 
where the locus of control for international human rights oversight should lie; the 
possible need for an inter-departmental group of officials; training civil servants; 
inconsistencies with the Cabinet vetting system; human rights education; state-level 
human rights governance; and some ideas for better implementation. The material in 
this chapter (and Chapters 6 and 8) relates to Phase Five about the more effective 
implementation of international human rights, particularly the theme of clarification. 
The several factors mentioned above are about showing how this effectiveness might be 
improved. 
5.1 Non-judicial approaches and early mainstreaming 
A key result of the Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand 
report was the emphasis on policy-based vs court-based initiatives i.e. non-judicial 
approaches. The re-evaluation team had noted:  
There are many different strategies by which a state may promote and protect 
international human rights. One approach is to permit the prosecution of human rights 
cases before domestic courts and international bodies. Another less adversarial 
approach is to integrate human rights into the state‘s policy-making processes. Both 
approaches are legitimate responses to the binding nature of international human rights 
law. Obviously, the policy approach depends less on the courts than the existence of 
good policy-making processes within government. Paragraph 5 of the Terms of 
Reference [of this report] requires the consideration of this non-judicial, policy-oriented 
approach to the promotion and protection of human rights. … Policies which respect 
and reflect human rights are more likely to be inclusive, equitable, robust, durable and 
of good quality. Critically, such policies will also be less vulnerable to domestic and 
international legal challenge (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 94, 95).
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99 Term of Reference 5 states: ‗To re-evaluate the adequacy of current mechanisms and, if necessary, recommend changes that 
would ensure that international human rights obligations are taken into account in the development and implementation of 
government policy, practice and New Zealand legislation‘ (Ministry of Justice 2000a: 17). 
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Other voices in New Zealand had been suggesting non-judicial approaches as well. At 
the 20
th
 anniversary of the NZ Law Commission in 2006 Sir Geoffrey Palmer noted 
that: 
… the establishment of such bodies as the Human Rights Commission suggests a desire 
to develop principles in a non-litigious way that is more flexible and less 
confrontational, using the techniques of mediation and conciliation and non-court 
oriented methods of dispute resolution (Palmer, 2006: 23).  
Two years later at the 60
th
 anniversary conference for the UDHR the Chief 
Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan stated that there was a history in this country of a 
‗pragmatic rather than legalistic approach‘ to implementation (Noonan, 2008). The re-
evaluation team also noted that the ad hoc growth of human rights in New Zealand had 
made it very difficult for these rights to be factored in at the desired early stages of 
policy making: 
New Zealand‘s law and institutions dealing with human rights have grown organically, 
largely in response to the adoption of the international standards we have helped to 
develop. … As a consequence of fragmented growth, each agency is focussed on its 
own principal areas of activity … there is little pressure or drive for strategic 
coordination and cooperation amongst the agencies … the inefficiencies and loss of 
effectiveness caused by fragmentation was commented on by many. … Today, 
international human rights are seldom taken into account early in New Zealand‘s 
policy-making process. For the most part the practice appears to be patchy, uneven and 
unsystematic (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 6, 56, 95).  
International human rights obligations are usually only factored into the government 
policy-making process at a relatively late stage [Cabinet vetting] with a consequent risk 
of disruption to that process. There are a number of practical steps that might be taken 
to encourage wider understanding amongst officials that early consideration of relevant 
international human rights norms will contribute to the development of sound policy 
proposals and a smooth policy-making process (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 13).  
These ‗practical steps‘ included the 12 recommendations set out below that were 
produced by the team. They affirmed the need to fully mainstream a human rights 
perspective into policy making and to rationalise departmental responses to 
international treaty obligations.  
1 All departments to review the arrangements which are designed to ensure that 
international human rights are integrated early in departmental policy-making 
processes. While it is anticipated that all departments will be assisted by the adoption of 
some of the following recommendations, given the varied nature of departmental work 
it is not expected that all recommendations will be adopted by all departments. The 
recommendations have particular relevance to those departments with policies and 
programmes with significant human rights implications, such as Justice, Social Policy, 
Health, Education, Labour, Children, Women, TPK, Treasury, MFAT, Police and 
Immigration. 
2 A single consolidated human rights requirement for submissions to the Cabinet 
Office [i.e. addressing both national and international human rights]. 
3 A departmental senior official to be responsible for ensuring realistic, practical 
and effective arrangements are in place by which human rights are integrated into 
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policy-making processes. 
4 State Services Commission to revise generic policy-making guidelines so they 
give due regard to human rights. 
5 Departmental policy-making guidelines to give due regard to human rights; 
such guidelines to list the international human rights instruments of particular relevance 
to that department‘s responsibilities. 
6 Departments to ensure their staff, especially policy advisors, receive 
appropriate training in relation to human rights. 
7 Departmental work programmes to identify the department‘s activities which 
are designed to enhance the promotion and protection of human rights. 
8 In some circumstances, a departmental human rights impact assessment should 
be prepared in relation to a particular policy. 
9 Departmental annual reports (or their equivalent) to list the international 
human rights instruments of particular relevance to the department and to include a 
section which outlines how the department‘s recent activities have advanced the 
realisation of human rights. 
10 To establish a permanent, inter-departmental network of officials with 
particular responsibility for human rights. 
11 To assign, with consequential resource allocation, primary responsibility for 
the preparation of periodic reports to Departments working especially closely to the 
relevant area e.g. ICCPR, CERD and CAT to Justice and ICESCR to the Ministry of 
Social Policy. 
12 The Ministry of Justice, MFAT and Crown Law should review their 
overlapping responsibilities for the provision of advice on international human rights 
law and report to their Ministers with agreed proposals for resolving the issue (Ministry 
of Justice, 2000a: 104-106). 
Geiringer and Palmer also looked at what the implications would be for New Zealand 
social policy making if a rights-based approach was taken. They noted that this 
approach is already ‗a matter of binding international law‘, and that NZBORA in 
particular has ‗forced‘ officials: 
… to confront the implications of human rights commitments for policymaking, and 
this is reflected in Cabinet‘s decision-making processes … Despite this, there remains 
considerable uncertainty within government as to what a rights-based approach to 
social policy might require … (Geiringer and Palmer, 2007: 12, 13, 14-15).  
However, it was written in 2007, a year before the HRC started their initiative ‗The 
Human Rights Approach‘, which tries to clarify what this approach means, so work has 
been done on the area they suggested (see Section 4.3.2 for a discussion on this).  
A further observation made by the re-evaluation team was that there was a strong 
linkage between social cohesion and a sound human rights environment. In their view 
integrating human rights early into the policy-making process tended to ‗generate 
policies that ensure reasonable social objectives are realised by fair means‘ (Ministry of 
Justice, 2000a: 95). They saw that ‗effective human rights institutions and a progressive 
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human rights environment are at the heart of a nation‘s ability to maintain a peaceful 
and stable society‘ and that maintaining social cohesion and inclusion was ‗an important 
aspect of welfare in the broadest sense‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 65, 95). The review 
therefore looked beyond the mechanics of the growing domestic architecture and 
reflected on the wider impact of a sound human rights policy environment. The HRC‘s 
action plan for human rights for 2005-2010 also noted that: ‗Human rights are vital to 
peace, security and sustainable development worldwide. Poverty, conflict, violence and 
terrorism flourish where human rights are denied‘ (HRC, 2005a: 2). These comments 
from the re-evaluation team and the HRC link back to the point made earlier that the 
human rights system was a new (essentially international policy) framework that came 
on track after World War II, and which became one of the means of building a fairer 
society at both the international and domestic levels.  
This sentiment is also echoed by Bradford and Scott in their work on robust economic 
governance: 
There is often a link between persistent weakness of state institutions and the 
emergence – or re-emergence – of conflict. … Achieving and maintaining security in 
the widest sense of the word is now an unavoidable part of promoting good governance 
and development. More often than in the past, the international community has to be 
involved in establishing and maintaining a security apparatus … in fragile states which 
are incapable of doing it themselves: without it, the chance of a viable and lasting 
development programme underpinned by a viable and lasting [economic] governance 
regime is impossible (Bradford and Scott, 2009: 1, 8).  
In this way robust human rights governance is the basis of a stable society, upon which 




The notion of a regulatory model is now briefly raised as it confirms the non-judicial 
approach already discussed in this section. When deciding about which route a 
particular international human rights issue travels into the domestic arena – law, policy 
or practice – it is obvious that some options such as legal interventions are more costly 
and it can be difficult for regulators to know whether to take a non-coercive or legalistic 
approach on issues. Michael Sparrow in his book on states managing compliance said 
                                                 
100 Bradford and Scott acknowledged that there are other governances (such as political governance), and noted that 




2009: 25). However, they also noted that there is an ongoing complex intersection across a whole range of 
factors (‗political, security and economic‘). This thesis focuses on yet another factor, robust human rights governance, and suggests 
that until ‗robust‘ vs ‗fragile‘ features of each type of governance work is understood, it is not possible to fully appreciate the 
linkages between them. 
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that ‗regulators, legislators, and others‘ sometimes ask ‗which approach – hard or soft – 
works best‘ (Sparrow, 2000: xvi). He described ‗graduated responses to non-
compliance‘ and an enforcement pyramid with ‗soft approaches‘ at the bottom and 
‗tougher sanctions (at the apex)‘ (Sparrow, 2000: 39). An adapted version of a 
regulatory pyramid from Ladley and Williams is shown below graphically in Figure 1.  
Specific law 




Public and private education 
Civic-minded – ‗do the right thing‘ 
Figure 1. Regulatory pyramid 
Ladley and Williams stated: 
There is a substantial body of literature which shows the complexity of achieving 
changes to citizens‘ behaviour and the even higher degree of difficulty in achieving 
changes to attitudes. Discussion about the use of law and regulation to achieve an 
objective often makes reference to some sort of sliding scale between education to 
achieve voluntary compliance, and enforcement to punish behaviour that deviates from 
the objectives (Ladley and Williams, 2007: 5).  
The top level of ‗state coercion‘ is ‗generally the least effective (and most expensive)‘ 
(Ladley and Williams, 2007: 6). The layers therefore move from soft persuasive 
techniques through to punitive measures. The move towards a non-judicial policy-based 
approach fits well with this type of model that relies on lower, less costly, levels of the 
pyramid. It also links with the emphasis on human rights education that will be 
discussed in Section 5.7. Often the more people are informed and understand something 
– such as human rights issues – the more likely they are to respect them and comply 
voluntarily. 
New Zealand has a basically rehabilitative approach to offenders, combined with a 
toughening of sanctions for some crimes. There is also a leaning towards non-coercive 
compliance in other areas. Because of this, a range of soft and hard strategies is used to 
enforce rules and influence attitudes and behaviours. Some societies such as the USA 
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escalate up the pyramid by having highly rule-based systems.
101
 However, if the aim of 
a society is to try to get some voluntary following of the rules, in a rehabilitative vs 
punitive system this becomes self-enforcement needing less coercion. The system, 
however, can only be self-enforcing if there is transparency and people know what the 
rules are – which is why a rights-literate policy advisor network is essential. If advisors 
are the gateway for the implementation of rights to the general public then their 
knowledge about international treaty obligations needs to be exceptionally high. Then 
as a non-judicial approach deepens into the state sector, and in turn into civil society, 
the human rights approach is embedded at the bottom of the pyramid so that people take 
on its values and comply willingly.  
A non-judicial approach which practises early mainstreaming can only occur when 
other factors are in place. The remainder of this chapter looks at various ways to 
strengthen the specific processes and mechanisms of New Zealand‘s human rights 
implementation, culminating in Section 5.9 which looks at specific ideas for better 
implementation. 
5.2 Locus of control 
The issue of locus of control is about who oversees human rights issues in the state 
sector. Over time responsibility for this has devolved more fully into the various 
departments concerned. Until the 1990s international human rights treaty obligations 
were largely managed and coordinated by MFAT and many staff within departments 
were unaware of international instruments and their associated obligations. MFAT has 
the chief oversight role of coordinating the preparation of periodic reports to the UN 
and the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office are the main assisting 
departments in this process. At the NZ Diversity Forum 09 Chief Commissioner 
                                                 
101 For instance Anne-Marie Cusac documented the increasingly punitive approach to offenders in the USA: ‗Over the past thirty-
five years the form of punishment in the United States has changed enormously. Our laws are harsher now. Convicts serve longer 
sentences … Since 1973 the nation‘s imprisonment rate has multiplied more than five times … One percent of our population is 
now in prison … I noticed an increase in new weapons and machines for policing and prisons. The novel technologies, nearly all of 
them aggressive in purpose but coolly promising to ―control‖ or ―restrain‖, proliferated across the landscape of American justice, 
often with little regard for questions of whether or not such devices could kill those they were supposed to subdue. Advertising 
materials for many of these devices promoted the pain they would cause a disobedient or unruly inmate …This understanding of the 
criminal personality as irredeemable leads us to punish harder and punish longer‘ (Cusac, 2009: 1-2, 3, 14). Where each state 
pitches itself in terms of the regulatory pyramid therefore depends on its ‗core philosophy‘ in relation to punishment.  
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Rosslyn Noonan suggested that the Minister of Justice should perhaps be the lead 
person in dealings with the UN Human Rights Council (he had just presented the UPR 
in May 2009). While the main oversight in this area has until now fallen to MFAT, it is 
not the agency responsible in New Zealand for the domestic implementation of 
international human rights treaties and the Chief Commissioner believed it could be 
timely to change that.  
This lack of clear leadership was one of the deficiencies noted in the general discussion 
at the NZ Diversity Forum 09. In comments from the floor a number of points were 
raised: the need for the right department with dominant responsibility for undertaking 
the reporting process (there are multiple agencies involved with no domestic oversight); 
the responsibility for international human rights needs to be dispersed across and within 
departments; there is a lot of overlap in the work of the departments with seven treaties, 
five-yearly reporting periods, and overlaps in timing between agencies; there can be 
reporting fatigue for some of the smaller departments ; in general, the information is not 
presented as effectively and efficiently as it could be; and that there is no clear dominant 
agency, no one group of officials dedicated to multi-agency human rights issues. 
5.3 Human Rights Working Group 
The 10
th
 point of the re-evaluation team‘s recommendations is: ‗To establish a 
permanent, inter-departmental network of officials with particular responsibility for 
human rights‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 105). In the previous chapter it was noted 
that the inter-agency working group that the Cabinet paper (Cabinet Office, 2001a) and 
Cabinet Minute (Cabinet Office, 2001b) endorsed was set up in 2002, but focused on 
helping the HRC develop a national plan of action instead of early mainstreaming. 
Because the group has since faded in a formal sense, there is now no official inter-
departmental training for policy advisors. Also the State Services Commission did not 
eventually produce generic guidelines for the state sector as suggested in the fourth 
point of the re-evaluation team‘s 12 recommendations (Aspey, 2008: Personal 
communication). This result is one of the problems with the ad hoc growth of New 
Zealand human rights framework. An independent ministerial report is commissioned 
which made expert recommendations and these are taken seriously at Cabinet level. 
They start to be implemented, but then because of lack of resources the work of the 
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group is re-prioritised (onto the then very important action plan) and it eventually fades. 
The need for such an inter-departmental group is still very important. It was noted in the 
general discussion at the NZ Diversity Forum 09 that although there were many 
experienced people in New Zealand across a number of treaties (CERD, UNCROC, 
CAT), there was no comprehensive approach to making these treaties realisable. 
The establishment of such a group need not be expensive, nor should it be time-
consuming for those involved. A meeting of key cross-agency representatives could for 
instance meet every two months for two hours, and if one of the departments provided 
secretariat services the administrative aspect could be absorbed within the state sector. 
One issue, however, would be finding the right level for the group. Given CEOs and 
general manager levels would not be free to become involved in the level of detail 
required, and general policy analysts would not be senior enough to make significant 
decisions, a group at the senior policy advisor/line manager level might be most suited 
to take on this role.  
A USA model and New Zealand public policy literature are now looked at as possible 
helpful aids for such a group, which might usefully be called a ‗Human Rights Working 
Group‘. (Note the discussion in Section 4.2.2 about the Cabinet direction that an ‗inter-
departmental working group‘ be established.)  
5.3.1 USA inter-agency model 
The USA has had an inter-agency group in this area and it is worth looking at their 
model to see if it could be useful here. Each country has a different political system, 
type of government and constitutional arrangement so this will affect the shape of any 
such group. In 1998 the Clinton administration established an Inter-agency Working 
Group on Human Rights Treaties, but it was disbanded by the Bush administration 
(HRC, 1998: 37). The Working Group had a wide-ranging brief including: 
 Coordinating the inter-agency effort towards the ratification of international treaties 
 Coordinating periodic reports to the UN 
 Coordinating responses of the USA government to complaints concerning human rights violations 
submitted to the UN and other international organisations 
 Developing mechanisms to ensure domestic legislation aligns with international treaty obligations 
 Developing public education programmes about the main treaties (ICCPR, CERD etc) 
 Coordinating an annual review of the USA reservations, declarations and understandings to human 
rights treaties 
 Coordinating on other significant tasks e.g. liaising with Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
and UN Special Rapporteurs (USA Government, 1998: 1). 
 115 
This is different to the New Zealand model where the above roles are spread primarily 
between the HRC, MFAT, the Ministry of Justice, the Crown Law Office and the 
Human Rights in Education (HRiE) initiative with relevant help from other departments 
as appropriate. The value of the broad-based USA model is that all aspects of the 
domestic human rights framework – treaty reporting, complaints, alignment of domestic 
law, education, reservations, national and regional human rights mechanism liaison – 
could be looked at in total by a Human Rights Working Group comprised of individuals 
across the state sector and possibly the HRC. This would be a practical example of a 
whole-of-government model, which (if functioning effectively) would result in the 
complementarity of the law+litigation and public policy approaches. 
5.3.2 Joined-up government and the Coordinated State Agencies 
Goal 
This whole-of-government approach is about the problem of dealing with complex 
inter-departmental issues. This issue has already been taken up by public policy 
academics and the notion of joined-up government is starting to gain traction in the 
public sector. An article by Ryan et al examined ‗managing for shared outcomes in 
complex policy cases‘, and inter-departmental networking on human rights issues could 
be classified as a complex undertaking.
102
 The authors felt that these types of 
collaborations were ‗a significant challenge for public sector organisations in NZ but, 
even more, for the collective leadership of the public sector‘ (Ryan et al, 2008: 14). The 
approach focused on looking at ‗ ―what works‖ rather than prescribing systems or 
models from the top-down or as context-free ―best/good practice‖ ‘ (Ryan et al, 2008: 
1). They stated that when a problem is multi-dimensional no single agency can deal 
with it:  
As NZ public officials gradually figure out what ―managing for outcomes‖ means, and 
especially ―shared outcomes‖, they are progressively realising ―we can‘t do this on our 
own‖ and that ―we need to join up to get the results‖. The talent in their practical 
response has been to build their work on small, informal horizontal networks that flow 
between organisations (and sectors): these have the advantages of being energetic, 
flexible and responsive, while still having the access to human and other capital that 
comes with being part of larger, vertically-aligned formal organisations (Ryan et al, 
2008: 14). 
                                                 
102 More references to cross-sector collaborations can be found in Bryson et al (2006), Eppel et al (2008) and High and Complex 
Needs Intersectoral Unit (2007).  
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In similar vein the State Services Commission has published guidelines (SSC, 2008) on 
the factors for successfully coordinating action among state agencies. A complementary 
document (SSC, 2004) is about agency leaders working towards shared outcomes. The 
first resource sets out a simple framework (using nine success factors) that agencies can 
use to coordinate their activity.
103
 The 2008 guidelines were produced in the context of 
the six Development Goals that the State Services Commission is working towards 
achieving. One of these six is the Coordinated State Agencies Goal: ‗Ensure the total 
contribution of government agencies is greater than the sum of its parts‘ (SSC, 2008: 6). 
Their vision for this goal:  
… is that government agencies coordinate their efforts using their expertise as 
appropriate, and are committed to shared outcomes where these help achieve the right 
results for New Zealanders. Agencies recognise that they need to work closely together 
and with partners to provide clear, joined-up responses to complex policy challenges 
and provide seamless services to the people who need them (SSC, 2008: 6).  
The State Services Commission noted that: ‗Internationally, government agencies are 
recognising that the policy issues they are addressing often transcend agency 
boundaries‘ (SSC, 2008: 7). They also raise the issue that governments are increasingly 
entering into international cooperation agreements, and human rights treaties certainly 
come under this category. Instead of different agencies working on the same problems 
in a vertical silo, horizontal cross-agency collaboration on a complex issue ‗can develop 
targeted solutions based on a better understanding of the full scope of the issue, 
resulting in more effective interventions‘ (SSC, 2008: 8). Analysing the models set out 
in this field of research could be very fruitful for any Human Rights Working Group 
networking on human rights issues. 
5.3.3 Covenant obligation seminars 
Another solution for strengthening human rights coordination and awareness in the state 
sector could be to set up generic covenant obligation seminars that different sets of 
departments would attend according to their area of responsibility. The 11
th
 point of the 
12 re-evaluation team recommendations was: 
                                                 
103 The nine factors are: ‗The mandate for successful coordination: (1) Leadership commitment; (2) Ministers‘ and stakeholders‘ 
buy-in; (3) Defined and agreed joint outcomes. The systems for successful coordination: (4) Appropriate and documented 
governance and accountability framework; (5) Sufficient and appropriate resources; (6) Process to measure performance from 
established baselines. The behaviours for successful coordination: (7) Right representation, skills and competencies; (8) 
Organisational cultures that support coordination; (9) Shared culture, language and values‘ (SSC, 2008: 11). 
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To assign, with consequential resource allocation, primary responsibility for the 
preparation of periodic reports to Departments working especially closely to the 
relevant area e.g. ICCPR, CERD and CAT to Justice and ICECR to the Ministry of 
Social Policy (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 106).  
It could be possible to take it a step further by developing a module on each of the core 
treaties (ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW, UNCROC, CAT, CERD and CRDP) which 
informs a cross-sector group of policy advisors from the appropriate agencies for that 
treaty about: the history of the treaty; New Zealand‘s obligations; a summary of this 
country‘s periodic reports submitted so far; developments on any reservations to the 
treaty; and areas of demarcation and overlap in responsibility for the treaty. These 
modules could be taught by specialists who are able to raise discussion points that come 
from topical cases about the treaty in Europe, the USA, Australia and New Zealand. 
They could also highlight areas of hidden or indirect discrimination relating to the treaty 
they are examining. 
5.4 Training officials 
The 6
th
 point of the re-evaluation team‘s recommendations was about greater cross-
agency training on human rights issues: ‗Departments to ensure their staff, especially 
policy advisors, receive appropriate training in relation to human rights‘. Other voices 
have added to this since then, including the Commonwealth Secretariat, the HRC in 
New Zealand, and the OHCHR. The Commonwealth Secretariat in its report on NHRI 
best practice emphasised the role of NHRIs in this type of training: 
Specific training [about applicable norms and human rights standards] should be 
designed for members of the police, military forces, judiciary, legal profession and 
other members of society that have powers or responsibility relevant to human rights … 
NHRIs can change the culture of government and its employees, the judiciary and the 
legal profession, the security forces and those in positions of power through training 
(Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 22, 23).  
The OHCHR has linked strengthening the accountability of public officials as a key to 
upholding the rule of law, one test of robust human rights governance. They believed 
officials need to be trained in order to understand the rights they are upholding 
(OHCHR, 2007: 6). In May 2009 the Committee Against Torture gave its Concluding 
Observations on New Zealand‘s fifth periodic CAT report and mentioned the need for 
more human rights training. While they were pleased that training on human rights 
obligations is given to ‗police recruits, prison personnel and armed forces‘, they were 
nevertheless concerned about the lack of training for immigration staff (UN, 2009: 2, 
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3). A snapshot picture of the current training available in the New Zealand state sector 
(and through the HRC) is given below.  
5.4.1 HRC, Justice and MFAT 
The HRC, as the NHRI, is statutorily tasked with the function of general human rights 
education, but does not specifically offer training to government agencies at the 
moment because of lack of resources. However, the HRC is working with the Ministry 
of Justice on an ongoing basis to formulate human rights-related workshops for 
departments (HRC, 2008d: 2-3). Also through its Infoline the HRC does provide 
information on issues such as anti-discrimination and Treaty issues if requested by 
departments. The HRC‘s submission on the UPR report emphasised this area: 
… the Commission recommends explicit government commitment to the full and 
effective incorporation of ratified international human rights standards in domestic 
legislation, in policy development and in public sector professional development and 
training (HRC, 2008b: 5).  
The government department that takes the greatest cross-agency lead in human rights 
training is the Ministry of Justice, whose focus has been on ensuring NZBORA 
compliance in the state sector. To this end three documents have been produced to help 
policy advisors working with the Human Rights Act and NZBORA: The Human Rights 
Act 1993: Guidelines for Government Policy Advisers (Ministry of Justice, 2000b); The 
Non-Discrimination Standards for Government (Ministry of Justice, 2002); and 
Guidelines on the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990: A Guide to the Rights and 
Freedoms in the Bill of Rights Act for the Public Sector (Ministry of Justice, 2004). It is 
this last document which points out to policy advisors that policy making occurs within 
the context of New Zealand‘s international human rights obligations. The Ministry also 
assists the Institute of Judicial Studies in education for judges about international 
obligations, runs a justice forum for officials from the state sector to discuss topical 
issues, and provides all internal staff with privacy training. 
MFAT holds an internal course on ‗Introduction to Multilateral Diplomacy‘, 
which includes a human rights element. In the past the HRC has organised courses for 
New Zealand's International Aid and Development Agency (NZAID) on human rights 
and development. MFAT are currently in the process of reviewing human rights 
training (Loose, 2009b: Personal communication).  
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5.4.2 Enforcement agencies 
Four enforcement agencies – NZDF, the Department of Corrections, the NZ Police and 
the Immigration Service of the Department of Labour – also have human rights training 
available to their staff. For instance in the NZDF all military personnel, as part of their 
basic training, have comprehensive training on the law of armed conflict, the four 
Geneva Conventions, the Anti-Personnel Lands Mine Convention, the Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and general human rights education. Further models are 
delivered two levels above basic training for commanders. They also provide ‗Equity 
Training‘ which covers the 13 grounds of discrimination, exemptions and some of the 
background to the Human Rights Act. This is given to all personnel during basic 
training, and in all military promotion courses and in Unit briefs. NZDF Anti-
harassment Advisers also get comprehensive training on the Human Rights Act 
(Johnson, 2010: Personal communication). 
The Department of Corrections currently trains new recruits in all policies and treaties 
during the initial training course for new Corrections Officers. This involves quite a 
lengthy session and covers all relevant information on the rights of prisoners within 
their care. They go over this area several times during refresher training and the 
department is in the process of writing new material with the ‗duty to protect life‘ 
initiative that is currently being expanded (Amesbury, 2009: Personal communication).  
Over 2004 and 2005 the NZ Police worked with the HRC to tailor their introductory 
package ‗Making Human Rights Work‘ to operational policing needs. The resulting 
training was delivered nationally to police staff over 2006 and 2007. The purpose of 
that training was to enable staff to fulfil their responsibilities in helping the NZ Police 
comply with and apply the wider intent of the Human Rights Act and human rights 
principles. It built on other training initiatives on topics such as NZBORA, ethics and 
inclusiveness. The goals of the training were for participants to: be aware of the context 
for human rights; understand the basic elements of the Human Rights Act and the links 
to NZBORA; recognise International Human Rights Standards (IHRS) as they apply to 
policing; apply the Human Rights Act and principles internally, to police staff, and 
externally to their work with the public; and identify what they need to do to ensure that 
the organisation complies with and meets the wider intent of the Act. Since 2007 newly 
appointed staff (including probationary constables) have attended sessions as scheduled 
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by their district, and ongoing refresher sessions are also provided. In the recruit training 
programme there are a number of areas where the treatment of individuals/rights of 
individuals is discussed.
104
 Training is also provided in relation to the Privacy Act 1993. 
The Police Privacy Officer currently trains all staff who are qualifying as Sergeants, 
Senior Sergeants and Inspectors at the Royal New Zealand Police College. The Privacy 
Officer also provides training around the country and at National Headquarters as and 
when it is deemed necessary (Wilson, 2009: Personal communication).  
The Immigration Service of the Department of Labour stated that how much training an 
officer receives on conventions, treaties and relevant legislation depends on what the 
officer does. The ‗average‘ immigration officer gets training on conventions such as the 
Hague Convention and sometimes UNCROC. The Hague Convention is looked at as 
part of their Adoptions Issues training and UNCROC is part of Student Policy training. 
Privacy Act 1993 and Official Information Act 1982 training is also available for all 
officers. Compliance Officers are responsible for humanitarian interviews prior to 
removal or deportation orders being made. They receive training on the ICCPR, 
conventions and protocols relating to the status of refugees, UNCROC and CAT. As 
Border Officers are responsible for turning people around at the border they receive the 
same training. Refugee Status Officers are also now well versed about relevant 
international instruments. They Immigration Service noted that with the Immigration 
Act commencing in 2010 they have made a commitment to staff and external 
stakeholders to cover more about human rights as part of the training for the new Act 
(Cheung, 2009: Personal communication). 
The agencies just listed have very good internal training and the Ministry of Justice has 
produced useful cross-agency publications. There has been a real attempt to train policy 
advisors about the cornerstone pieces of human rights legislation – NZBORA and the 
Human Rights Act. The international reporting obligations are therefore a real driver for 
public sector work. However, a further level of generic cross-agency training on 
specific treaty obligations has not yet occurred, and the suggestion given in Section 
                                                 
104 This has included but is not limited to: Victims‘ Rights Act 2002; Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the related Practice Note on 
Police Questioning (Evidence Act 2006); Criminal Disclosures Act 1995; Domestic Violence Act 1995; Crimes Act 1961/Misuse of 
Drugs Act 1975/Arms Act 1983 – detention powers/processes; Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment Act) 1992 – 
detention powers/processes/treatment of patients; Responsiveness to Māori; Sudden death – cultural factors and awareness; 
Children, Young Persons & Their Families Act 1989; and Ethics (Wilson, 2009: Personal communication). 
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5.3.3 about covenant obligation seminars (or a similar initiative) could help this. A 
database of what human rights training is actually being offered by each agency would 
perhaps also be helpful, and that this could potentially be updated by a Human Rights 
Working Group.  
Cross-agency training would also offer a useful connect between the macro-meso-micro 
levels outlined in Chapter 2. Officials could be given information on: (a) the broad 
principles underlying the human rights system; (b) the law and regulation level; (c) how 
this affects specific cases. Currently, it might be possible for an official doing ‗small p‘ 
policy work to have very little interface with the ‗big P‘ macro human rights system, but 
if the law+litigation/policy complementarity is strengthened it would advance human 
rights implementation much more effectively. At the moment there is not quite the 
inter-meshing where changes come through at that macro level, feed through laws and 
regulations at the meso level, and then down into specific cases involving an individual 
at the micro level. As this cascade is not entirely integrated, there is still more work to 
do in this area. 
5.5 Cabinet vetting system 
Some problems with the Cabinet vetting system in relation to human rights-related 
legislation are now examined. All new legislation is vetted against NZBORA, the 
Human Rights Act and the Privacy Act. The institution of this system, which came into 
effect after the passing of NZBORA in 1990, acted as a sea-change leading to the much 
wider impact of human rights across many sectors. There is also a Treaty vet, which 
will be discussed in this section. However, the re-evaluation team were critical of the 
negative orientation of the vetting process, particularly its legal vs policy focus i.e. a 
judicial vs non-judicial approach: 
When legislative proposals are ‗vetted‘, the exercise tends to have a negative 
orientation. Geared towards technical compliance, ‗vetting‘ is designed to check that 
the proposal does not breach New Zealand‘s international obligations. It reflects a risk 
management strategy, the primary aim of which is to minimise the risk of legal 
proceedings. ‗Vetting‘ and compliance are corollaries of the court-based approach to 
the promotion and protection of human rights. This approach is important but 
Paragraph 5 of the Terms of Reference [of this report] is based upon a less adversarial, 
policy approach to the realisation of human rights. While vetting has a negative 
orientation, the integration of human rights into policy is a much more positive 
approach to human rights implementation (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 96).  
The updated online CabGuide (Cabinet Office, 2010a) and Cabinet Manual (Cabinet 
 122 
Office, 2010b) contain instructions for policy advisors setting out the human rights 
implications of policy proposals and draft legislation in Cabinet papers. Bill of Rights 
vetting is carried out by the Ministry of Justice (for non-Justice bills) and the Crown 
Law Office for any Bills put forward by the Ministry and this is known as ‗Section 7 
vetting‘.105 The CabGuide also noted that: ‗Although the formal requirement in terms of 
section 7 is for a Bill of Rights report, in practice the vetting of bills at this stage also 
deals with Human Rights Act issues‘.106 The CabGuide stated that any inconsistency 
with either NZBORA or the Human Rights Act must be pointed out ‗before proposals 
reach the legislative or implementation stage‘ and importantly the advice asked 
departments ‗to consider human rights issues in terms broader than the avoidance of 
discrimination‘.107 The key part under ‗Human Rights Implications‘ in this section 
stated that Cabinet papers should include a ‗paragraph on the consistency of the 
proposals‘ with NZBORA and the Human Rights Act which:  
 states the nature of any potential inconsistencies identified (or states that there 
are none);  
 note the steps to be taken to address the issues; or 
 include information on any justifications for the policy infringing a right or a 
freedom. 
The process is slightly different for Cabinet papers seeking to introduce a Bill. In this 
case under the heading ‗Compliance‘ officials are asked to: 
Indicate whether the Bill complies with each of the following, with reasons if the 
Bill does not comply (list each sub-heading): 
 principles of the Treaty of Waitangi; 
 rights and freedoms contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and 
the Human Rights Act 1993 (state the nature of any potential inconsistencies 
identified, or state that there are none; note the steps taken to address any 
issues, or include information on any justifications for the Bill infringing a 
right or freedom); 
 principles and guidelines set out in the Privacy Act 1993 (if the Bill raises 
privacy issues, indicate whether the Privacy Commissioner agrees that it 
complies with all relevant principles); 
 relevant international standards and obligations; and 
 LAC Guidelines: Guidelines on Process and Content of Legislation, a 
publication by the Legislation Advisory Committee. 
                                                 
105 Section 7 of NZBORA states: ‗Attorney-General to report to Parliament where Bill appears to be inconsistent with Bill of 
Rights. Where any Bill is introduced into the House of Representatives, the Attorney-General shall: (a) In the case of a Government 
Bill, on the introduction of that Bill; or (b) In any other case, as soon as practicable after the introduction of the Bill, bring to the 
attention of the House of Representatives any provision in the Bill that appears to be inconsistent with any of the rights and 
freedoms contained in this Bill of Rights‘. 
106 See http://cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/procedures/legislation/checking-human-rights-issues (accessed on 4 June 2009). 
107 See http://cabguide.cabinetoffice.govt.nz/procedures/papers/sections-in-papers (accessed on 4 June 2009). 
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Any moves to develop early mainstreaming initiatives will address issues at the initial 
policy stage rather than allow them to be raised as potential legal risks just as the matter 
is being presented to Cabinet. The contrasting negative and positive aspects of the two 
approaches can now be summarised. Negative vetting: Cabinet paper process of vetting 
legislative proposals; risk-management approach (minimising risk of legal 
proceedings); court-based; and technical legal compliance. Positive vetting: early 
integration of human rights considerations into the policy-making process; non-
adversarial; policy-based; and focus on compliance with the spirit and intention of the 
Human Rights Act vs strict technical legal compliance. 
The vetting process is therefore an important ‗gate‘ for policy advisors to stop at and 
consider human rights implications, even if it is at a late stage. When a policy 
mechanism is put in place it therefore changes public servant behaviour i.e. they must 
work differently. 
5.5.1 Inconsistent vetting: Treaty, bill of rights, privacy, human 
rights 
Cabinet vetting (for either policy proposals or Bills) is therefore a late stage approach 
that needs to be complemented with early mainstreaming efforts. However, on closer 
examination it can be seen that vetting is carried out in different ways across topics: 
NZBORA vetting, Treaty vetting, privacy vetting and human rights vetting. NZBORA 
vetting is the most straightforward (and probably the strongest) because the Ministry of 
Justice is responsible and has a dedicated Bill of Rights Team carrying out this work on 
a daily basis. At the general discussion at the NZ Diversity Forum 09 it was noted that 
the Ministry of Justice vets 50-60 pieces of legislation a year and around 250-300 
Cabinet papers and policy documents. This forms a significant component of their 
work, and as suggested above human rights vetting (against the Human Rights Act) 
would happen simultaneously when this team is checking for NZBORA consistency. 
However, this is a lot of pressure on one relatively small team of people. 
In relation to Treaty vetting Matthew Palmer stated in 2008 his concern about this. The 
LAC Guidelines,
108
 the Cabinet Manual and the CabGuide all contain requirements 
                                                 
108 See www2.justice.govt.nz/lac/pubs/2001/legislative_guide_2000/chapter_5.html. 
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about considering Treaty implications when developing draft legislation. He noted there 
are 14 departments who might be consulted about Treaty issues but that the key 
agencies are Te Puni Kokiri and the Ministry of Justice (Office of Treaty Settlements). 
However, for Palmer: 
There is a question as to how well all these requirements are enforced in practice. There 
is a great temptation for Ministers and officials simply to assert that no Treaty of 
Waitangi implications of legislation, or of policy proposals, have been identified or that 
they do not require action, without properly analysing whether that is right. … Yet the 
rules for Cabinet decision-making give important signals to public servants as to what 
is important. The existence of explicit systemic requirements in relation to the Treaty 
for the last 22 years has, in my experience, had a significant effect on the day-to-day 
reality of executive government. It has greatly increased the extent to which officials 
think, and act as if, the Treaty of Waitangi has power in reality (Palmer, 2008: 223).  
The same could be said for human rights vetting: it is difficult to gauge how seriously 
government agencies other than the Ministry of Justice and the Crown Law Office take 
this requirement. In 2000 the re-evaluation team were concerned that despite the 
requirement for departments to indicate whether Bills or regulations are compliant it 
‗generates a relatively superficial departmental consideration‘ and ‗international human 
rights standards and obligations seldom receive the level of attention they deserve‘ 
(Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 214). However, as pointed out by Palmer in relation to 
Treaty vetting, its mere presence means these considerations are at least raised at crucial 
times in the late stage policy and legislation drafting processes.  
Turning now to the privacy and human rights vets, the human rights vet is carried out 
simultaneously with the NZBORA vet by the Ministry of Justice and the HRC is not 
involved at this stage. Their role comes later once a Bill has been drafted. Section 
5(2)(k)(iii) sets out their statutory discretion to look at proposed legislation: 
Section 5. Functions of Commission 
(2)(k) To report to the Prime Minister on— 
(iii) the implications of any proposed legislation (including subordinate legislation) or proposed 
policy of the Government that the Commission considers may affect human rights: 
 
Comparing this with the privacy vetting system, the Privacy Commissioner is statutorily 
obligated to carry out a similar role: 
 
Section 13. Functions of Commissioner 
(1)(o) To examine any proposed legislation (including subordinate legislation) or proposed policy of 
the Government that the Commissioner considers may affect the privacy of individuals, and to report 
to the responsible Minister the results of the examination. 
 
However, the Privacy Commissioner is not only mentioned in legislation, but there is 
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a counterpart administrative side in the Cabinet Manual that consultation should be carried 
out. Under ‗Principles of Cabinet Decision Making‘ there is a section on ‗Departmental 
Consultation‘. Included in this is the statement that: ‗Consultation may sometimes be needed 
with agencies that have an advisory role, for example, the Office of the Privacy 
Commissioner‘ (Cabinet Office, 2010b: Para 19). The more detailed information about 
departmental consultation explicitly stated: 
Departments preparing papers must ensure that they consider the interests both of other 
departments and other government agencies including the Privacy Commissioner, 
Officers of Parliament – the Controller and Auditor-General, Office of the Ombudsmen 
and the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment – and consult them at the 
earliest possible stage (Cabinet Office, 2010b: Para 19).  
Note the prompt for early consultation: in practice this means that the Privacy 
Commissioner is invited to comment during the drafting of policy or legislation and 
liaise directly with departments. Not only do they have this role, they have the primary 
responsibility for privacy-related vetting issues as there is no department that takes on 
this responsibility. This puts the Privacy Commission as an outside agency – an 
independent crown entity – in a unique and heavily responsible position. Blair Stewart 
in his paper about the Privacy Commissioner‘s legislative and policy monitoring role 
noted the proactive role of that Commissioner in liaising closely with departments to 
ensure privacy considerations are taken into account early in their processes (Stewart, 
1995: 38). This is therefore a parallel process to the early mainstreaming of human 
rights. Because they are not included in this Cabinet Manual consultation list the HRC 
only sees Bills (very seldom policies) after they have been drafted and are ready to be 
presented to Cabinet.  
At this point a practical suggestion is raised: that there should perhaps be early stage 
HRC vetting of Bills and policies (in the same way as carried out by the Privacy 
Commission), which would offer a counter-point view to that of any departments and 
thus achieve a more robust human rights vet. It would also give much greater traction to 
the early mainstreaming of human rights considerations in the policy-making process 
endorsed by the re-evaluation report. This could be as simple as their inclusion on the 
next Cabinet Manual consultation list so that officials are prompted to contact the 
Commission ‗at the earliest possible stage‘. 
One possible problem with this suggestion is that it could compromise the HRC‘s role 
as an independent body; it would certainly have to be an advisory role. If the HRC were 
too caught up in policy development, or took too legalistic a viewpoint, then it 
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would cut across its own mandate. Also, examining the privacy implications of new 
Bills and policies is a relatively small area, while looking at these across the whole 
range of human right issues would be a vast undertaking and the HRC is not necessarily 
resourced to do this at too early a stage. Realising this inconsistency, however, adds 
weight to the argument that what is really needed is a body such as a Human Rights 
Working Group and more thoroughly trained policy advisors. It is not possible in this 
research to delve too deeply into this issue, but instead it is raised as a potential area to 
help the early mainstreaming efforts.
109
  
5.6 Concluding Observations 
Apart from the issues raised so far in this section, what has been missing in the New 
Zealand domestic framework is an effective way of considering and then implementing 
UN treaty body feedback in the form of Concluding Observations. The growing 
domestic human rights architecture in New Zealand has been influenced by UN 
comment through the cyclical reporting process for the core treaties. The Concluding 
Observations give a historical picture over time about the UN‘s views on New 
Zealand‘s compliance or not with human rights obligations and help States Parties to 
prepare future reports. It is expected that national parliaments and relevant government 
departments will debate and assess Concluding Observations to ensure greater 
compliance. The UN recommends that they are disseminated widely among all levels of 
society, especially the judiciary and state officials. It is also expected that domestic 
courts consider ratified international human rights instruments, such as the two major 
covenants, as interpretive aids to domestic law. Michael O‘Flaherty has endorsed their 
importance: 
Arguably, the issuance of concluding observations is the single most important activity 
of human rights treaty bodies. It provides an opportunity for the delivery of an 
authoritative overview of the state of human rights in a country and for the delivery of 
forms of advice which can stimulate systemic improvements. … Despite their relatively 
recent emergence in treaty body practice [1980s onwards], Concluding Observations 
have been elevated to be the primary record of the finding and recommendations 
regarding each State Party under review (O‘Flaherty, 2006: 1, 51). 
                                                 
109 For a useful similar discussion on how the structure and processes of government could help the state sector take a rights-based 
approach to social policy see Geiringer and Palmer (2007: 31-34). Their focus is, however, on analysing whether cabinet decision-
making/legislative/judicial processes have a systemic bias against economic and social rights and not on the area raised in this 
research (the implementation of New Zealand‘s international human rights system). 
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He also pointed out when clarifying the legal status of Concluding Observations that as 
they are ‗advisory rather than binding texts‘ they are not legally binding on states 
(O‘Flaherty, 2006: 32). However, O‘Flaherty believed they do have ‗special status‘, 
quoting the views of a former UN Human Rights Committee member, Martin Scheinin: 
The treaty obligations themselves are, naturally, legally binding, and the international 
expert body established by the treaty is the most authoritative interpreter of the treaty in 
question. Therefore, a finding of a violation by a UN human rights treaty body may be 
understood as an indication of the state party being under a legal obligation to remedy 
the situation (O‘Flaherty, 2006: 34).  
O‘Flaherty made the point that the ‗process of dialogue‘ surrounding the Concluding 
Observations is ‗notable for its non-adversarial nature‘ and went on to say that:  
To confer a compulsive quality to the subsequent findings by the treaty body would be 
inconsistent with this model and is likely to meet with resistance from States and 
further unwillingness to participate in the reporting process (O‘Flaherty, 2006: 36).  
Concluding Observations are therefore a fairly non-threatening way of treaty body 
committees giving feedback to ratifying states, and because of the ongoing five-yearly 
periodic reports they have over time come to form (as O‘Flaherty stated) a kind of 
dialogue or conversation between the UN treaty body committees and each of these 
states. 
The following two sub-sections outline: a German response to taking Concluding 
Observations seriously in the form of expert meetings; and an HRC initiative related to 
CERD that could act as a useful model for dealing with the problem. 
5.6.1 The German response: expert meetings 
Each country deals with Concluding Observations in different ways. The equivalent of 
the HRC in Germany (the German Institute for Human Rights) holds expert meetings 
on the observations to help ministry officials, NGOs, parliamentarians and academics 
decide how to implement the recommendations in them. The meetings have the added 
effect of being educational as each of the representatives from these groups is able to 
hear different perspectives from other experts. It is also helpful to have cross-treaty 
issues dealt with at once. For example, two or three UN treaty body committees may 
make a similar comment on an issue in their Concluding Observations and a 
coordinated vs fractured response can be resolved at a joint experts meeting. The expert 
meetings idea is presented by the Institute as ‗a tool of treaty implementation to the 
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international human rights community‘ (Seidensticker, 2005: 5).  
As noted by Seidensticker the examination of state reports has several purposes: 
external monitoring; preventive aspect; common, targeted goal setting by the treaty 
body and the state party; and self-evaluation by the state concerning the progressive 
realisation of the rights contained in the treaty (Seidensticker, 2005: 8). Combining the 
UN system with a national expert meeting model allows for ‗ongoing dialogue between 
governments and treaty bodies at the international level and the human rights 
community at the national level‘ (Seidensticker, 2005: 12). This Concluding 
Observations expert meetings idea perhaps parallels that of the USA Interagency 
Working Group on Human Rights. Any such group – whether it is working on a large-
scale (about the overall human rights system in a country) or on a micro scale (about 
taking into account Concluding Observation comments) – is broadly operating in the 
area of more effective implementation and many of the processes at the macro and 
micro levels could perhaps be the same and streamlined.  
5.6.2 A New Zealand model: Implementation Monitoring Table 
An excellent 2009 New Zealand solution to Concluding Observation implementation 
tackles this problem in such a way that it could be a very useful model across treaties. It 
is such a clear idea that it could be used not only in this country but in other 
jurisdictions. Joris de Bres, the Race Relations Commissioner at the HRC, has 
developed a CERD Implementation Monitoring Table, where the Concluding 
Observations from the last periodic report are set out on a covering front page, followed 
by a table in the form below. 
The table can be updated on a regular basis, and this means that by the time the next 
report is due all points have been noted and, if necessary, progressively implemented. If 
such a system were developed for all the core treaties, inter-departmental coordination 
on human rights would naturally increase as this idea requires that departments 
responsible for each covenant participate. A possible problem, however, is that such a 
system would need to ensure against paperwork proliferation and a tick-box mentality. 
This idea would also address the problem raised in the general discussion at the NZ 
Diversity Forum 09 that Concluding Observations tend to go on the shelf until just 
before the next reporting round for a treaty and then there is an urgent message sent out 
from MFAT to departments asking what have they done to fulfil or implement the 
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recommendations. It was noted during the general discussion at the forum that there is a 
lack of consistency about how reports are prepared and recommendations followed up. 
 








Government Response as at 
August 2009 
11 Ministry of Justice The Committee notes that the 
Government of the State Party 
has not formally endorsed the 
Human Rights Commission‘s 
New Zealand Action Plan for 
Human Rights, which also 
refers to race relations issues 
(art. 2). 
 
The Committee recommends 
that the State Party provide 
more detailed information on 
measures adopted to follow 
up on the Human Rights 
Commission’s New Zealand 
Action Plan for Human 
Rights, regarding race 
relations issues. It encourages 
the State Party to adopt, on 
the basis of the proposals 
made by the Human Rights 
Commission, its own Action 
Plan for Human Rights. 
 
Cabinet decision in July 2007 
directed Chief Executives of 
government departments to 
consider priorities in the Action 
Plan in their annual planning and 
reporting processes and to 
engage in dialogue with the 
Human Rights Commission in 
implementation of the Plan. No 
separate government action plan 
is envisaged … 
Source: Joris de Bres, Race Relations Commissioner, HRC 
 
Chief Commissioner Rosslyn Noonan had also pointed out at the NZ Diversity Forum 
09 that there is a need to start to identify key indicators (most of which already exist) to 
track standards implemented so there is no regression over time on issues, and this table 
model would also be useful in monitoring these indicators (Noonan, 2009).  
5.7 Human rights education 
The human rights training available at the present time in government agencies, 
however, only represents one level of human rights literacy. For a human rights 
approach to seed into other parts of society – NGOs, academics, the media and the 
public – wider human rights education needs to be available.  
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The importance of human rights education was set out in the UDHR in 1948.
110
 It took 
over 50 years for the UN to develop the World Programme for Human Rights Education 
in 2004, which followed on from the UN Decade for Human Rights Education between 
1995-2004 (UN 2004). The programme is based on a number of phases with the first 
involving a Plan of Action for Primary and Secondary School Systems (2005-2009). 
This rights-based approach to education not only ensures that there is respect for all in 
the school community but that the curriculum and teaching methods are conducive to 
the learning of human rights. That is, human rights education is not a small confined 
area of the syllabus, but a background to the entire way teaching is carried out and 
school life is lived. This echoes the point made in Chapter 1 that the human rights 
project is at the ‗heart‘ of the way government is carried out in New Zealand. 
Since 2003 a cooperative venture in this area has been developed – the Human Rights in 
Education (HRiE) initiative – founded on the principles of both the UDHR and 
UNCROC. The initiative was launched by three NGOs (Amnesty International, the 
Peace Foundation and the Development Resource Centre), as well as the HRC and the 
Children‘s Commissioner. The HRiE is described as: ‗a collaborative initiative for 
better education and effective citizenship, by developing schools and early childhood 
education centres as communities that know, promote and live human rights and 
responsibilities‘.111 With children being taught human rights principles at school, there is 
not only a top-down approach to this education, but a bottom-up process where they are 
encouraged to explore their own basic instincts about fairness and justice. They can 
then link this to the core ideas contained in the international covenants they learn about. 
There is a close connection between the HRiE and the New Zealand Curriculum 
(launched in November 2007), which specifically mentions human rights in its purpose, 
aims and content and takes a rights-based approach to education (Ministry of Education, 
2007: 1). The initiative is informed by work done by Canadian academics which 
showed that explicitly teaching human rights will result in a range of benefits including 
higher self-esteem, mutual respect, less bullying and truancy, better learning and 
ultimately more responsible citizens (Covell and Howe, 2007, 2008). Part of the 
                                                 
110 Article 26 of the UDHR states that education should be directed to ‗the strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms‘.  
111 See www.rightsined.org.nz/index.php/hrie/what-were-about.html (accessed on 3 December 2009). For a further discussion on 
the initiative see Simpson (2009). 
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premise of UNCROC is that children are citizens (see also Amnesty et al, 2007: 27-28). 
The HRiE initiative also aims to develop children as future citizens i.e. those who 
understand the dual nature of rights and responsibilities.  
Mirroring the idea of policy advisors taking a human rights approach in their work, 
teachers are now encouraged to do this in schools. Through the HRiE initiative they are 
being shown that the school is already a human rights environment so applying such a 
lens is merely making apparent what is actually happening i.e. schools exist to fulfil the 
human right to an education. However, schools are often overloaded workplaces, with 
teachers being expected to be at once educators, social workers and now possibly 
human rights advocates. The Canadian studies show, however, that when they 
encouraged this approach in classrooms teachers found management of the students 
easier and their job satisfaction higher.  
A year after the HRiE initiative was established the HRC produced Human Rights in 
New Zealand Today which noted that human rights education is ‗much more than 
providing information about human rights‘ and is rather about ‗creating an environment 
where human rights are respected‘ (HRC, 2004a: 364). The report raised current 
multiple problems with the provision of education in this country: that Māori, Pacific 
and disabled people and low-socio-economic groups had low participation and success 
rates; standards of education were not always good for those in isolated schools, poorer 
areas or for disabled children; and children continued to be discriminated against, 
bullied and harassed because of race, disability, sexual orientation and gender (HRC, 
2004a: 279). Following on from this the HRC also established the Right to Education 
Framework: He Tapapa Matauranga in 2004 (HRC, 2004b). Four standards and nine 
criteria were developed to monitor the right to education and schools can assess their 
performance against these.  
In 2007 another multi-agency initiative emerged to tackle the issue of human rights-
based education. The HRC in collaboration with Amnesty International and other 
agencies produced a report on building human rights communities in education 
(Amnesty et al, 2007). The aim of the report was to introduce:  
… the concept of early childhood education centres and schools as human rights 
communities. By human rights communities we mean places where children and young 
people know their rights, acknowledge their responsibilities, and respect the rights of 
others. In this model the right to education for every child and young person is fully 
realised, learning is ensured, individuality and diversity are respected and there is 
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freedom from violence, bullying and harassment (Amnesty et al, 2007: 3).  
Because children and young people are especially vulnerable to human rights abuses at 
home and school, this initiative was set up so schools and early childhood centres could 
be places where they can realise their rights.
112
 A key point of the report was that it 
recommended that ‗early childhood education centres and schools explicitly meet New 
Zealand‘s human rights obligations‘ (Amnesty et al, 2007: 7). The duty to meet these 
international obligations is therefore taken down one level from state agencies and into 
the frontline of education providers. It also extends the notion of human rights 
communities deep into civil society, thus layering three levels of such communities as 
seen below: international, national and local. This concept of human rights communities 
could be extended at the local level to include workplaces (at least state sector 
agencies), and universities and other training organisations such as Industry Training 
Organisations (ITOs) and training colleges. Three levels can therefore be envisaged: 
1. International human rights communities (UN, international NGOs, 
regional mechanisms such as European Commission on Human Rights) 
2. National human rights communities (domestic governments and NGOs) 
3. Local human rights communities (workplaces, universities, schools and 
early childhood centres, ITOs, training colleges). 
One positive aspect therefore of the move to get human rights-based education 
initiatives established is that a clear route is opened from the international human rights 
treaty level down through to people on the ground. UNCROC is an international treaty 
ratified by New Zealand and the obligations are reported on by state agencies. Schools 
(teachers, boards and parents) are now required to be aware of the rights of the child set 
out in this instrument, and as these initiatives strengthen children will become aware of 
and more fully able to realise these rights. New Zealand has taken a layered approach to 
human rights education and it appears to operate vertically (from pre-school through to 
university, from state sector down to civil society) and horizontally with cross-agency 
(and therefore collaborative) developments.  
                                                 
112 The report identified seven aspects of a child‘s right to education: ‗The right to free education; the full realisation of the right to 
education for specific groups such as Māori, Pacific peoples, disabled people and those from poor communities; the right of the 
child to education regardless of legal status – denied to children of parents without official immigration status; the right to an 
acceptable standard of education; the right of children to ―enjoy his or her own culture, to profess his or her own religion, or to use 
his or her own language‖ [from Article 30 of UNCROC]; the right to be safe from discrimination, bullying and harassment; and the 
availability of systematic human rights education provision‘ (Amnesty et al 2007: 9). 
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This broadening and deepening of human rights education into all sections of society is 
an example of more clarity (a Phase Five theme) as the mechanisms and evolving 
structures establish. More specifically, in relation to the overarching theme of the thesis, 
rights are able to travel down through the international frameworks, into the domestic 
state sector, and be realised by the children (as individual rights-holders) who are 
protected by UNCROC. The training of policy advisors and general human rights 
education therefore become the twin arms of the attempt to instill a human rights 
approach into the state sector and deeper into civil society. 
Another positive aspect relates to and confirms the link between human rights and 
social cohesion. The concept emerging out of the move towards human rights-based 
education is the possibility of rights-respecting classrooms/schools/communities 
helping to develop rights-respecting citizens. The report about building human rights 
communities in education also echoes the point about the early mainstreaming of policy 
work:  
The combination of ethnicity, poverty and educational disadvantage poses a severe risk 
to social cohesion in this country [and there was a need to] move beyond the rhetoric of 
children‘s rights to the mainstreaming of a human rights perspective into all public 
policy (Amnesty et al, 2007: 10).  
As well as research into human rights education at the school level a new trend has 
arisen in the last 20 years of multi-disciplinary research in universities and two 
examples exist in Australasia. The Australian Journal of Human Rights is published by 
the Australian Human Rights Centre (Forster and Morris, 1991 ongoing). The aim of 
the journal is to raise awareness of human rights issues in Australia and monitor 
developments in the area as they arise. Human Rights Research is a New Zealand 
journal produced by the Victoria University Human Rights Programme (2003 ongoing) 
as a result of a human rights symposium held at the university each year. Both the 
Australian and New Zealand journals have contributors from a wide range of 
disciplines: history, philosophy, religious studies, education, sociology, criminology, 
commercial law, political science and law. The public policy field has been noticeably 
absent from the contributions to this journal. Traditionally there has been much written 
on this topic by legal academics, and this cross-discipline approach will also strengthen 
this subject outside that area. 
Human rights is becoming an increasingly inter-disciplinary topic. As government 
department staff become more rights-literate, academics continue to explore this topic 
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within their disciplines, and NGOs input their perspective into the discussion, there will 
be a growing body of literature with more connectivity.  
5.8 Human rights governance level 
Having now examined the various aspects of embedding a human rights approach into 
the state sector, what is missing is a ‗human rights governance level‘. If this was 
operating well it would unite the law+litigation and public policy fields in an attempt to 
more effectively implement rights. This would result in complementarity where human 
rights become a central part of the fabric by which policy decisions are made. Even for 
New Zealand, with its good human rights framework, it would seem that the public 
policy field needs reviewing to better integrate aspects of this large human rights field 
that sits to its side and is even influencing the very nature of the state. As noted earlier, 
it was a post-war ambition to create an entirely different type of state ever: a human 
rights compliant state.  
If the human rights field can be conceived of as a set of underpinning principles in the 
state sector, as previously discussed, it could be necessary to have: 
 both the public policy and human rights fields prioritising early mainstreaming 
efforts, including the trend to use policy-based approaches to implementation 
 public policy tools formally used in the implementation of international human 
rights 
 more case studies and examinations which bridge the two fields: public policy 
and human rights 
 public policy academics, researchers and practitioners perhaps becoming 
involved in the international human rights implementation area in the same way 
they currently support areas such as education, health and environmental issues. 
These suggestions envisage a future different relationship between the law+litigation 
and public policy fields, and of those fields to the state sector. The result of this 
complementarity could be an emerging area of theory and practice in its own right. 
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5.8.1 Towards a four-fold domestic human rights framework 
A tri-fold international human rights framework has so far been suggested: 
organisational, legislative and guidance (see Table 2 in Section 3.2.2). The structures of 
the UN, the international law system, and the way the UN guides states about human 
rights have developed into this three-tiered system. Similarly a tri-fold domestic human 
rights framework has been outlined: organisational, legislative, policy-based (see Table 
3 in Section 4.2). Human rights institutions have been set up, laws enacted, and non-
legislative approaches are being explored. The development of an additional fourth 
level – state-level human rights governance – would perhaps be parallel to the UN 
guidance level in the international arena (also see Table 3). This fourth level would also 
be identified by a good complementarity of law+litigation and public policy 
approaches. This guidance level has come into place internationally precisely because 
the equation ‗treaty ratification = improved human rights‘ obviously does not work. As 
shown by this research it does not work domestically either. However, it has also shown 
that by looking carefully at the specific processes and mechanisms of the New 
Zealand‘s human rights framework there are still ways to strengthen the implementation 
of ratified treaty rights, and these are discussed in the next section. 
This four-fold framework relates to all three macro-micro-meso policy levels of Section 
2.2. For instance, the organisational level (institutions, ministries and agencies) and the 
human rights governance level operate at the macro level of providing underlying 
principles. The law+litigation/policy areas, on the other hand, operate at the meso level 
because this is the level of law and regulation which gives standards against which to 
judge micro instances e.g. a particular child‘s right in a particular case. 
5.9 Better implementation 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, it is not within the parameters of this research to make 
recommendations. However, this section highlights several areas that could possibly be 
researched further, culminating in the idea of an effective Human Rights Working 
Group and what this might ‗look like‘.  
What was clear from Chapter 4 is that the several planning and evaluation initiatives do 
speak to each other at times, even though some of the authors would not have known of 
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the existence of all the reports and despite their origin in several different agencies. 
Common issues did emerge and there was a build-up of similar strategies about what 
might address some of these problems. However, what has become obvious from the 
review of these initiatives is that some of the resulting recommendations have become 
‗lost‘ in the system. A type of ‗bureaucratic stickiness‘ can occur when multiple 
agencies are involved so it is not surprising that carefully considered solutions vanish 
without implementation. Reports are also commissioned or written without any 
previous knowledge that related agencies have carried out parallel work and arrived at 
similar conclusions. Work done at the parliamentary level can also be isolated from that 
carried out by departments.  
One possibility is that a Human Rights Working Group could be responsible for 
keeping an ongoing record of past and any future key recommendations from major 
reports in the human rights area so they do not become lost. Resources permitting, this 
could over time be expanded to include major reports from the NGO sector. Another 
role for such a group could also be to keep an annually updated database of the human 
rights training available by the HRC and each government agency. Once a clearer 
picture has become available of what is currently in place, some streamlining should be 
possible to avoid duplication of effort. 
To summarise, some of the outstanding issues are: 
 International (UN, Commonwealth Secretariat) and national voices (the HRC, 
the re-evaluation report) are being ignored if mechanisms such as Concluding 
Observations are not being taken as seriously as they could be, and the 
recommendations of evaluation and planning reports carried out over a number 
of years are not being implemented. 
 There is no overarching body or agency responsible for the breadth of human 
rights implementation similar to the USA Inter-agency Working Group on 
Human Rights.  
 Human rights training is happening in key human rights-related departments, but 




 Research already carried out in other parts of the state sector (e.g. the State 
Services Commission model of cross-agency coordination) is not being utilised 
to help the complex problem of human rights coordination. 
 The Cabinet vetting is being inconsistently applied, with the key human rights 
agency (the HRC) possibly being left out of the loop in a vital way. 
 
Table 6. Potential role of a Human Rights Working Group 
STRUCTURE  Modeled perhaps on similar groups in other jurisdictions e.g. the USA 
Inter-agency Working Group on Human Rights 
 Use the State Services Commission cross-agency coordination model or 
public policy joined-up government model, for instance, to help operational 
aspects 
 Keep an ongoing summary of the key recommendations of major human 
rights reports 
 Decide which department should be the lead agency in the area i.e. 
reviewing MFAT having the main domestic oversight for the treaty 
reporting process, and who should represent New Zealand at UN fora  
TRAINING  Keep an annually updated database of human rights training available 
through the HRC and government agencies 





 Carry out an audit or examination of Cabinet vetting systems across 
NZBORA, Human Rights Act, Privacy Act and the Treaty, with the 
possibility of including the HRC in that process. This could be as simple as 
the Commission‘s inclusion on the Cabinet Manual consultation list so that 
officials are prompted to contact them at the earliest possible stage  
CONCLUDING 
OBSERVATIONS 
 Look at models for implementing Concluding Observation 
recommendations, including the HRC CERD model and the German expert 
meeting system idea 
 
Any classic multi-agency problem would almost certainly result in an inter-
departmental network of officials. Table 6 above takes this idea as a starting point 
(suggesting a Human Rights Working Group), and collates the ideas contained in this 
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chapter which could all be carried out as part of the role of such a group.
113
 This multi-
faceted approach should ensure a greater overall traction of human rights into 
government policy making and ultimately more human rights compliant laws and 
policies. If this approach was taken this should also enhance the Phase Five theme of 
clarification because the ‗processes‘ for effective implementation will become much 
clearer over time.  
5.10 Summary 
The analyses that have been carried out in this area show a willingness to look at the 
root causes of problems and address them e.g. the Cabinet vetting process is too far 
down the track to be first thinking about human rights considerations. In particular, 
policy advisors need increased training so they are taking a rights-based approach right 
at the outset of the development of any new laws and policies. Models from other 
disciplines such as public policy, and other jurisdictions such as the USA, are now 
available for dealing with cross-agency coordination, which will be particularly helpful 
in the complex area of inter-departmental human rights networking. German and New 
Zealand models are also emerging for better implementation of Concluding Observation 
recommendations. A stronger Cabinet vetting system including a greater role for the 
key agency in the area (the HRC) could help deepen a human rights approach into the 
state sector. Understanding regulatory and core punishment models could also help to 
analyse the trend towards non-judicial, softer, non-coercive approaches. However, none 
of these ideas has been investigated, or not looked at fully, because there is no Human 
Rights Working Group in existence. Implementing some or all of these ideas could 
create a unifying core to a currently quite ad hoc human rights system. 
                                                 
113 Geiringer and Palmer also suggested some kind of ‗capacity‘ be developed in the state sector in relation to ‗mainstreaming a 
rights-based approach to social policy‘. In their view: ‗The key requirements for establishing this capacity are: a willingness at 
senior levels in one or more departments to adopt a rights-based approach to social policy issues (along with other approaches); 
understanding of social policy and ability to engage in social science analysis; a critical mass of individuals to sustain an ongoing 
capacity; high-quality legal skills and experience in applying legal analysis to policy issues characterised by fluid and flexible 
parameters; sufficient allocation of funding to ensure that the capacity is of sufficient quality to be credible and sustainable‘ 
(Geiringer and Palmer, 2007: 34). While their idea is focused on some kind of social policy capacity, it could be seen as 
complementary to the idea of a Human Rights Working Group because this group could have sub-committees in various areas (e.g. 
justice and human rights, Treaty and human rights, foreign policy and human rights, social policy and human rights) or across 
certain departments. 
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Although there is a legislative (law+litigation) bedrock to human rights protection, this 
is not enough (even for first generation rights). The human rights endeavour envisaged a 
changed role of government, but as has been shown it also results in a changed 
relationship of the public servant to government given they have a crucial international 
legal protection role. With public policy a policy or mechanism is implemented which 
ultimately shapes state behaviour, the behaviour of officials and that of citizens as well 
– sometimes (as in the case of human rights) even shaping values. As the human rights 
endeavour as a set of underpinning principles has such a large effect, it is all the more 
important that the mechanisms and processes by which rights are implemented through 
the state sector are sound and efficient and employing all possible approaches and tools 
(both legal and policy i.e. complementarity). 
It is now possible to answer the first research question: ‗How have human rights 
considerations been integrated into the policy environment, and does this policy area 
align with the law+litigation approach to achieve complementarity of these fields‘? A 
descriptive theory has developed in this thesis which shows the evolving integration of 
human rights into domestic policy, and although there is no full alignment with this 
field and that of law+litigation, the threads are there for it to happen over time. This 
research suggests that the field of human rights has become increasingly important in 
the policy environment because of the pivotal role of policy makers as the gate-keepers 
of New Zealand‘s international human rights protection. Another reason is because 
independent sources (the re-evaluation report, the HRC national plan of action 2005-
2010, and the CabGuide) have identified early mainstreaming as essential to the more 
effective implementation of international human rights.  
The diagnosis has therefore been given strongly; however, making the necessary 
changes is an ongoing task for the state sector. This research has shown that change in 
this area is an evolving process and one that is by no means as robust as it could be. 
Having said that, the 60-year build-up of human rights institutions, laws, policies and 
practices only started to be evaluated in the mid-1990s and this took a further 10 years 
to complete and the planning phase since 2005 is only five years old. As with many 
other areas on the government‘s programme, this issue is a ‗work in progress‘, but if 
successful it would be a key part of the progress towards robust human rights 
governance. 
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However, having discussed the benefits of greater collaboration the question needs to be 
asked about whether this is fully the answer. The problem may be systemic, and 
therefore better collaboration would be wasted if underlying resource and leadership 
issues are not resolved first. Individual agencies with highly developed human rights 
policies could perhaps effectively carry out reporting requirements and other obligations 
anyway, thus avoiding any duplication of effort arising from an inter-agency approach. 
A solution is therefore needed where individual agencies are working optimally on their 
own, where there is adequate resourcing and effective leadership generally (whether this 
is through a Human Rights Working Group or not), and where collaborative efforts 
actually enhance more effective implementation of human rights through the state 
sector. This raises the point too that enhanced collaboration and policy approaches only 
go so far. Another factor will be raised in Chapter 6: that the alignment of first, second 
and third generation rights also needs to occur for effective implementation. However, 
if this alignment took place and indigenous rights were to be incorporated, then the 
greater complementarity envisaged would be beyond the responsibility of professional 
public management. The larger holistic blending of law+litigation, the policy field, and 
rights balancing (with its philosophical and ideological underpinnings) would possibly 
need to be managed at another level, and this is where the notion of a human rights 
governance level (more fully developed in Chapter 7) could be helpful. 
This chapter has looked closely at embedding a human rights approach into the state 
sector and answered the first research question about complementarity. Before 
answering the second question about what effectiveness would look like, Chapter 6 
turns to two important issues in the current New Zealand human rights discussion: 
raising the status of both second generation (economic, social and cultural rights) and 
third generation (Treaty) rights.  
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CHAPTER 6: RAISING THE STATUS OF SECOND 
GENERATION RIGHTS AND THIRD GENERATION 
(TREATY) RIGHTS 
 
Elevating the status of second and third generation rights is the focus of this chapter. 
The status of second generation rights is a large and complex topic and would require a 
separate research project in its own right. Here the broad issues are raised to show how 
they are located within the wider domestic human rights framework, but also to situate 
the discussion in some overseas literature. Section 6.1 of this chapter illustrates the fifth 
phase of New Zealand‘s human rights history, with its three aspects of clarification, 
education and cooperation. This section clarifies how second generation rights could be 
implemented more effectively by looking at the experience of other jurisdictions, and 
this necessarily involves a re-education or re-thinking about this problem by taking 
account of these perspectives. There is also a cooperative effort on the part of the UN, 
the international organisation of NHRIs and the HRC in New Zealand to continually 
monitor the progress of the realisation of these rights. This section also contains a 
summary of potential legal and policy ideas that could be explored in the future. 
Third generation rights are group or collective rights. Section 6.2 of this chapter looks 
at the three parts of the indigenous rights protection triangle: the Treaty of Waitangi, the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and a Human Rights Approach. 
The growing recognition of the Declaration domestically and internationally means a 
sharp lens has now been focused on its relationship with the Treaty and, in fact, how it 
can act as a tool to understand the human rights dimensions of the Treaty better. It is 
believed that the core principles underlying the Declaration are the same as those 
underpinning the Treaty. The Human Rights Approach is used in all of the HRC‘s 
policy work, and the Declaration is also now a reference point in this work. This 
approach applies particularly to the Treaty because the Commission is under statutory 
obligation to promote a better understanding of the human rights dimensions of the 
Treaty and its relationship with domestic and international human rights law.  
The Treaty and the Declaration may not necessarily be viewed as human rights 
documents, but this chapter shows that they elevate both collective and individual rights 
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and advocate a balance between them instead of a polarised tension. This work on 
linking both the Treaty and the Declaration to human rights is also consistent with the 
fifth phase of New Zealand‘s human rights history, the more effective implementation 
of international human rights standards. This chapter also shows very good examples of 
all three parts of this phase: clarification, education and collaboration. It will be shown 
that much has been done in the last few years to clarify the application of the Treaty and 
Declaration to human rights, education about the Treaty is ongoing, and attempts to 
penetrate the Treaty into the machinery of government (central and local) have 
necessarily involved cooperation.  
6.1 Second generation rights 
Interspersed throughout this research has been mention of this country‘s ongoing efforts 
to raise the status of second generation rights, a journey started by Prime Minister Peter 
Fraser with the drafting of the UN Charter in 1945, and with attempts to find non-
legislative gateways for these rights to travel through. The Human Rights in New 
Zealand Today report stated: 
Although New Zealand is not flawless, the report shows that we have most of the 
elements essential for the effective protection, promotion and fulfilment of human 
rights; democracy, the rule of law and an independent judiciary free of corruption; 
effective structures of governance; specific processes for human rights and other forms 
of accountability; recognition of particular groups and individuals; and active, involved, 
diversely organised citizens … as individual New Zealanders we are generally free to 
say what we think, read what we like, worship where and when we choose, move freely 
around the country and feel confident in laws that protect us from discrimination and 
the arbitrary abuse of power (HRC, 2004a: 378). 
However, the types of rights mentioned above are largely civil and political and the 
report conclusion identified the several outstanding pressing issues in the economic and 
social field which have already been mentioned.
114
 It is clear then that much more work 
needs to be done in this area and the Commission has specified the better provision of 
second generation rights as a key area of future work. It is also timely for the HRC to 
focus on these rights as they themselves have noted that other countries have taken 
proactive approaches to handling these rights. They cite, for instance, that these rights 
have been reflected in new constitutions for Denmark, Norway, Mongolia and Peru, and 
                                                 
114 See Footnote 32. 
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that in 2004 the UK Joint Committee on Human Rights published a detailed report on 
the implementation of the ICESCR in the UK (HRC, 2005b: 12).
115
  
At the outset of this chapter it is suggested that New Zealand‘s commitment to ensuring 
fourth generation (environmental and ecological) rights is perhaps stronger than it is to 
second generation rights, possibly because the latter seem in the ‗too hard basket‘, with 
perceptions of huge policies, programmes and associated costs needed to implement 
them adequately. There is wide public concern about and support for the recognition of 
this fourth type of rights; however, as has been seen in recent years, protecting 
environmental rights is also costly, for example the Emissions Trading Scheme and 
Kyoto Protocol commitments. Third generation (group, collective or solidarity) rights 
are also often at the forefront of the media through Treaty-related issues.  
The first/second generation debate has often been split along the North-South (or 
developed/developing countries) divide. Developing nations have been critical of the 
West for too highly favouring civil and political rights at the expense of committing to 
real policies to ensure the realisation of second generation rights.
116
 On the other hand 
the West has sometimes been sceptical that developing nations focus on the urgency of 
providing subsistence rights (e.g. food, water, housing) as the reason not to fully protect 
the civil and political rights of their citizens (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 15, 
21). In 1996 a group of 29 international law experts met in Holland to consider the more 
effective implementation of the ICESCR. In their view economic and social rights could 
‗be realised in a variety of political settings‘, there was ‗no single road to their full 
realisation‘, and that ‗successes and failures have been registered in both market and 
non-market economies, in both centralised and de-centralised political structures‘ 
(International Commission of Jurists, 2006: 4). The group urged states to provide 
minimum subsistence rights despite their economic circumstances.  
This links to a long-standing debate about the difference between first and second 
generation rights: the former have tended to occupy a ‗second class status‘ (Beetham, 
1995: 41). According to human rights theorist David Beetham, second generation rights 
                                                 
115 For this report see UK Parliament (2004).  
116 This focus has been because civil and political rights were the first to be protected in the West. For instance, the American, 
French and English Bills of Rights were about protecting life, liberty and property. Second generation rights have typically not been 
protected until the development of social welfare legislation in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in developed states, or until the 
advent of international instruments such as the UDHR and the ICESCR. 
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can be seen more as basic welfare goals than rights.
117
 Civil and political rights are 
easily classed as rights because they are ‗definable in justiciable form‘, it is ‗clear who 
has the duty to uphold or implement‘ them, and they can be linked to a ‗responsible 
agency‘ which has the capacity to fulfil their obligations (Beetham, 1995: 42). He said 
some argue that second generation rights ‗do not satisfy these conditions‘ (Beetham, 
1995: 42). However, he claimed there is value in keeping up the pressure for human 
rights in the economic and social area as they sound more authoritative than ‗basic 
welfare goals‘, they help those in poorer countries argue their case, and they ‗emphasize 
the obligations of governments or international agencies‘ (Beetham, 1995: 60). This 
point is echoed by Marshall who stated that: 
… there remains something vitally important, even irreplaceable, about the notion of 
human rights. It is better able than any equivalent phrase to give voice to certain 
essential convictions about the worth of human life, the nature of human relationships, 
and the limits of state power (Marshall, 2001: 34). 
6.1.1 Redressing the imbalance: New Zealand response 
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has stated that it is the 
‗progressive realisation‘ of these rights that will ensure their implementation.118 Article 
2(1) of the ICESCR asserts that each state party must: 
… take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a 
view to achieving progressively the full realisation of the rights recognised in the 




This progressive realisation is in contrast to the immediately enforceable requirements 
of the ICCPR. There have been many comments on the imbalance between first and 
second generation rights implementation. For instance in 2003 the HRC noted: 
In Western countries, civil and political rights have taken precedence over economic, 
social and cultural rights. However, it is increasingly accepted that all rights are equally 
important and cannot be considered in isolation from each other. New Zealand can take 
some credit for this development, having argued vigorously at the time the United 
Nations Charter was being drafted at San Francisco in 1945, and later, for economic, 
social and cultural rights to be given equal weight with civil and political rights (HRC, 
                                                 
117 For a discussion on welfare rights see James (2009). 
118 Three ways that states can breach the realisation of these rights are set out by Geoff Budlender. The first is by being inattentive 
i.e. failing to ‗appreciate the nature and extent of the obligation concerned‘; the second by incompetence, where although the state 
realises what is needed, ‗the machinery of state is inadequate to the task‘; and the third is intransigence, with the state actively 
choosing not to abide by covenant obligations (Budlender, 2006: 139). 
119 Economic, social and cultural rights are also known as ‗programmatic or progressive rights‘ (Conde, 2004: 152). 
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2003: 6).  
Later in 2007 Geiringer and Palmer noted: 
Generally speaking, ESC rights have not been subject to the same extensive degree of 
standard setting that has attended the international regulation of CP rights and, 
accordingly, the language in which they are cast is often imprecise … it is clear that as 
a general proposition, ESC rights currently receive substantially less judicial protection 
in New Zealand than CP rights do (Geiringer and Palmer, 2007: 13).  
The Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand report confirmed 
this and discussed the role of national plans of action in relation to all rights:  
… there has been an imbalance in the promotion of the international level of economic, 
social and cultural rights and the right to development on the one hand, and of civil and 
political rights on the other. A NPA places human rights improvement in the context of 
public policy, so that government, individuals, groups, communities and others can 
endorse human rights objectives as practical goals, devise programmes to ensure their 
achievement … and allocate appropriate resources. … the NPA should adopt a 
comprehensive approach to human rights, giving equal attention to all categories of 
rights (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 21, 108, 109).  
Endorsing the UN view that these rights needed to be ‗progressively realised, not just 
aspired to‘, the New Zealand NHRI, the HRC, stated in the action plan for human rights 
for 2005-2010 that many studies: 
… provide compelling evidence of the persistent inequalities in people‘s experience of 
economic, social and cultural rights [and they] do not generally have the same level of 
legislative protection as civil and political rights (HRC, 2005a: 31).  
The Commonwealth Secretariat report on best practice for NHRIs noted that they have 
a ‗crucial role to play in promoting and ensuring the indivisibility and interdependence 
of all human rights‘ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 33).120 The Secretariat asserts 
that NHRIs should do everything possible to advance these second generation rights 
‗whether or not its enabling statute or national constitution recognises economic, social 
and cultural rights as justiciable‘ (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 33). To ensure this 
the Secretariat suggested that NHRIs: develop educational programmes for the public 
sector and the public about economic and social rights; scrutinise laws for consistency 
with the ICESCR; identify national benchmarks for the realisation of ICESCR 
obligations and conduct research into this area; monitor compliance with ICCPR rights; 
and examine complaints infringing these rights (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2001: 52).  
                                                 
120 For a good example of the interdependence of the rights in the ICCPR and ICESCR see Broeks v The Netherlands (UNHRC 
Communcation No. 172/1984, a case where married women (but not married men) were discriminated against by unemployment 
legislation. 
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The HRC action plan for human rights for 2005-2010 sets out strategies for the 
provision of economic and social rights. Poverty, housing, health, education and 
employment are five key areas prioritised in the plan to achieve improvements. The first 
goal is the reduction of poverty which is seen as undermining ‗the realisation of the 
most basic human rights, in particular health and education‘ (HRC, 2005a: 31). The 
Commission is particularly concerned about child poverty.
121
 A three-pronged strategy 
to improve housing, education and work in tandem is described in the NPA as ‗crucial 
to poverty reduction‘ (HRC, 2005a: 31). The development of an official poverty 
measure is also recommended.  
Another key issue is housing. Barriers to realising the right to housing are ‗affordability 
and accessibility‘ and more strategies are needed for those at the lowest end of the 
housing spectrum – the homeless (HRC, 2005a: 31). Supplying social housing and 
helping disadvantaged groups (disabled people, Māori and Pacific people, the elderly 
and refugees) is also recommended. Sub-standard housing is another issue raised in the 
NPA (HRC, 2005a: 32). The third economic and social right discussed in the NPA, 
health, is determined by many factors: environmental, socio-economic and access 
issues. The plan highlighted that ‗housing, education and employment are major 
contributors to people‘s health status‘ (HRC, 2005a: 32-33). Māori and Pacific people 
have the poorest health outcomes in New Zealand on many indicators. The NPA also 
flagged a whole-of-government approach to issues such as air and water quality, 
incorporating Māori concepts of health into the mainstream system, and initiating a 
public discussion about a ‗human rights approach to health‘ (HRC, 2005a: 34).  
The section on education in the plan looked at the area of adult literacy, stating that: 
‗The 1996 International Adult Literacy Survey (IALS) found that one in five New 
Zealanders had poor literacy skills‘ (HRC, 2005a: 34). The Adult Literacy Strategy 
(operated by the Tertiary Education Commission) is one step towards alleviating this 
problem, although adult literacy classes at night-school facilities contentiously had their 
funding cut in 2009.  
                                                 
121 This is confirmed by a recent report prepared for the Children‘s Commissioner and Barnados on addressing child poverty in 
New Zealand. It found that: ‗In 2006/07, 22 percent of children were living in households with incomes below the 60-percent-of-
median [of the] income poverty line‘ (Fletcher and Dwyer, 2008: 1).  
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The final right raised in the plan is employment. Again, Māori and Pacific peoples have 
poorer employment outcomes than other ethnic groups, for instance, higher 
unemployment rates. Other groups still face problems too: there is prejudice against 
older workers, disabled people, those re-entering the workforce after raising families 
and school leavers entering it. Other ongoing issues in the employment sector include 
the gender gap in pay, with women still earning far less than men. Also, the 
vulnerability of young people, low-paid employees in the labour market, and people 
who work as home care and personal support workers (HRC, 2005: 35). The HRC has 
recommended that New Zealand ratify four ILO Conventions immediately to alleviate 
these problems.
122
 Other pressing priorities given in the plan are to address the barriers 
to employment mentioned above and improve gender pay equity and the pay of 
vulnerable groups (HRC, 2005a: 35). 
It is possible that many of the strategies outlined in the HRC action plan for human 
rights for 2005-2010 can be effected non-judicially i.e. through policies and 
programmes. This is in line with the trend of a third policy-based approach to human 
rights implementation. This next section, however, looks at the implementation problem 
from another angle and examines the issue of justiciability, and the growing literature 
on the positive obligations of states to provide for these rights.  
6.1.2 Justiciability and the positive obligations of states 
The courts have been reluctant to become involved in issues around the justiciability of 
second generation rights because allocation of resources associated with many 
economic and social policies are seen to be the domain of Parliament and not for them 
to decide.
123
 Lawson v Housing New Zealand is cited as a key domestic case in this 
area. The complainant, in the absence of any right to housing in New Zealand, sought 
judicial review of a government policy to increase the rent of state housing to market 
                                                 
122 These conventions are: ILO Convention 87 Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise; ILO Convention 
138 Minimum Age for Admission to Employment; ILO Convention 159 Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment (Disabled 
Persons); ILO Convention 183 Maternity Protection (HRC, 2005a: 35). 
123 A clear definition of ‗justiciable‘ was given by Victor Conde: ‗A word describing the character of an issue as legally capable of 
being resolved by resorting to a legal process. One asks whether an issue is justiciable i.e. whether a court/tribunal has the power to 
handle/resolve the issue. Certain issues cannot be resolved by courts but must be resolved by executive/administrative procedures. It 
is a question both of the competence of the court/tribunal and the nature of the issue. In some jurisdictions e.g. political questions 
are considered to not be justiciable by courts. Such issues are called non-justiciable. They are to be resolved in a non-judicial forum‘ 
(Conde, 2004: 143).  
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levels. She claimed that she was unable to meet the rent and, as a consequence, would 
be forced to leave her home. This amounted to her being deprived of affordable shelter 
and was a breach of the right to an adequate standard of living and, therefore, Article 1 
of the ICESCR. Williams J in the High Court held that the matter involved: ‗Strong 
policy considerations and was [therefore] not amenable to judicial review … the issue 
of compliance with international treaties was determined by international forums, not by 
the court‘ (HRC, 2004a: 2).  
The Commonwealth Secretariat NHRI report mentioned above noted that not all 
governments agree that these rights can easily be translated into legislation. Bob Hepple 
also stated that: ‗economic and social rights are usually cast in the form of soft law or 
policy goals‘ (Hepple, 2006: 116). Article 2(1) of the ICESCR emphasises the full 
realisation of economic and social rights, ‗including particularly the adoption of 
legislative measures‘. The ICESCR committee was concerned at the time of New 
Zealand‘s initial ICESCR periodic report that this country‘s delegation had (in 
discussions about NZBORA) expressed the view that economic and social rights were 
not necessarily justiciable. The New Zealand response was that after considerable 
debate the government had decided not to include social and economic rights in the Bill 
of Rights Act. The delegation cited Sir Geoffrey Palmer‘s rationale during the second 
reading of the Bill in 1993: 
The Bill does not include social and economic rights. The Bill is focused on 
fundamental civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of speech and the 
right to vote. A Bill of Rights is traditionally concerned with putting restraints on the 
powers of the state, and is about guarding individual liberty. Social and economic rights 
are in a different category requiring positive action by the state. That does not mean that 
those rights are of lesser importance; it means that they need to be protected in a 
different way (MFAT, 1994: 10). 
Twelve years later in the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee‘s inquiry into 
the role of human rights in foreign policy this committee gave a similar view on the 
protection of rights when it discussed New Zealand‘s legislative readiness to ratify 
treaties: 
In the field of human rights, it has been unnecessary for New Zealand to engage in 
massive legislative change in order to give effect to newly assumed international 
obligations. The reason for this is that New Zealand, with its strong common law 
tradition together with the separation of powers and independent judiciary, has provided 
the necessary safeguards for the protection of most civil and political rights. Similarly, 
the state‘s commitment to social welfare rights has ensured that no specific legislative 
action was required to give effect to the rights protected by the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (NZ House of Representatives, 2005: 56). 
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The group of 29 international law experts who met in 2006 to consider the more 
effective implementation of the ICESCR developed the ‗Limburg Principles‘ 
(International Commission of Jurists, 2006). No. 8 of these principles stated: 
Although the full realisation of the rights recognised in the Covenant is to be attained 
progressively, the application of some rights can be made justiciable immediately while 
other rights can become justiciable over time.  
As can be seen there was a clear intention on the part of this group to maintain the 
momentum for legal implementation of second generation rights.  
When analysing the question of the justiciability of second as opposed to first 
generation rights much of the discussion focuses on the blurred role of the state and the 
courts in trying to address the broad problem of the implementation of these rights as 
set out in this ICESCR. While a trend towards non-judicial policy-based initiatives has 
been suggested, several viewpoints will now be canvassed which, despite the reluctance 
of the courts to become involved, each give a prominent role to them in ensuring the 
effective implementation of second generation rights.
124
 Before doing this it is noted 
that Geiringer and Palmer‘s 2007 article on human rights and social policy in New 
Zealand looks extensively into the government‘s substantive obligations in relation to 
economic and social rights, despite the seemingly imprecise nature of the ICESCR 
wording, and they make several suggestions in this regard.
125
 The aim here is not to 
replicate that work, but to canvass views from other countries to show the breadth of the 
debate and to see if ideas from other jurisdictions might be helpful.  
The first view has been expressed by the ICESCR committee in General Comment No. 
9: The Domestic Application of the Covenant, which outlines concrete measures for 
states to elevate second generation rights to similar levels as first generation. New 
Zealand had been referred to this document after it made the comment that these rights 
were not necessarily justiciable. General Comment No. 9 stated: 
                                                 
124 Major work has been done in this area by the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights which held a seminar on the justiciability of 
economic and social rights in 2005 with participants from many countries. The papers have been published (Coomans, 2006), and 
this collection looked at the difficult question of how domestic courts can give effect to these rights when countries have ratified the 
ICESCR. Coomans believed that there is ‗greater interest‘ in protecting these rights, partly because of ‗creative case law coming 
from a number of domestic systems‘, including South Africa, and that new ways are evolving of enforcing them through ‗judicial 
and quasi-judicial means‘ (Coomans, 2006: 3).  
125 The suggestions were: ‗(1) An ongoing and reasonable engagement with the scope and effect of relevant rights; (2) No 
retrogressive measures; (3) An obligation to ―respect‖ the rights; (4) An obligation to provide minimum levels of realisation?; (5) 
Participation of rights-holders in policy development; (6) Forms of enhanced accountability; (7) Special protection for the 
disadvantaged‘. For the detailed discussion on this see Geiringer and Palmer (2007: 22-29). 
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… there is no Covenant right which could not, in the great majority of systems, be 
considered to possess at least some significant justiciable dimensions. It is sometimes 
suggested that matters involving the allocation of resources should be left to the 
political authorities rather than the courts. While the respective competences of various 
branches of government must be respected, it is appropriate to acknowledge that courts 
are generally already involved in a considerable range of matters which have important 
resource implications. The adoption of a rigid classification of economic, social and 
cultural rights which puts them, by definition, beyond the reach of the courts would 
thus be arbitrary and incompatible with the principle that the two sets of human rights 
are indivisible and interdependent. It would also drastically curtail the capacity of the 
courts to protect the rights of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups in society 
(UNCESCR, 1998: Para 10).  
The committee noted that courts worldwide had different ways of dealing with the 
covenant: some had applied its provisions directly or as interpretive standards while 
others had paid lip service but there was no practical outcome, and still others had 
refused to give legal effect to it (UNCESCR, 1998: Paras 13-14).  
The second view from Sandra Liebenberg claimed that states have a positive duty or 
obligation to implement economic and social rights in their laws, policies and 
programmes. She believed that ‗human rights impose both negative and positive duties 
on the state‘ (Liebenberg, 2006: 109). Traditional negative liberties are the protection of 
personal security and property, but a state which recognises its positive duties will also 
uphold socio-economic rights. The gap between what advanced and developing 
economies can provide in terms of second generation rights is enormous. Because it is 
extremely difficult to measure the provision of these rights, Liebenberg endorses the 
move by the committee to develop indicators to assess state compliance in providing 
socio-economic rights which focus on three factors: ‗availability‘, ‗accessibility‘ and 
‗quality of services‘ (Liebenberg, 2006: 109).  
The 1996 South African Constitution entrenches some socio-economic rights (Sections 
26-27). These include core provisions for adequate food, water, housing, health care and 
social security. Liebenberg noted the qualifying phrase which follows the list of these 
provisions: ‗The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures within its 
available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights‘ 
(Liebenberg, 2006: 111). This is in line with the ICESCR committee phrase above. Also 
in South Africa the Constitutional Court has developed a ‗model of reasonableness 
review‘ (Liebenberg, 2006: 111). Liebenberg believed this is a helpful step as it 
acknowledges the role of the legislature and executive in policy formulation, but allows 
the courts the role of assessing whether the programmes in existence are ‗reasonably 
capable‘ of progressively realising socio-economic rights. She was also positive that 
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there have been three examples where the Constitutional Court has been able to operate 
in the socio-economic area.
126
 
A similar view is given by Silvia Borelli. She believed that the concept of states having 
positive obligations has ‗substantially expanded the reach of the human rights 
obligations of states‘ and ‗undoubtedly vastly advanced the scope of protection of 
human rights‘ (Borelli, 2006: 102, 103). In relation to economic, social and cultural 
rights she said that positive obligations take them beyond being: 
… merely aspirational, programmatic statements of intent, to be achieved in a far-
distant future, but that they impose concrete obligations on the state, albeit to be 
progressively realised, which are fully binding on state authorities and are justiciable 
before both domestic courts, and as a last resort, before treaty-monitoring bodies 
(Borelli, 2006: 103).  
A further view from Iain Byrne noted, in a similar vein to Liebenberg, the difficulty of 
implementing second generation rights.
127
 He believed that they have broadly: ‗tended 
to be dealt with from a negative civil liberties perspective rather than the consideration 
of positive state obligations to provide adequate resources‘ (Byrne, 2005: 3). He offered 
the notion of ‗indirect protection‘ as a way forward in ensuring the implementation of 
these rights and suggested two techniques (Byrne, 2005: 15). The first is to further 
expand the definition of civil rights. This could be arguing that the right to life has been 
too narrowly interpreted and should be widened to include that states take all measures 
to ensure, for instance, that infant mortality is reduced or malnutrition is eradicated. The 
second is to use cross-cutting methods e.g. linking the issue to legalised equality and 
non-discrimination provisions (Byrne, 2005: 14-15, 20). An example from The Times 
(19 May 2009) about the right to life of soldiers stretches the reach of this right: 
Courts rule British soldiers covered by right to life 
Army chiefs can be sued over decisions taken in the heat of battle after a Court of 
Appeal ruling that troops must be protected by the Human Rights Act. The judgment by 
Sir Anthony Clarke, the Master of the Rolls, and two other judges, makes the Ministry 
of Defence liable to civil prosecutions by families who claim that the treatment of 
soldiers who have died on operations overseas might have breached their human rights. 
                                                 
126 The first (Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign with Others 2005) involved direct instructions from this 
court where the state was ordered to provide Nevirapine, a drug which greatly prevents mother-child HIV transmission. The drug 
was actually being offered free by the manufacturer at no cost to the government but it had only been allowed at certain 
experimental sites. The second case concerned the provision of remedies where a group excluded from eligibility criteria for social 
assistance was read in to the legislation as a remedy. The third instance involved structural interdicts e.g. cases in which the 
problems are so systemic that a one-off court order would not work and instead the state is asked to adopt a plan of action for 
remedying the breach and to work with the Constitutional Court to implement it (Liebenberg, 2006: 111).  
127 Byrne‘s connection to New Zealand is his recent contribution of the Foreword to the 2009 New Zealand Law Review‘s Special 
Issue on Human Rights in the Pacific (NZLR 2009: v). 
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The landmark ruling follows a long-running battle between the MoD and Andrew 
Walker, the assistant deputy coroner of Oxfordshire, who has criticised the ministry for 
sending troops to war allegedly with defective equipment.  
The judgment provoked anger from General Sir Mike Jackson, the former head of the 
Army. He told The Times: ―I cannot imagine that this is what Parliament had in mind 
when it voted for the Human Rights Act … It‘s potentially very dangerous and could 
damage operational effectiveness because commanding officers will be concerned that 
they run the risk of being taken to court over decisions they have had to make.‖ 
Yesterday‘s judgment concerned the case of Private Jason Smith, 32, of the Territorial 
Army, who died of heatstroke in Basra six years ago. At the inquest, in 2006, Mr 
Walker said that his death was caused ―by a serious failure to recognise and take 
appropriate steps to address the difficulty that he had in adjusting to the climate‖ – 
temperatures of 50°C. The coroner said that it amounted to a breach of his human 
rights. 
The MoD conceded that Private Smith was within the jurisdiction of European and 
British human rights laws because he died while in hospital at a British base in Iraq. 
But MoD lawyers challenged a general-principle ruling by Mr Justice Collins in the 
High Court in which he said that members of the Armed Forces always remained in the 
jurisdiction of the UK and were therefore covered by the Human Rights Act wherever 
they were serving overseas. The MoD argued that soldiers could not be protected by 
human rights laws if they were fighting ―beyond the wire‖ of a base. Mr Justice Collins 
dismissed the MoD appeal and yesterday the Master of the Rolls, one of the most senior 
judges, agreed with his judgment and also threw out the ministry‘s case. ―For the 
purpose of determining whether there is a sufficient link with the UK to qualify for 
protection, it seems to us to make no sense to hold that there is a distinction between a 
person inside and outside premises controlled by the UK,‖ the judges ruled. 
Martin Scheinin, based in Turkey, also advocated using non-discrimination provisions 
as a way of protecting second generation rights through treaties on civil and political 
rights. He suggested an ‗integrated approach‘ to first and second generation rights 
where the latter can be helped by using the mechanisms of the former (Scheinin, 2001: 
32-34). He noted a hierarchy of protection of second generation rights: they are most 
protected in those countries with a constitution or bill of rights containing economic and 
social rights; then in those with some form of ‗treaty-specific incorporating statute‘ 
where these rights are automatically incorporated into domestic law (Scheinin, 2001: 
49).
128
 The example of Korea was given in Chapter 2.1 where, under the ROK 
Constitution, recognised international law has the same effect as the domestic laws of 
the Republic. Sandra Liebenberg adds to this list that a third protection mechanism is 
‗national institutions‘ involved in monitoring and enforcing these rights (Liebenberg, 
2001: 56). This endorses the view given by the Commonwealth Secretariat earlier that 
NHRIs have a crucial role to play in this respect, and New Zealand does have the HRC.  
                                                 
128 For a full discussion of a range of second generation right mechanisms see for instance Rosas and Scheinin (2001).  
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Liebenberg noted that domestic courts have been reluctant to enter the territory of 
second generation rights because it would seem that judges would then be in a position 
to shape economic and social policy which would be a clear a breach of the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Her reaction is: 
Separation of powers and respect for the institutional competencies of the other 
branches of government are certainly constraining influences on judicial power. 
However this does not imply that the judiciary and international human rights 
supervisory bodies do not have a significant role to play in holding the state 
accountable for the impact of its actions and omissions on people‘s welfare 
(Liebenberg, 2006: 110).  
Byrne acknowledged second generation rights are not always codified in domestic law, 
but like Liebenberg believed that the judiciary has a key role (without violating the 
separation of powers doctrine) in interpreting what is reasonable access to resources: 
How far judges should be prepared to go in deciding questions with resource 
implications – something which does not just affect the right to health but clearly all 
economic and social rights (esrs) – is a crucial question … Much will depend on how 
far courts will be prepared to go in offering creative but legitimate approaches which do 
not exceed the scope of judicial powers (Byrne, 2005: 4, 14).  
The HRC in New Zealand has also noted that: 
The developing jurisprudence of the South African Constitutional Court suggests that, 
in that country at least, the court considers that the doctrine of the separation of powers 
does not impede its ability to make decisions that require the Government to adopt 
policies that are consistent with its obligations under the Constitution (HRC, 2004a: 
34).  
However, much also depends on the financial and resource implications of decisions by 
the judiciary, but the Constitutional Court in South Africa has twice commented that the 
courts can require the state to meet constitutional obligations about economic and social 
rights even though there may be budgetary implications. In the first instance in Minister 
of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign with Others 2005, Geoff Budlender 
noted the court argued that in these types of cases the government would just have ‗to 
find the resources‘ (Budlender, 2006: 140). In another case, Rail Commuter Action 
Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail and Others, he noted the court warned 
the government to be careful about raising human and financial resource constraints as a 
‗bald‘ reason not to meet its obligation: unless carefully detailed resource implications 
were given the court would require the state to comply (Budlender, 2006: 140). 
This issue about the justiciability of second generation rights is therefore part of a larger 
discussion about public policy decisions about resources and the blurred role of the 
judiciary and Parliament. The courts in New Zealand are caught between UN pressures 
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to give legal effect to rights set out in international instruments and domestic concerns 
that they are over-stepping their judicial functions. New Zealand‘s third ICCPR 
periodic report had commented that NZBORA had been given the status of ordinary 
legislation to avoid a significant shift in the constitutional balance of power from 
Parliament to the judiciary (MFAT, 1995: 39). However, NZBORA itself has come 
under intense scrutiny in current debates about the role of the judiciary in its 
interpretation, particularly charges of judicial activism.  
Another view on justiciability is found in literature from the USA. Weak Courts, Strong 
Rights by Mark Tushnet examined the enforcement of social welfare rights by the 
courts. This looked at the merits or not of trying to include economic rights in new 
constitutions, such as the South African model discussed above. He pointed out that 
historically this is seen as a bad idea, given that although they can be included in the 
constitution they cannot be enforced by the courts. He called this ability to enforce 
‗judicial capacity‘ and believed the unease about it underlies: 
… a concern about the ability of the courts to coerce the political branches into making 
substantial changes in background rules, typically by large programs of social provision 
that require significant alterations in the distribution of wealth by means of taxes 
(Tushnet, 2008: 227).  
Tushnet distinguished between strong-form and weak-form judicial enforcement, the 
first when the courts aggressively enforce second generation rights. This would have the 
effect of forcing legislators to make political decisions about increasing taxation or 
taking other means to gain revenue to pay for the cost of the rights being realised, thus 
revisiting the resources issue mentioned above in the South African discussion and 
earlier in the New Zealand housing case. He believed it is going too far, for instance, to 
suggest that if people are entitled as a right to minimally decent housing that the 
judiciary should create ‗social welfare programs‘: as this is surely the role of the 
legislature (Tushnet, 2008: 232). He also suggested, however, that it was because of the 
legislature that there might be a lack of adequate housing in the first place: 
The fact that the courts have found a constitutional violation means that the 
legislature‘s own priorities placed attainment of the social welfare right below other 
social policies – national defense, building new roads, and the like. So, in enforcing 
social and economic rights, courts displace legislative judgments about how social 
policies should be ranked (Tushnet, 2008: 233). 
Tushnet further distinguished between rights that are: (a) non-justiciable; (b) weak 
substantive; and (c) strong substantive (Tushnet, 2008: 238, 242, 245). In relation to the 
first he cited the Irish Constitutio, which lists social welfare rights but has a 
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qualifying paragraph making them non-justiciable. An instance of weak substantive 
rights involves another South African case: Government of South Africa and Others v 
Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 119 (CC). This involved appalling housing 
conditions in a shantytown, where a group was moved and then evicted into a worse 
area. Even though the Constitutional Court asserted it was not its role to determine 
minimum core standards or decide ‗how public revenues should most effectively be 
spent‘, they did find the people involved were in desperate need and the government 
housing programs were not addressing this (Tushnet, 2008: 243). The court required the 
government to include a ‗people in desperate need‘ provision in their planning for these 
programs. As Tushnet noted there was not necessarily any ‗individualized relief‘, but in 
line with the ICESCR statement set out above about progressive realisation, the 
government was urged to make reasonable progress towards realising the right to 
minimal standards of housing (Tushnet, 2008: 244). Also in line with the covenant, 
immediate results are not expected. 
Unlike weak substantive rights, strong substantive rights can entail immediate relief. 
Tushnet cited the first South African case mentioned above – Minister of Health and 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign with Others 2005 – in which the Constitutional 
Court enforced the social welfare right to treatment with Nevirapine as an example of 
these strong rights. In this case, as the drug was free, there were no budgetary 
implications if a court enforced them. The Constitutional Court therefore directly 
ordered the state to provide the drug to the women involved and cited decisions in other 
jurisdictions in these types of cases (e.g. the USA, India, Germany and the UK) in 
entering a ‗mandatory injunction‘ to the government (Tushnet, 2008: 247). Tushnet 
therefore argued that perhaps the distinction between non-justiciable, weak and strong 
rights is simply one of the timing of the judicial remedy: strong rights get immediate 
remedies; weak rights have theirs deferred; and non-justiciable get none at all (Tushnet, 
2008: 250). He then posited two fixed points: one that ‗first generation rights must be 
enforced in the courts‘; and the second that ‗modern constitutions must contain 
guarantees of social and economic rights‘ (Tushnet, 2008: 251). This is in contrast to Sir 
Geoffrey Palmer‘s view that NZBORA as part of New Zealand‘s constitutional 
framework should not contain these types of rights (MFAT, 1994: 10). 
Finally Matthew Palmer‘s 2008 book on the Treaty has a section on ‗Creeping Monism: 
Amplifying Indirect Enforcement through International Law‘. This discussed issues 
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similar to those just raised above. While his focus is on indirect ways to implement 
Treaty rights, his findings are helpful in examining indirect ways of achieving the 
implementation of second generation rights via the courts. He noted that USA academic 
Melissa Waters ‗identifies a cross-national trend of courts finding indirect ways of 
giving legal leverage to international obligations that are not formally ‗incorporated‘ 
into domestic law‘ (Palmer, 2008: 210). He also noted that Waters has set out: 
… five primary means by which courts use interpretive techniques to incorporate 
international human rights treaties in domestic law. A court can: point to the provisions 
of an international treaty as additional support for its own interpretation of a statute; 
interpret an ambiguous statute so as not to violate a treaty obligation; use a treaty as a 
key source for updating the common law; interpret domestic constitutional provisions 
so that they conform to international human rights law (Palmer, 2008: 211).  
Theorists in a number of jurisdictions – New Zealand, the UK, South Africa, Turkey 
and the USA – are therefore grappling with this problem of legitimately implementing 
second generation rights through the courts. Martin Scheinin made the point that it is 
not so much whether rights are justiciable or not, as ‗the significant issue is the effective 
protection of the rights in question‘, whichever mechanisms you use (Scheinin, 2001: 
54). He also referred to the notion of positive state obligations as being ‗legislative, 
budgetary and other‘, again focusing on the outcome and not the various means by 
which these rights can be implemented (Scheinin, 2001: 54).  
6.1.3 Potential ideas 
This chapter has given various overseas examples that show attempts have been made 
to realise second generation rights through the courts without violating judicial 
boundaries. As far as can be ascertained, these legal angles have yet to be explored in 
this country. New Zealand‘s constitutional framework is quite different, with economic, 
social and cultural rights having explicitly been excluded from NZBORA. This notion 
of the positive obligation of states to provide these rights has perhaps been too firmly 
skewed towards judicial solutions and Table 7 shows how these ideas developed with 
the courts in mind could be explored from a policy angle in New Zealand. The policy 
and legal approaches are therefore pragmatically intertwined and complementary. It is 
possible that (1) Indicators, (2) Breach assessment and (6) Model of reasonableness 
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review in this table could be looked at from a policy instead of legal perspective.
129
 The 
HRC has already suggested that indicators should be developed (HRC, 2004a: 24). This 
notion of realising some of these ideas from a policy angle means that this could be a 
move from a court-based to a policy-based approach. It also means the state sector 
acting differently, and requires a change in public servant behaviour if there is a demand 
for a different type of state intervention that is skewed away from the legal approach. 
 
Table 7. Possible policy and legislative initiatives to improve 








The idea of developing indicators – such as 
availability, accessibility and quality of 
services – to assess state compliance in 
providing socio-economic rights 
(Liebenberg) 
 
(4) Widening first generation rights 
Further widening the definition of civil rights so that some 
economic and social rights can be caught under their 
umbrella e.g. right to health linked to right to life case law 
(Byrne) 
 
(2) Breach assessment 
Assessing whether New Zealand is 
breaching any of these rights because of (a) 




Using cross-cutting methods such as linking a second 
generation issue to equality and non-discrimination 
provisions in law (Byrne, Scheinin) 
 
(3) Model of reasonableness review  
Developing a ‗model of reasonableness 
review‘ to see if rights are in fact being 
progressively realised (Liebenberg)  
 
(6) Interpretive incorporation 
Using interpretive incorporation techniques e.g. point to the 
provisions of an international treaty as additional support 
for its own interpretation of a statute; interpret an 
ambiguous statute so as not to violate a treaty obligation; 
use a treaty as a key source for updating the common law; 
interpret domestic constitutional provisions so that they 
conform to international human rights law (Waters) 
 
 (7) Strong/weak-form judicial review 
Looking at models of strong-form and weak-form judicial 
enforcement to see how they might help second generation 
rights implementation (Tushnet) 
                                                 
129 I am indebted to Michael White (Legal and Policy Advisor at the HRC) who raised an alternative view in relation to the model 
of reasonableness review. While such a review could be carried out from a policy perspective if carefully framed, he raised the issue 
that for it to have any real teeth there may need to be a legislative requirement for the review (such as currently happens with the 
NZBORA vet) to ensure it was not inappropriately or incorrectly applied (White, 2009: Personal communication). 
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6.1.4 Resource implications 
Weaving a path between realising international treaty rights and the availability of 
resources within states has been a theme in this chapter. The courts have been reluctant 
to become involved in issues around the justiciability of these rights because allocation 
of resources associated with many economic and social policies are seen to be the 
legislature‘s domain. It is also the case, however, that other generations of rights are 
expensive: first generation rights need a legal system with a judiciary and enforcement 
agencies; third generation often involve large claims such as Treaty of Waitangi 
settlements; and fourth generation are now becoming costly to realise as countries try to 
meet Kyoto Protocol and other environmental-related requirements.  
This raises the issue about whether rights can actually regress in a given state, or 
whether citizens should perhaps not expect that resources will become more available 
on every front at all times. There has definitely been an overall progression in the 
realisation of human rights in New Zealand at many levels. However, as seen from this 
chapter, the resource-dependent nature of their provision means that they are a 
moveable feast. The provision of human rights, and the primacy that they have in any 
country or region, is extremely situation-dependent on where they sit amongst other 
factors (that it can be increased or decreased at any time). There has, therefore, not been 
a linear progression of human rights even among Western nations since the UDHR was 
signed in 1948. The whole domestic human rights framework can experience growth, 
then fragmentation, followed by re-integration, and this research has shown this pattern 
has occurred in New Zealand.  
Each government has to make a trade-off in provision of services, and in times of 
recession cuts may be made to areas that were previously more generously funded. New 
Zealanders have already made significant trade-offs, for example exchanging free 
tertiary education for a student loan system, but this was done so that many more people 
could attend these institutions. Again, the right to sue was traded for the introduction of 
the ACC system. Some may argue that cutting adult literacy classes in the current 
climate is a regression of the right to education; others that it is contestable if the money 
is being better spent elsewhere (perhaps in an area which helps realise the right to 
health). It is also possible to imagine degrees of provision – a gold-plated health care 
system, an average one, or a minimum/skeletal system – and this will depend of course 
 159 
on a mixture of government policy and public pressure.
130
  
It can be seen therefore that the provision of rights may go up and down, and as with 
any government policies choices are contestable. Is there a difference therefore between 
rights and political largesse? Perhaps at the level of providing for the most vulnerable it 
is possible to definitely use the language of rights. One of the useful points that the 
human rights field brings to such discussions is the notion of ‗non-derogable rights‘ i.e. 
those that are not under any circumstances contestable such as the right not to be 
tortured. Another helpful point comes from New Zealand‘s own human rights 
legislation. Section 5 of NZBORA contains the phrase: ‗the limits that are demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society‘. This is useful when rights seem to be 
breached, but for the protection of larger public policy reasons.
131
 
The HRRT had made a decision in January 2010 about whether an issue was a justified 
limitation under section 5 of NZBORA. This case involved family members as paid 
caregivers, and is an example of whether or not the state will provide resources to a 
certain group. In Atkinson v Ministry of Health (Decision No. 01/2010 (HRRT 33/05)), 
nine plaintiffs challenged the Ministry of Health‘s policy of excluding family members 
of people who are eligible for disability support services for payment for providing their 
services because of their family relationship. This was said to breach section 19 of 
NZBORA. The Tribunal‘s decision was that the plaintiffs were successful at that stage, 
and the exclusion policy was ‗inconsistent with section 19 of NZBORA in that it limits 
the right to freedom of discrimination, both directly and indirectly, on the grounds of 
family status and is not, under section 5 of that Act, a justified limitation‘. However, 
following this decision the Crown announced it would appeal and the case went to the 
High Court in June 2010, and has now been adjourned until 2011.
132
 
There can also be resource implications related to gender rights. A key case was the 
complaint that the New Zealand Students‘ Association (NZUSA) lodged with the 
Human Rights Commission in 2003. At the time there was interest on students loans, 
                                                 
130 For a useful discussion on the complexity of resource allocation in policy making see Considine (1994: 31-33).
 
131 Noort‘s Case (Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA)) is such an example. This was a drink-driving test case 
where the section 5 justification was invoked in order to reduce the road toll. The rights of the individual in this instance were 
infringed in the interest of public safety.  
132 See Ministry of Health v Atkinson CIV-2010-404-287, 30 June 2010. For a full report of the HRRT‘s January 2010 judgment 
see Decision No. 01/2010 (HRRT 33/05), which also gives the Ministry of Health‘s reasons why they felt there was no breach of 
section 5 or section 19. 
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and the Association claimed that two factors in particular (the gender pay gap and time 
spent away from the workforce caring for children) meant that women ended up paying 
more for their qualifications than men. The claim was eventually withdrawn because of 




Having examined second generation rights this research now turns to third generation 
rights. An emerging area is the assessment of the human rights implications of the 
Treaty of Waitangi.  
6.2 Human rights dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi 
6.2.1 How is the Treaty a human rights document? 
Some of the 1994-2009 evaluation and planning initiatives raised the issue of clarifying 
the relationship between the Treaty of Waitangi and human rights. The HRC‘s 
Consistency 2000 project final report noted that the Treaty was: ‗relevant to the 
assessment of legislation, policies and practices for consistency with the Human Rights 
Act‘ (HRC, 1998: 68). The Commission has called the Treaty a human rights document 
(HRC, 2009b: 2). The HRC‘s analysis of the Treaty is developing over time and it has 
come to the view that that it has three aspects, the middle one related to human rights. 
First it established the Crown/Rangitira relationship. It also laid out both indigenous 
rights and universal human rights. Finally it ‗sets out the rights and responsibilities‘ 
surrounding the three aspects: the Crown has a right to govern, Māori have a right to 
live in their own way, and there are citizenship and equal rights for all New Zealanders. 
This is a complete view therefore of what the relationships are, how they connect to the 
international and domestic human rights frameworks, and who benefits and needs to 
take ownership in relation to the three aspects.  
The Re-evaluation of the Human Rights Protections in New Zealand report authors also 
asserted the need to clarify the relationship of the Treaty with domestic and 
international human rights law. They encouraged a better understanding of the human 
rights dimensions of the Treaty because there was a strong linkage between the Treaty 
                                                 





 They also recognised that the Treaty is a ‗human rights instrument‘ 
and that it: 
… encompasses respect for cultural life, non-discrimination, equality and other 
fundamental principles, all of which resonate with international human rights law. 
Moreover, both international human rights law and the Treaty anticipate that a 
reasonable balance may be struck between the rights of individuals and groups. In this 
sense, therefore, the Treaty of Waitangi is a human rights instrument and it, too, has 
informed the understanding of human rights which underpins this Report (Ministry of 
Justice, 2000a: 24).  
The HRC established a specific ‗Human Rights and the Treaty of Waitangi: Te Mana i 
Waitangi‘ project in 2003. Between 2003 and 2007 the project involved a nation-wide 
community dialogue programme that had 16,000 participants. It raised the tension 
between individual rights (a key feature of the Western model) and collective group 
rights (that reflect a cultural perspective) but noted that all these rights are inter-related 
(HRC, 2003: 7).
135
 This is in line with an earlier theme of this research that seeks to find 
a parity and commonality between first (civil and political) and second (economic, 
social and cultural) generation rights. A further development would be to also find 
common ground between first, second and third generation (group) rights, and the 
indigenous protection triangle can be seen as a step towards this. Again, this would be a 
form of complementarity. Much work is currently being done on clarifying the 
similarities between the Treaty and the human rights framework. First, in the same way 
that human rights implications are vetted whenever a new Bill or Regulation passes 
through Cabinet, Bills also have to be vetted for consistency with the principles of the 
Treaty (HRC, 2003: 16). Secondly, one view is that it can be considered ‗an 
international treaty between two sovereign nations‘ and the HRC report above 
confirmed this stance: 
The English text of the Treaty is consistent with the forms of treaties of international 
law and is concerned with matters such as the cession of sovereignty (or kawanatanga) 
in exchange for the grant of British citizenship which properly fall within the scope of 
an international treaty (HRC, 2003: 18).  
                                                 
134 The report also suggested the following linkages between Article 2 of the Treaty and domestic and international human rights 
laws and treaties: ‗section 20 (right to culture) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, the international jurisprudence generated by 
article 27 (right to culture) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and article 15 (right to cultural life) of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 38). 
135 Currently the HRC has published a Te Mana I Waitangi draft for discussion (HRC, 2010). This will form the basis of a separate 




Because of these commonalities the report concluded that Treaty rights and human 
rights are complementary concepts. Three other similarities are that both the Treaty and 
human rights ‗govern relationships‘ between citizens and the Crown, are ‗part of New 
Zealand‘s constitutional framework‘, and are about evolving rights, although there will 
inevitably be conflict and tension between the rights of different parties (HRC, 2003: 
19). Clarification has therefore happened at a number of levels: that the Treaty is indeed 
a human rights document; its relationship to domestic and international human rights 
frameworks is becoming increasingly understood; and that individual and collective 
rights sit together and not at odds.  
The education aspect of the fifth phase of New Zealand‘s human rights history is 
evident in Māori language school initiatives and in the wider public education work of 
the HRC when it collaborated with other agencies to publish the report on building 
human rights communities in education (Amnesty et al, 2007). This report noted a 
specifically Treaty-based Māori approach to human rights education (Amnesty et al, 
2007: 11), including the development of ‗A Draft Charter of the Rights of the Māori 
Child: Te Mana o te Tamaiti Māori‘ (Early Childhood Development, 2002). The report 
also cited the philosophy of the Kohanga Reo movement giving a ‗communal lens to 
human rights‘ that is based on five principles (Amnesty et al, 2007: 14).136 Thus the 
needs of Māori children are linked through every level of Māori society and with the 
responsibilities of the state sector and its special relationship to the Treaty. Wider public 
education is also the focus of two parts of the HRC‘s work programme: an internal 
scoping paper on the human rights dimensions of the Treaty (HRC, 2009b); and work 
linking the Treaty with the language of human rights.
137
  
Another HRC project, which is a work-in-progress, is a draft table that links the Treaty 
with the language of human rights (see Table 8). Given the poor economic and social 
statistics for Māori generally, making this link echoes the view given by Beetham 
                                                 
136 These five principles are: ‗Principle 1: It is the right of the Māori child to be raised in the Māori language within the bosom of 
the whanau; Principle 2: It is the right of the whanau to nurture and care for the mokopuna/children and grandchildren; Principle 3: 
It is the obligation of the hapu/clan to ensure that the whanau is strengthened to carry out its responsibilities; Principle 4: It is the 
obligation of the iwi/tribe to advocate, negotiate and resource the hapu and whanau; Principle 5: It is the obligation of the 
Government under Te Tiriti o Waitangi to fulfil the aspirations of the Māori people for its future generations‘ (Amnesty et al, 2007: 
14). 
137 Similar work carried out in this area is the New Zealand Law Commission‘s (2006) report Converging Currents: Custom and 
Human Rights in the Pacific. This explored the sometimes difficult interface between Western human rights and indigenous Pacific 
culture, and suggested ways to ‗harmonise‘ the tensions looking for areas of commonality as a starting point.  
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earlier. He claimed there is value in keeping up the pressure for human rights in the 
economic and social area as they sound more authoritative than basic welfare goals and 
they emphasise the obligations of governments. The table shows that the flip side of 
rights is responsibilities and that carefully examining the relationship between the 
Treaty and the Crown can unpack where these lie. One of responsibilities is that the 
community protects and assists youth and the next section looks at the still very poor 
statistics for Māori vs non-Māori children and young people.  
As well as clarification and education, collaboration is a key feature of the fifth phase 
and one aspect of this is the penetration of these issues into the state sector and local 
government. For instance in 2006 the Ministry of Justice, Te Puni Kokiri and the Crown 
Law Office developed a policy framework giving guidelines and advice to state sector 














                                                 
138 Crown-Māori Instruments are known as CMRI and this covers ‗formal relationship agreements between the Crown and Māori 
organisations, whanau, hapu and iwi‘ and CMRI is about providing ‗a ―whole of government‖ approach to establishing and 
recognising collaborative and ongoing relationships between the Crown and Māori‘ (HRC, 2009c: 1; and see also LGNZ, 2007). 
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Table 8. The Treaty and human rights 












 Rangatira gave and the 
Crown gained the 
authority to govern 
The Crown promised to 
protect and Rangatira kept 
their authority to protect 
and develop their taonga 
The Crown gave Māori 
and British the 
authority to belong 
and participate as 
equals (citizenship) 
  Rangatira gave and the 
Crown gained the pre-
emptive right to purchase 
land Māori wished to sell 
 
Rights To make laws 
Gather taxes 
Set up institutions 
Make agreements with 
other nations 







Equality before the law 
Fair process 
Free speech, thoughts 
and beliefs 





Responsibilities Ensure laws are fair 
Observe principles of 
natural justice 
Protect our constitution 
Provide services 
Protect Rangatira-tanga 











Protect and assist youth 
Look after people who 
are vulnerable  
Respect the Treaty 
 
Source: HRC draft table (Hamilton, 2009: Personal communication) 
6.2.2 Poor statistics: continuing disparities 
The 2009 UPR report noted that: 
Despite recent socio-economic improvements, inequalities still persist for Māori in 
education, health, employment and income. In 2007 10.1 per cent of Māori students left 
school with little or no attainment compared to 3.5 per cent of New Zealand European, 
which is an improvement on previous years. In the year ended December 2007, just 9 
per cent of Māori held a tertiary qualification at bachelor‘s degree level or above 
compared with 22 per cent of European. In 2000-02 (the most recent years for which 
data is available) Māori female life expectancy was 73.2 years, 8.7 years below that of 
non-Māori females (81.9 years), and Māori male life expectancy was 69.0 years, 8.2 
years below that of non-Māori males (77.2 years). Māori are also more likely to be 
unemployed than European and earn less (UNGA, 2009a: 8). 
Previously in 2005 the action plan for human rights for 2005-2010 had also identified 
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structural disadvantages, continuing discrimination, and challenges in the way the 
Treaty would be viewed in the future (HRC, 2005a: 23). The plan also acknowledged 
that good race relations are dependent on the provision of both first and second 
generation rights. However, the increasing incorporation of the Treaty and the 
Declaration into the human rights framework also means they are dependent on 
providing and raising the status of third generation rights. In 2008 the Ministry of Social 
Development published a report on wellbeing in children and young people in New 
Zealand which stressed that:  
Despite the improvements, health outcomes for Māori generally compare unfavourably 
against those for the total population: Māori have a higher proportion of low birth 
weight babies, higher infant mortality, lower immunisation rates, poorer hearing and 
oral health, higher rates of obesity and cigarette smoking and higher rates of youth 
suicide (MSD, 2008: 7).  
The picture for education is similar. While there have been improvements compared to 
previous figures for Māori, when set against the total population indicators are that 
Māori still have: less participation in tertiary education and less likelihood of staying at 
school to 17.5 years of age; a strong chance of leaving without higher school 
qualifications; more truancy; and lower mean scores for reading, maths and science. 
One positive is that: ‗The proportion of Māori school leavers with NCEA Level 2 or 
above increased from 29 percent to 44 percent between 2003 and 2007, the largest 
improvement of any ethnic group‘ (MSD, 2008: 7-8). 
The figures for economic security show a similar mix of positive and negative 
indicators, although the positive aspects will undoubtedly become affected by the 
current recession. The report noted that: ‗The proportion of Māori children whose 
parents were not in paid work fell from 48 percent to 30 percent between 1991 and 
2006‘ (MSD, 2008: 8). Also most young Māori aged 15-24 are more likely to be in paid 
work than in the 1990s, but set against the total population, Māori unemployment 
figures are still high (MSD, 2008: 8). In terms of physical safety, compared to the 
whole under-25 population Māori youth are ‗at greater risk of dying from assault, 
unintentional injury and motor vehicle accidents‘ (MSD, 2008: 8). Youth justice 
statistics paint a similar scenario: young Māori account for ‗almost half of all police 
apprehensions of 14-16 year olds and over half of all cases proved in the Youth Court 
involving 14-16 year olds‘ (MSD, 2008: 8). Good indicators are that between 2001 and 
2006 there was a doubling of both the number of young Māori who speak te reo Māori 
and the number who live in homes with internet access, a lessening of those living in 
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homes with parents who smoke, and fewer living in crowded houses generally (MSD, 
2008: 8).  
The UPR report also noted poor statistics for Māori, but gave strategies for trying to 
improve these: 
The Government recognises that it is essential for New Zealand‘s future to address 
inequalities for Māori and is taking immediate action to address the impact of the 
economic crisis on Māori. In January 2009 the Minister of Māori Affairs convened a 
Māori Economic Summit and is leading a Māori Affairs Ministerial Taskforce on 
Economic Development. The Government is also working towards the development 
and implementation of the Māori Potential Approach across the public sector. Te Puni 
Kokiri (Ministry of Māori Development) is leading this work in cooperation with other 
Government departments and community groups. This approach is intended to guide 
the development and implementation of public policy that is derived from and reflects 
the strengths and aspirations of Māori. For example, the Government is implementing a 
specific Māori education strategy, which has been developed to focus Government, 
school and teacher practice on lifting the achievement of Māori students through 
evidence based practice (UNGA, 2009a: 8).  
Included in this section on the human rights dimensions of the Treaty is the following 
discussion on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. As will be seen 
below much work has been done to align the two documents and the Declaration is 
considered to be a vital part of New Zealand‘s protection of third generation indigenous 
rights. 
6.3 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
The 2009 HRC scoping paper noted that the human rights dimensions of the Treaty are 
connected to both the universal human rights of the UDHR and the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was formally supported by New Zealand in 
2009 (HRC, 2009b: 4). The Declaration, like the Treaty, is also seen as a tool to address 
the ongoing disparities outlined above. The HRC has developed a table that showed the 
close alignment between each of the 46 articles of the Declaration and the Treaty (HRC, 
2009d). Again, like Table 8, it unpacks the rights and responsibilities which underlie 
both documents and also used the same tri-fold model of authority: kawanatanga – the 
authority of the Crown to govern; rangatiratanga – the authority of rangatira to protect 
and develop their taonga; turangawaewae – the authority of citizens to belong as 
equals. 
Briefly, the events leading up to this support were that in September 2007 the UN 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration which was the result of a long 
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process – the drafting work had begun over 20 years before in 1985. It is considered an 
aspirational document and not legally binding in any way, relying instead on its moral 
force.
139
 Minimum standards have been set out for the indigenous peoples of the world. 
It is hoped these standards will ensure their third generation rights are acknowledged 
and realised including: freedom from discrimination; self-determination; having distinct 
political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions; collective rights; land rights; 
language rights; spiritual and religious freedom; control of educational and health 
systems and media; and the protection of traditions, histories and customs. One of the 
important features about the Declaration is that it is not saying anything new and 
therefore should not be threatening to states. It is largely built on existing international 
treaties such as the ICCPR, ICESCR and CERD and draws together many rights and 
explains how they relate to indigenous peoples. As the Commission‘s scoping paper 
noted, the Declaration ‗does not create new rights‘ (HRC, 2009b: 13). 
New Zealand under the Labour Government did not sign the Declaration in September 
2007. At the time of adoption of the draft in June 2006 and later in October 2006 New 
Zealand, Australia and the USA made two joint statements about their concerns with 
the Declaration saying it was ‗confusing, unworkable, contradictory and deeply flawed‘ 
(MFAT, 2006c: 1). The main points of contention were: (a) self-determination; (b) veto 
power; (c) land and resources; (d) universality of human rights; and (e) lack of 
definition of ‗indigenous peoples‘ (MFAT, 2006c: 1-2).140 Work continued on a 
                                                 
139 Despite its non-binding status it is having a powerful effect in the international community because, as the HRC noted in its 
scoping paper, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination is urging states to use the Declaration as an interpretive 
tool when preparing CERD reports (HRC, 2009b: 12). The scoping paper also outlines various ways the Declaration can be 
implemented including: ‗direct incorporation into domestic law‘ [Bolivia has done this]; as an educative tool; by Courts when 
developing and interpreting law [in New Zealand Ngai Tahu v DG of Conservation, 1995, CA 18/85; B v Director-General of Social 
Welfare 1997 HC]; as the basis of action plans for the improvement of indigenous peoples‘ enjoyment of their rights; as a tool for 
constitutional reform‘ (HRC, 2009b: 14).  
140 The specific comments on each of these areas were: ‗Self-determination. The provisions for articulating self-determination for 
indigenous peoples in this text inappropriately reproduce common Article 1 of the covenants. Self-determination in the Chair‘s text 
therefore could be misrepresented as conferring a unilateral right of self-determination and possible secession upon a specific subset 
of the national populace, thus threatening the political unity, territorial integrity and the stability of existing UN Member States. 
Veto power? The text also appears to purport to confer upon a sub-national group, a power of veto over the laws of a democratic 
legislature. Indigenous peoples in our countries can already fully and freely engage in our democratic decision-making processes. 
But, our governments cannot accept the notion of creating different classes of citizenship. To give one group in society rights that 
take precedence over those of others could be discriminatory under the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. 
While the Convention allows states to take special measures, the power to do so is discretionary, and cannot be used to take 
measures that are unlimited in duration. Land and resources. The provisions on lands and resources in the text before us are also 
equally unworkable and unacceptable. They ignore the contemporary realities in many countries with indigenous populations, by 
appearing to require the recognition of indigenous rights to lands now lawfully owned by other citizens, both indigenous and non-
indigenous. Such provisions would be both arbitrary and impossible to implement. Universality of human rights. Other important 
provisions in the Chair‘s text are potentially discriminatory. It seems to be assumed that the rights of all individuals, which are 
enshrined in international law, are a secondary consideration in this text. The intent of states participating in the Working Group was 
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compromise text and by 31 August 2007 the New Zealand Government was satisfied 
that the text had made some headway on the self-determination issue. However, the 
overall feeling was that the minor changes made did not answer more serious concerns 
about the draft wording as they affected some of this country‘s ‗basic constitutional and 
legal arrangements‘ (MFAT, 2006b: 1-2).  
After the 2008 election the National Government took a ‗wait and see‘ approach. When 
questioned in the House on 31 March 2009 by the Hon Hone Harawira about when New 
Zealand would give unqualified support for the Declaration, the Prime Minister John 
Key stated his government would revise its position once the Australian Government 
had reviewed their stance and ‗see whether its interpretation is applicable in New 
Zealand‘ (NZ Parliament, 2009: 1).141 A few days later on 3 April 2009 the Australian 
Government made a statement on the Declaration which marked a turn-around from 
their previous position, including on the problematic issue of self-determination: 
Today, Australia joins the international community to affirm the aspirations of all 
Indigenous peoples … For the first time governments worked directly with Indigenous 
peoples to develop a significant human rights statement. The decades of work 
culminated in a landmark document. A document that reflects and pays homage to the 
unique place of Indigenous peoples and their entitlements to all human rights as 
recognised in international law. … On 17 September 2007, 143 nations voted in support 
of the Declaration. Australia was one of the four countries that voted against the 
Declaration. Today, Australia changes its position. Today, Australia gives our support 
to the Declaration. … The Declaration is historic and aspirational. While it is non-
binding and does not affect existing Australian law, it sets important international 
principles for nations to aspire to. Through the Article on self-determination, the 
Declaration recognises the entitlement of Indigenous peoples to have control over their 
destiny and to be treated respectfully. Article 46 makes it clear that the Declaration 




                                                                                                                                               
clear that, as has always been the case, human rights are universal and apply in equal measure to all individuals. This means that one 
group cannot have human rights that are denied to other groups within the same nation-state. Lack of definition of ‘indigenous 
peoples’. We cannot accept the argument some are making, disingenuously, that this declaration will only apply to countries that 
have significant or obvious indigenous populations. There is no definition of ―indigenous peoples‖ in the text. The lack of definition 
or scope of application within the Chair‘s text means that separatist or minority groups, with traditional connections to the territory 
where they live – in all regions of the globe – could seek to exploit this declaration to claim the right to self-determination, including 
exclusive control of their territorial resources. And this text would allow them wrongly to claim international endorsement for 
exercising such rights‘ (MFAT, 2006c: 1-2). 
141 The USA Government has also been revisiting its stance on the Declaration, partly because of CERD Committee pressure 
(HRC 2009b: 10). 
142 Article 26 states: ‗Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any state, people, group or person any right to 
engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the UN or construed as authorising or encouraging any action 
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states‘. 
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On 6 April 2009 the Chief Commissioner, Rosslyn Noonan, and the Race Relations 
Commissioner, Joris de Bres, wrote a joint letter to the Prime Minister John Key. They 
acknowledged the Australian stance and linked the Declaration with the Treaty: 
For New Zealand the Declaration provides a valuable guide in the development of 
policies and initiatives to give better effect to the Treaty of Waitangi. Affirming the 
value of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for New Zealand before 
Parliament would highlight the government‘s commitment to improving Crown-
Tangata Whenua relationships in a very powerful way. It would be particularly 
appropriate to do it at the time of New Zealand‘s appearance before the Human Rights 
Council on Thursday 7 May [2009] for its first Universal Periodic Review of its human 
rights performance (HRC, 2009a: 2). 
Progress was finally made towards this country‘s support of the Declaration. The 
National-led Government announced formal support through Māori Affairs Minister 
Pita Sharples at the UN on 20 April 2010. The announcement immediately stirred 
strong debate about the status of the Declaration and how it would affect the 
relationship of Māori to the Crown. One commentator, High Court Judge Sir Edward 
Taihakurei Durie, said for instance: ‗I would still rank the day that New Zealand gave 
support to the declaration as the most significant day in advancing Māori rights since 
February 6, 1840‘.143 
6.4 Summary 
There has clearly been an imbalance in the implementation of first and second 
generation rights. Third and fourth generation rights have at times perhaps also tended 
to gain more traction, government funding and public sympathy in New Zealand. There 
are many voices, however, that are urging that this situation be redressed for economic 
and social rights. The expert international law group that developed the Limburg 
Principles in 2006, international organisations such as the UN and the Commonwealth 
Secretariat, and domestic human rights institutions such as the HRC and authors such as 
Geiringer and Palmer, are aligning to ensure economic and social rights will be more 
realisable than in the past. The action plan for human rights for 2005-2010 gave 
concrete examples of strategies to work on the five key areas where these rights are 
poorly implemented: poverty, housing, health, education and employment. The 
development of the 2011-2016 version of the Commission‘s action plan should help to 
                                                 
143 See www.3news.co.nz/NZ-supports-declaration-on-rights-of-indigenous-peoples/tabid/419/articleID/151854/Default.aspx 
(accessed on 20 April 2010). 
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ensure that indicators are continually monitored so at least some progressive realisation 
can occur. Nearly all of the recommendations and initiatives in the 2005-2010 plan 
about second generation rights are policy vs legal-focused and can be carried out 
without legislative change, in line with the trend of a third policy-based level emerging 
in New Zealand‘s human rights framework.  
As mentioned, third generation rights are gaining more traction. The blending of the 
three parts of the indigenous rights protection triangle – the Treaty, the Declaration and 
a human rights approach – is well underway. The Declaration and the human rights 
approach are backed by the weight of the institutional and legal international human 
rights framework and should work to reinforce and strengthen the position of the Treaty 
as a rights-based document from which some progress for Māori could flow.  
So far the research has canvassed New Zealand‘s relationship to the international 
human rights framework, the build-up of (and problems with) its domestic framework, 
and two important issues in the current human rights discussion in this country. This 
wide background now makes it possible to answer in the next chapter the second 
research question about what effectiveness look likes. 
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CHAPTER 7: COMPLEMENTARITY: WHAT DOES 
EFFECTIVENESS LOOK LIKE? 
Human rights have become part and parcel of New Zealand governance generally, and 
in the applied business of domestic and international public policy they are here to stay. 
The assumption should therefore be that successive governments will want to keep 
improving this country‘s record. In this chapter it is now possible to answer the second 
research question: ‗How might effectiveness be characterised in relation to robust 
human rights governance‘? The criteria around this notion of robust human rights 
governance (hereinafter robustness) are also developed.  
This chapter looks at the larger picture of how well the state sector is doing as a whole 
in facilitating a human rights approach at many levels. The attributes of robustness 
differ from those found in fragile human rights governance (hereinafter fragility). The 
second research question will be answered in two parts: clarifying robust vs fragile 
human rights governance; and then assessing New Zealand‘s status and effectiveness in 
terms of robust human rights governance. 
7.1 Clarifying robustness v fragility 
One of the hallmarks of robustness is that there is a good understanding of and 
interaction with the UN framework, particularly the international instruments and 
obligations that have been ratified. With fragility there may be a rush to sign treaties so 
a state ‗appears‘ to be a good international citizen when the implications of fully 
implementing the rights involved are not fully understood. As noted in Section 2.1, 
Minister of Justice Simon Power had confirmed that New Zealand‘s stance is only to 
ratify in a considered manner (Power, 2009). This thesis has looked at both the top-
down influence of the UN towards New Zealand, and the bottom-up influence of this 
country back towards the UN. What this type of research shows is that the long 
evolution of governance produces in some states a mentality that is much more 
susceptible to the kinds of standards that emerged after World War II. In New Zealand‘s 
case, it was precisely its participation in the formation of the UN that gave it a bedrock 
human rights focus, and this had already been foreshadowed in everything that had 
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come before such as common law standards. This long evolution is not something that 
is easily transported into a country like Zimbabwe, for instance, which did not help set 




Each country that joins the UN is invited to accept the human rights framework, but 
there will of course always be states that do not believe in the human rights principles 
behind it. It is possible to show these states what mechanisms they need to build 
robustness (such as bills of rights, NHRIs, domestic laws and policies), but their state 
sector needs to own these for them to have any real meaning. The ideal environment in 
which human rights are taken seriously is when there is a rights-sympathetic state 
sector, a political system compatible with the international human rights system, and 
citizens willing to create a climate that allows rights to be acknowledged. As New 
Zealand is fortunate to have all three present, rights have been given a central position 
as a public policy goal (or a set of underpinning principles). 
While some states may not be robust in this area, if there is good intention these 
countries can be on a spectrum towards becoming stronger human rights environments. 
Even in states with ongoing human rights abuses, it might be that the NGO sector and 
other civil society organisations are vibrant and full of people who record human rights 
violations and provide evidence for when there might eventually be mass prosecutions. 
This is parallel to the situation in South Africa prior to 1994 when apartheid was 
overthrown. For many decades before the South African constitution came into effect, 
civil society organisations, international movements of people, multilaterals and the UN 
system were building a very deep human rights environment amongst sympathetic 
people. When the apartheid regime was eventually toppled, this experience meant that 
                                                 
144 What is striking about the Zimbabwe situation, however, is that the state sector formally has some of the right human rights 
credentials, i.e. there is a perfectly good constitution, but the reality is vastly different as many of these rights are constantly 
breached. The most recent Amnesty International report for instance outlines many human rights problems: the aftermath of the 
March 2008 elections resulted in ‗at least 180 deaths, and at least 9,000 people injured from torture, beatings and other violations 
perpetrated mainly by security forces, war veterans and ZANU-PF supporters‘; perpetrators of human rights violations were not 
brought to justice and given impunity; extrajudicial executions and unlawful killings; enforced disappearances; torture and other ill-
treatment; restrictions on freedom of expression and on the work of human rights defenders (see Zimbabwe country report at 
www.amnesty.org). In terms of its constitution, it has the potential to protect many rights (mainly first generation): Chapter III of 
the Zimbabwe Constitution (1979 with Amendments to 2005) contains: The Declaration of Rights: 11. Preamble; 12. Protection of 
right to life; 13. Protection of right to personal liberty; 14. Protection from slavery and forced labour; 15. Protection from inhuman 
treatment; 16. Protection from deprivation of property; 17. Protection from arbitrary search or entry; 18. Provisions to secure 
protection of law; 19. Protection of freedom of conscience; 20. Protection of freedom of expression; 21. Protection of freedom of 
assembly and association; 22. Protection of freedom of movement; 23. Protection from discrimination on the grounds of race etc. A 
copy of the full constitution can be seen www.parlzim.gov.zw/inside.aspx?mpgid=25&spid=68 (accessed 5 February 2010). 
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the state itself could quickly mainstream a human rights focus. So in the one country it 
is possible to have a state sector treating human rights with contempt and domestic and 
international actors building a robust human rights mentality.  
Also when there is fragility instead of robustness the judiciary can be taken over by the 
ruling party and used as an instrument of civil war, essentially using the law+litigation 
framework to prosecute opponents.
145 
Looked at from this perspective, New Zealand is 
not contesting the viability of the human rights system; there is simply haggling over 
the margins. Also in this country the state has not been the aggressor; in fact with its 
social welfare system and willingness to monitor itself with non-discrimination 
legislation it has largely been the protector. The argument in this country is mostly not 
about whether the citizen can trust the state, but about how much the state should be 
involved in legislating on issues.
146
 When there is fragility, however, a state can 
struggle to accept any core human rights standards and can itself be complicit in crimes 
against its own population such as genocide. It needs to be remembered, however, that 
the growth of the human rights system in most western liberal democratic countries has 
been the result of a domestic struggle against oppression (either by the state or other 
actors) at one time or another, so the condition of fragility is one that states with robust 
human rights governance have already gone through at some point.  
It is also possible that a government could take a minimalist law+litigation approach 
and do the least required under international law to fulfil its international human rights 
treaty obligations. This would be a narrow reading, perhaps a legalistic approach. Also, 
if in any state sector the relationship between law+litigation and policy is poorly 
understood, there will be a tension instead of an alignment between the two. Some 
government agencies within a state (even in New Zealand) may by virtue of their 
portfolio take a legal stance on issues, while others would naturally tend towards a 
policy view. With complementarity – proactively combining the law+litigation and 
public policy fields – the result is closer to a gold standard of international best practice. 
Many countries cannot afford a gold standard human rights system, but it should still be 
                                                 
145 Bradford and Scott (2009: 101) also made the link between fragility and corruption: ‗Probably most important is the level of 
corruption which exists, recognising that all fragile states have a record of corruption in their history; it is a factor which coexists 
with fragility, just as a relative absence of corruption – and strong independent agencies to combat it – coexists with strong states‘. 
146 The years 1990-1993 (when three pivotal pieces of human rights legislation were enacted – NZBORA, Human Rights Act, 
Privacy Act) were an important time for contesting the boundaries of the New Zealand state‘s area of activity in relation to its 
citizens.  
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possible to find some economic and effective ways to reach towards that goal. Here the 
ongoing debate set out in the previous chapter about how to elevate second generation 
rights is helpful, as the discussion is already underway about novel ways to increase 
access to these rights given the ever-present resource limitations in many states.  
7.2 New Zealand’s status and effectiveness in robust human 
rights governance 
It is now possible to assess a number of factors to see what New Zealand‘s status is in 
terms of robust human rights governance i.e. how effective has it been? To aid this, 
Table 9 with 20 criteria has been developed relating to each of the six phases of New 
Zealand‘s human rights history. Four categories are used: strong, developing, weak and 
non-existent. The rationale for using these has already been set out in Section 1.5 on 
developing criteria for effectiveness.  
Looking at Table 9 in detail the ‗strong‘ status is largely related to legal and structural 
factors i.e. Phase One (international law-making); Phases Two to Four (creation of 
domestic architecture and streamlined institutions and legislation); Phase Five 
(judiciary/legal system enforcing international obligations and treaties are ratified after 
careful checking); and Phase Six (rule of law adhered to, domestic remedies for 
breaches of international rights). This is not surprising for two reasons. The legal aspect 
to human rights implementation has always been much more developed than any other, 
including several decades of academic support in this area.
 Also, the West‘s focus on 
civil and political rights has meant that these first generation rights have received more 
legal protection and this is reflected in New Zealand‘s points of strength. The point was 
made earlier, however, that having an effective human rights system in New Zealand is 
not just about enacting laws. Other non-legal elements work together to form a wider 
and tighter framework for international human rights to enter this country and be 
transformed in the domestic context, and as will now be seen it is these non-legal 











Growth of international architecture – UN-NZ interplay 
(1) Involvement in UN structural development and international law-making Strong 
PHASE TWO 
Growth of domestic architecture 
(2) Evolving domestic architecture – institutions (especially NHRI), legislation, 
policies and practices 
Strong 
(3) Ongoing incorporation of international obligations into domestic law if 
relevant and possible 
Strong  
(4) Clear lead government department with overall domestic oversight for 
international human rights treaty body reporting and implementation 
Weak 
(5) ‗Formal‘ inter-departmental network of officials (or Human Rights Working 
Group) 
Non-existent 
PHASES THREE AND FOUR 
Stock-take and planning initiatives 
(6) Streamlined institutions and legislation, and stock-take and planning 
initiatives carried out when necessary 
Strong 
PHASE FIVE 
More effective implementation 
 
(7) Judiciary/legal system enforcing international obligations Strong 
(8) Treaties ratified after careful check for compliance Strong 
(9) Exploring proactive approaches instead of always being reactive  Developing 
(10) Four-fold human rights domestic framework: organisations, legislation, 
policy, human rights governance level 
Developing 
(11) Increasing parity across first, second, third and fourth generation rights Developing 
(12) Early mainstreaming of human rights considerations into policy making Developing 
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(13) Cultural issues being worked through Developing 
(14) Effective public human rights education programme Developing  
(15) State sector and NGOs working together on human rights issues Developing 
(16) Internal human rights training in department and cross-agency training of 
policy advisors to ensure good understanding of international instruments and 
obligations 
Weak –  
Developing 
(17) Concluding Observations recognised as important Weak –  
Developing 
PHASE SIX 
Robust human rights governance 
 
(18) Good international citizen and role model – human rights abuses much less 
likely 
Strong 
(19) Good governance practices: democracy, rule of law adhered to, judiciary 
and officials not corrupt; public participation 
Strong 





It is clear from Table 9 that the ‗developing‘ status is almost solely related to Phase 
Five about more effective implementation, and this again is not surprising because New 
Zealand has only just completed a 15-year period of review i.e. stock-taking and 
planning initiatives. These looked at problems in implementation which, having only 
just been identified in the stock-take phase, will take some time to set in place. The 
‗weak‘ and ‗non-existent‘ status areas are in Phase Two and Phase Five. In fact, two out 
of the four Phase Two factors are not at all strong which indicates this is a phase that 
definitely needs more work. Summarising, Phases One, Three, Four and Six are strong 
and Phases Two and Five need to be addressed. This research suggests that if a Human 
Rights Working Group (or similar body) was established (currently the only ‗non-
existent‘ factor), they could monitor the development of progress towards achieving 
robustness using these (or similar) phase and status factors.  
Since developing this table, a table in the Bradford and Scott (2009) report on developing 
robust economic governance systems was sighted that takes a similar approach entitled 
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‗Moving Governance Institutions from a Fragile to a Developed State‘.147 The term 
‗human rights‘ does not feature in their extensive lists, again confirming the disjuncture 
between general international policy making and the field of international human rights. 
However, their analogous approach (of moving from fragile to developed – in this thesis 
from fragile to robust) strengthens this research as the core concepts are being used in 
another field to understand a related issue. They also make the perceptive point that: ‗The 
mirror image of the strengths of EGMs [economic governance mechanisms] are the 
weakness factors‘ (Bradford and Scott, 2009: 101). This is true also of the attempt in this 
thesis to develop the 20 criteria for robustness; these too are the ‗mirror image‘ of the 
attributes for fragility. For robust economic governance, Bradford and Scott conclude with 
nine ‗design principles‘ for establishing this in fragile states.148 Each of these principles 
could equally well apply to the development towards robust human rights governance in a 
fragile state, and there is probably room for some cross-fertilisation between this research 
and any efforts to better understand state-level improvements in the human rights field. 
7.3 Summary 
The second research question can now be answered about how effective New Zealand has 
been in relation to robust human rights governance. It is possible to characterise not ‗total‘ 
effectiveness, but ‗a great measure of‘ effectiveness, having entered the sixth stage of 
robustness and with work still to do to bring Phase Two and Phase Five issues into a 
position of strength. Again, as with the first research question, the diagnosis about how to 
reach the status of robust human rights governance can be given at least in part, but making 
the necessary changes can only occur if there is a strong commitment from within the state 
sector to formally move in this direction.  
 
The next chapter now turns to the two case studies that show how easy or difficult it can be 
to implement rights from the international arena. That is, the complex alignment that needs 
                                                 
147 Table 2.1 in their report looks at three status levels (conflict prone state/fragile state/developed state) and suggests features that 
would indicate the range ‗no governance‘ to ‗good governance‘ across three areas (politics/economic and social/security) (Bradford 
and Scott, 2009: 22-23).  
148 These principles are: understanding the ‗historical and political context‘ of the fragile state; seeking a ‗stable political and 
security environment‘; the need for ‗political endorsement‘; the necessity of ‗political reform‘ so that robust economic governance 
can happen; ‗long-term commitment‘ by other (donor) countries who are trying to help; ‗donor coordination‘ among these countries; 
‗capacity building‘; ‗oversight, monitoring and evaluation‘; crucial involvement of ‗civil society‘ (Bradford and Scott, 2009: 131-
134).  
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to happen starting with a ratified international covenant, its progression possibly into law 
and/or policies, and its route down to the rights being enjoyed by individuals, can be more 
or less out of sync. The military justice system example is a positive one, however, 
showing the specific processes and mechanisms of the human rights system working at 
best international good practice and allowing effective complementarity between the 
law+litigation and public policy fields. Once the case studies have been presented in 
Chapter 8 (which also deepen New Zealand‘s human rights story), it will then be possible 
to make concluding comments in Chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER 8: CASE PRACTICE: REACTIVE AND 
PROACTIVE APPROACHES 
This thesis has analysed the complexity of how human rights have entered into the 
domestic arena over the last several decades – in an unsystematic way and often 
reactive to overseas trends or pressure from the UN. The two case studies now highlight 
similar issues: that policy advisors are working in a bill of rights climate and that the 
domestic transfer of international human rights is now a core part of their work; that the 
existence of the Optional Protocol route can have an marked effect on domestic law-
making; and that there are constitutional issues related to these human rights cases 
(parliamentary vs judicial boundaries in the Baigent instance and the protection of 
constitutional rights in the military justice system example). The military justice study 
in particular also affirms the government‘s proactive commitment to the effective 
implementation of international human rights. Each case study will be examined in the 
light of several layers (see Tables 10 and 12). The starting point for each will be the 
international covenant context in which these issues sit. Domestic legislative/judicial 
implications are outlined and the impact at the Cabinet/departmental/policy level is 
analysed. Finally the effect on the individual as rights-holder is then assessed.  
Table 10. Baigent – levels of impact 
INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT 
International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights 1976 
Contains right to remedies under Article 
2(3)  
DOMESTIC LEGISLATION NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990 Contains no express remedies 
JUDICIAL  Court of Appeal 1994 Court created remedies in Baigent‘s case 




Cabinet and NZ Police response 
to case 
Input sought from other affected 
departments 
Fiscal, policy and rights implications 
INDIVIDUAL Optional Protocol previously 
only route 




Using these examples this chapter seeks to establish that the penetration of human rights 
into the New Zealand state sector is a multi-levelled process which goes through a 
different number of stages, depending on the way the issue arises in the beginning. This 
is also the last chapter which aligns with Phase Five about the effective implementation 
of international human rights. The key theme that is most clearly illustrated in this 
chapter is that of clarification: in both case studies a long process of clarifying the effect 
of international (ICCPR) and domestic (NZBORA) law on the circumstances of the 
Baigent case and the military justice system review was needed in order to come to a 
point where anomalies were ironed out.  
8.1 Baigent’s case: reactive 
This section on Baigent sets out the background to the case, including that the Court of 
Appeal‘s ruling created new public law remedies. A brief discussion about UN concerns 
over the area of remedies in New Zealand law prior to the case, and implications that 
the decision had on individuals using the ICCPR Optional Protocol route, follows. Once 
the background has been established, the impact of the case on the state sector is 
examined, particularly the response of Cabinet and the NZ Police. 
Judicial/parliamentary boundaries are then discussed because the case raised this issue. 
It is also shown how the case was eventually mainstreamed into the state sector, and a 
final note is made on the effect of Baigent on another jurisdiction, Australia. 
8.1.1 Background 
The ramifications of this decision were complex and layered throughout the state sector. 
Briefly the case involved a wrongful search as described by Jerome Elkind in his 
critique of Baigent: 
A detective on the New Zealand Police Force, Detective Drummond, received the 
following information. A cannabis dealer named Tony O‘Brien lived at 16 Main Road, 
Korokoro with his girlfriend and owned a Mitsubishi L300, registration No LW 9466. 
On investigation the detective found there was no Main Road in Korokoro. The likely 
address was either 16 Korokoro Road or 16 London Road. He applied to the Registrar 
of the District Court for a search warrant for 16 London Road. The address was Ms 
Baigent‘s address. It had no connection with Mr O‘Brien who lived at 16 Korokoro 
Road. At 7.30 am on 18 October 1991 the warrant was executed by a team of police 
officers with Detective Drummond in charge. Ms Baigent was not at home. Her son 
was at home. He told the Police that they had the wrong address, as did a 
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neighbour whom one of the team asked shortly after entry. There was a Jaguar in the 
garage and no sign of a Mitsubishi. During the search the son showed the team his 
passport as proof of his identity and phoned his sister who claimed to be a barrister. She 
also told Detective Drummond that he had the wrong address and that the search was 
unlawful. It is alleged that he replied ―We often get it wrong, but while we are here we 
will have a look around anyway‖ (Elkind, 1995: 148). 
In Baigent the Court of Appeal created a new public law compensatory damages 
remedy for cases where rights under NZBORA were infringed and no other adequate 
remedy (e.g. exclusion of evidence) was available. The court relied on Article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR which ensures effective remedies under the covenant – this is a binding 
obligation in international law.
149
 The Court of Appeal‘s focus was also on the lack of 
civil remedy for a breach of section 21 of NZBORA (unreasonable search and seizure). 
The court held that effective and appropriate remedies needed to be available for breach 
of NZBORA, and that the courts were seen as having a positive duty to provide public 
law remedies including issuing a stay of proceedings, reducing an offender‘s sentence, 
excluding tainted evidence and monetary compensation. These came to be known as 
‗Baigent remedies‘ or ‗Baigent damages‘. 
The UN Human Rights Committee had expressed over time a range of concerns about 
the ICCPR and NZBORA relationship. For instance in the third periodic ICCPR report 
feedback in 1995, they felt that covenant obligations had not been fully incorporated 
into domestic law and given an overriding status in the legal system. Some rights 
guaranteed under the covenant were seen to not to be reflected in the new Act, 
inconsistent legislation had not been repealed, and NZBORA had no status higher than 
ordinary legislation. They were especially concerned about ‗the absence of express 
provision for remedies for all those whose rights under the Covenant or Bill of Rights 
have been violated‘ (MFAT, 1995: 69).150  
                                                 
149 The full text of Article 2(3) reads: ‗Each state party to the present covenant undertakes: (a) To ensure that any person whose 
rights and freedoms as herein recognised are violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been 
committed by persons acting in an official capacity; (b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right 
thereto determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority provided for 
by the legal system of the state, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; (c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall 
enforce such remedies when granted‘. 
150 Butler and Butler (2005: 1118) note in this regard that: ‗A number of commentators have noted the statements of the HRC on 
the coverage of BORA and on its status vis-à-vis other enactments and called for the amendment of BORA so as to better reflect 
New Zealand‘s obligations under the ICCPR. Other commentators, however, have criticised the HRC‘s Concluding Observations on 
the basis that they call for a level of domestic implementation greater than that actually required by the terms of the ICCPR and that 
they fail to acknowledge the ability of a state party to give effect to the ICCPR rights through a mix of statute and practice‘. This is 
in keeping with the findings of this research that policy-oriented approaches are being explored in this country as an alternative to 
legislative options, and the general view of this thesis that the UN committees for the major covenants have favoured a judicial vs 
non-judicial approach to the implementation of covenant rights. 
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The New Zealand response to the List of Issues of the UN Human Rights Committee 
about the status of NZBORA was that after five years of debate about the subject it was 
decided that ‗New Zealand was not ready for an entrenched Bill of Rights‘ (MFAT, 
1995: 39). As already noted in Section 2.1, public opinion was wary of entrenchment 
because of the possible redistribution of power from elected representatives to an 
appointed judiciary. There were also other reasons, because as noted the position of the 
Treaty of Waitangi would have to be very carefully worked through. As a result 
NZBORA had been passed as an ordinary statute and did not have the status of supreme 
law. It was also hoped that Cabinet vetting of all new Bills and Regulations would help 
reduce inconsistencies in future legislation (MFAT, 1995: 39). In terms of lack of 
remedies, New Zealand was able to report that although NZBORA did not contain 
express remedies the Court of Appeal had in 1994 held in a decision (un-named case 
although it was Baigent) that there was a remedy under the Bill of Rights for breaches 
of NZBORA. The committee was told that in the ruling ‗the Court placed reliance on 
the availability of remedies under the International Covenant‘ (MFAT, 1995: 39). In 
this Baigent Court of Appeal case Justice Casey noted the problem of leaving New 
Zealand citizens with no redress through the domestic courts: 
By its accession to the First Optional Protocol to the Covenant on 26 August 1989, New 
Zealand accepted individual access by its citizens to the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee for violation of rights under the Covenant, where they have been unable to 
obtain a domestic remedy. The Act reflects Covenant rights, and it would be a strange 
thing if Parliament, which passed it one year later, must be taken as contemplating that 
New Zealand citizens could go to the United Nations Committee in New York for 
appropriate redress, but could not obtain it from our Courts (Simpson v Attorney 
General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) 691, 73). 
Justice Hardie Boys had noted that: 
Citizens of New Zealand ought not to have to resort to international tribunals to obtain 
adequate remedy for infringement of Covenant rights this country has affirmed by 
Statute. I consider that the courts are obligated to provide these remedies in domestic 
law (Simpson v Attorney General [1994] 3 NZLR 667 (CA) 700, 83).  
The route between covenant-statute-individual was unclear and the Court of Appeal 
addressed this by providing domestic redress. However, the effects of the decision were 





8.1.2 Impact on state sector: Cabinet and NZ Police response 
In a memorandum for the Cabinet Strategy Committee dated 24 May 1995 the Rt Hon 
Doug Graham stated that: ‗The new public law action for breach of the Bill of Rights 
Act is identified as the most far-reaching aspect of the Baigent decision‘ (Office of the 
Minister of Justice, 1995a: 2).
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 Immediately after the Court of Appeal ruling a year 
earlier there had been much discussion at Cabinet/departmental level about reversing 
the decision by legislation. The NZ Police in particular were in favour of this (Kerr, 
1994: 1-2). Potential costs as a result of the decision were considered to be a significant 
factor in favour of overriding the decision, and the estimates of those costs were huge. 
The 24 May 1995 memorandum had identified that up until 30 April 1995 the NZ 
Police had claims totalling $8.5m relating to NZBORA liability and that the Crown Law 
Office had advised that as they were being ‗filed at the rate of about two per week and 
an average of around $1m per month, the contingent liability would be $12m per year‘ 
(Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995a: 9).  
Apart from serious fiscal implications, other issues had earlier been drawn to Cabinet‘s 
attention by DB Kerr, Chief Legal Advisor to the NZ Police. In a letter dated 25 
November 1994 he had raised concerns with the Solicitor-General about the decision‘s 
wider impact on policing: 
I forsee the creation of a style of defensive policing, defensive Judges and Courts 
dispensing justice and a defensive style of prison management designed to minimise 
claims against the Crown. … the Police will be forced to adopt defensive policies to 
decrease [the contingent] liability to save money for operational policing. Primarily I 
see offenders being summonsed rather than arrested; searches without warrant will 
become a thing of the past and the number of search warrants issued will decrease 
markedly either because the Courts will refuse to issue them or the Police will be 
reluctant to request them other than when very good evidence exists to justify them. 
Judges will then be reluctant to remand prisoners in custody or send them to prison on 
conviction if there is any possibility of the jury verdict being overturned on appeal. … 
Penal institutions will have to treat prisoners with kid gloves to avoid aggravated 
damages in the event of the conviction being later overturned. None of these outcomes 
will do anything positive for Law and Order in New Zealand and in due course there 
will be a major public outcry. I enclose a copy of my pessimistic forecast to our Policy 
and Planning Section who are scoping an environment scan in preparation for the round 
                                                 
151 Memorandum for Cabinet Strategy Committee. Baigent’s Case: Options for Government dated 24 May 1995 stated three 
options: ‗(i) Legislate to overrule the decisions in the Baigent and AUWRC cases to provide that no public law action lies for breach 
of the Bill of Rights Act; (ii) Let the decisions stand without modifications; or (iii) Let the decisions stand with modifications, the 
form of which would be identified in a review of Crown liability generally which could be done in two stages: (A) The first stage 
would focus on making amendments directed at limiting the scope of the Baigent public law action by providing defences and 
clarifying areas of procedural uncertainty; (B) The second stage would involve more general legislative changes relating to Crown 
liability (whether under the Bill of Rights Act or otherwise) and would lead to a new Crown Proceedings Act)‘ (Office for Minister 
of Justice 1995a: 11). 
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1995/96. The financial implications for the Government are enormous, the implications 
for the Police and law and order in general are also enormous. Unless the Privy Council 
overturns the Court of Appeal [sic] the Government is going to have to look at seriously 
re-writing the Crown Proceedings Act to prevent these outcomes. I believe that while 
the right of appeal exists the Government must exercise it before considering major 
changes to the law to avoid severe public criticism (Kerr, 1994: 1-2).  
An Addendum document attached to this letter, ‗Implications of Baigent Decision‘, had 
given a long list of rights which the NZ Police believed at the time would ‗be vulnerable 
to civil action in the future under the Baigent decision‘: 
 Right not to be deprived of life [e.g. fatal road accidents involving the police] 
 Right not be subject to torture or cruel treatment [e.g. allegation of assault by a police officer] 
 Right to refuse to undergo medical treatment [e.g. the police calling in a doctor to an injured 
person] 
 Freedom of expression [e.g. language offences by police officers] 
 Freedom of peaceful assembly [e.g. Springbok tour scenarios] 
 Freedom of association [e.g. not allowing suspects to associate with others] 
 Freedom of movement [e.g. time spent in custody without a conviction] 
 Freedom from discrimination [e.g. bypassing the Human Rights Act to make direct claims for 
discriminatory behaviour] 
 Rights of minorities [e.g. gangs or cults might claim police harassment] 
 Unreasonable search and seizure [e.g. Baigent now gives no protection to the police despite 
executing a judicial search warrant] 
 Right not to be arbitrarily arrested or detained [e.g. possibly easier chance of acquittal since 
Baigent] 
 Breach of rights of person charged [e.g. may lead to more civil action as a result of Baigent] 
 Minimum standard of criminal procedure e.g. undue trial delays could lead to damages for 
breach of right] (Kerr, 1994: Addendum 1-3).  
On 6 April 1995 DB Kerr again wrote to the Secretary for Justice with more concerns 
about the effect on policing: 
The Police are exposed to enormous potential liability under the Baigent and AUWRC 
decisions because every arrest, refusal to grant bail, search with or without warrant, 
vehicle stop and crime scene the Police must use their statutory powers which exposes 
them to allegations of abuse of those powers and potential civil claim for damages. 
Successive governments have provided the Police with the statutory tools to maintain 
law and order but those tools now provide the basis for a counter attack on the Police 
(Kerr, 1995: 2). 
During the course of this research information was also received from the NZ Police 
about their reaction to NZBORA from as early as 1990.
152
 The NZ Police Gazette, 
                                                 
152 This information (McCullough, 2009: Personal communication) included extracts from the NZ Police Gazette (1990), an 
internal police document New Law; legal information provided to officers on NZBORA; a copy of law notes relating to NZBORA 
material published in the NZ Police publications The Bulletin and Ten-One; and the relevant sections of the Manual of Best Practice 
on the NZ Bill of Rights (available on the NZ Police intranet) referred to in Inspector Spackman‘s letter above.  
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published in 1990 (the same year as the Act), noted in relation to unreasonable search 
and seizure that: 
… should a power of search be exercised other than in accordance with the statute 
giving the authority, or not in terms of the consent that was given, a court will probably 
hold it unlawful. This is essentially what the law is now, but it is likely to be of greater 
significance under this legislation (NZ Police, 1990: 249).  
The following year (1991) the NZ Police Bulletin commented on NZBORA: 
The Bill of Rights Act 1990 has far-reaching implications for the police – especially for 
those on the streets, regularly enforcing police responsibilities. The Act came into force 
in September last year, but many police are still unsure of its provisions and how they 
relate to every-day policing. According to Neville Trendle, Chief Legal Adviser, Police 
National Headquarters, the Act was clearly one of the most important pieces of 
legislation for the police yet. It was of critical importance to law enforcement. ―It has 
the potential to have major implications for policing. Police dealing with arrests, 
searches, bailing and other day to day activities need to understand the Act‘s 
provisions, and comply with them. The most critical consequence of non-compliance 
with the Bill of Rights will be in the courts, where evidence could be rejected because 
of a breach‖, said Neville (NZ Police, 1991: 14).  
In 1992 the New Law (Issue 6) publication issued a four-page guide containing Bill of 
Rights checklists. This also warned officers that the impact of NZBORA was 
significant: 
PLEASE NOTE: The world has changed. The Bill of Rights is here to stay. Do you risk 
losing your case and thereby wasting valuable time and resources by trying to ‗short 
circuit‘ the Bill of Rights. The Courts have made it quite clear that they will not tolerate 
such tactics. It may well be that the days of the confessional statement are numbered 
and that prosecution cases will stand or fall on eyewitness or circumstantial evidence 
(NZ Police, 1992a: 1). 
In the next instalment of New Law (Issue 7) in the same year more information was 
given in this statement: 
BILL OF RIGHTS – Legislative change – The [four-page] guide [Issue 6] may have 
given the impression that the Police had ‗rolled over‘ on the Bill of Rights. That is not 
true. The Commissioner will be making submissions to Government for amendments to 
blunt the adverse effects that some of the more literal views of the courts are having on 
the process of maintaining law and order. The guide‘s prime objective was to leave 
staff in no doubt as to what the law is now (NZ Police, 1992b: 1). 
The NZ Police Index also cited several cases for the years 1991 to 1995 in relation to 
section 21 Bill of Rights searches without a warrant or unlawful search instances: R v 
Watt (1991), R v Laugalis (1993), Hufflett v R (1993), Tuki v Police (1993) and R v R 
(1994) (NZ Police 1995: 9). Despite the huge reaction to the case – from Cabinet level 
downwards – Baigent (Simpson v Attorney General) is not used as an example in this 
Index or in the current NZ Police best practice manual on NZBORA (NZ Police, 2009) 
which is regularly updated.  
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In a further memorandum to the Cabinet Strategy Committee dated 16 August 1995 the 
Rt Hon Doug Graham noted in similar vein to the NZ Police response: ‗If there were 
liability for all negligent conduct resulting in a breach that could result in ―over-
deterrence‖ thus impacting on the ability to govern effectively‘ (Office of the Minister 
of Justice, 1995c: 8). The memorandum for the committee had also reached a position 
on how to proceed in the interim. Cabinet had directed: a first stage review of the issue 
of Crown liability by the NZ Law Commission; the examination of public liability 
approaches in other jurisdictions; and the monitoring of Baigent fiscal liabilities and the 
need to amend current legislation (Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995c: 2). By this 
time (four months since the 30 April 1995 estimate) the memorandum noted that the 
Crown Law Office had estimated it had ‗20 sets of proceedings based wholly or in part 
on the Baigent action, most of which are against the Police‘ and ‗The amount claimed 
now totals approximately $24.95m‘ (Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995c: 1).  
The potential fiscal and other effects of the Baigent decision on a number of 
government departments – through various Acts and the powers given to staff under 
them – meant wide consultation was carried out to identify at-risk areas. Some of these 
areas identified in May 1995 were: 
 The Justice Department felt the most significant impact of NZBORA would be 
‗departmental compliance costs (e.g. providing more court facilities and 
upgrading prison conditions) rather than individual awards of damages‘. 
 Department of Labour concerns centred on risks of Baigent damages against 
immigration officers and OSH officials.  
 ACC identified a possible weakening of their ‗ability to enforce medical 
examinations and treatment under sections 64 and 73 of the ARCI Act‘. They 
expressed concern that ‗The Corporation‘s ability to carry out its statutory duties 
in a responsible and accountable manner could be severely affected‘.  
 Customs noted that their officers had powers under the Customs Act 1966 to 
search and detain people‘s property which could be affected.  
 The Department of Social Welfare was concerned about liability for the actions 
of social workers and other personnel working with child abuse cases or with 
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children under CYPS protection. 
 The Ministry of Education identified some employees working in the areas of 
investigation and inspection who might be at risk. 
 MAF noted that many frontline staff – biosecurity personnel, meat inspectors 
and fisheries officers – could be exposed to NZBORA liability.  
 The Department of Internal Affairs also had staff working in several areas who 
might also become vulnerable: gaming inspectors, civil defence staff and Films, 
Videos and Publications Act inspectors.  
 The Inland Revenue Department identified relevant personnel e.g. those with the 
power to inspect documentation.  
 Department of Conservation staff identified some warranted officers under the 
Wildlife Act 1953, the Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978, the Wild Animal 
Control Act 1979 and the Trade in Endangered Species Act 1989.  
 The Ministry of Health identified the Mental Health Act 1969 and the Mental 
Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 as potential sources 
of liability, particularly claims of ‗false imprisonment and non-consensual 
treatment of persons committed to hospitals‘ (Office of the Minister of Justice, 
1995b: Schedule 1-6).  
Despite pressure from the NZ Police to overturn the legislation it had even earlier been 
decided to take a modified approach. In a letter dated 27 April 1995 the Secretary for 
Justice wrote to the Commissioner for Police: ‗We have therefore modified the options, 
proposing now that there be a partial review of Crown liability with a view to devising 
amendments that would see the public law remedy retained but constrained‘ (Hay, 
1995: 1). The 16 August 1995 memorandum for the Cabinet Strategy Committee noted 
that the Solicitor-General had been instructed by it on 14 December 1994 ‗that the 
appeals to the Privy Council should be discontinued‘ (Office of the Minister of Justice, 
1995b: 1). Fairly soon after the Court of Appeal decision the matter had therefore been 
resolved: the legislation was not overturned but the new remedy was confined within 
boundaries acceptable to the state sector.  
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The NZ Police response in 1994-1995 was that the decision was going to be hugely 
problematic at three levels: fiscal, policy and rights. However, these fears were 
unfounded. When contacted in October 2008 the current Acting Chief Legal Advisor 
did not share his predecessor‘s concerns about the effect on policing: 
The Baigent case did not change the style of policing used by Police or lead to any 
amendments to operational instructions. Decisions that police officers make on a daily 
basis are grounded upon common sense considerations. With no ability to legislate 
common sense, inevitably a decision reached will be held to be wrong and Police will 
be held accountable. … Police training and the Manual of Best Practice on the Bill of 
Rights Legislation is periodically reviewed and updated to incorporate judicial 
decisions where appropriate and necessary (Spackman, 2008: 1).  
From a fiscal perspective he was unable to advise the cost of Baigent damages to the 
NZ Police in the intervening years. However, he had noted that the Quantifiable 
Contingent Liability was about $1.2m in 2007 and $548,000 to 30 June 2008, much less 
than the $24.95m quoted for 1995 (Spackman, 2008: 1).  
Advice from the NZ Law Commission was very much in favour of ensuring remedies 
rather than swaying in the direction of the panic that was being felt throughout the state 
sector about whether the decision was workable from an operational or fiscal 
perspective. In their detailed report on the subject published three years after the case 
the Commission asked ‗whether the Baigent remedy should be altered or abolished by 
legislation‘ (NZ Law Commission, 1997: 26). In their view this was not necessary for 
three reasons: ‗the need to provide an effective remedy for breaches of rights under the 
Bill of Rights Act; the development of common law remedies to protect rights and 
interests similar to those in the Act is likely to be slow and sporadic; international law 
supports linking remedies to rights‘ (NZ Law Commission, 1997: 26). The NZ Law 
Commission also noted in their report that: ‗Appropriate remedies [including monetary 
remedy] … are all essential means of emphasising that the state is subject to the law‘ 
(NZ Law Commission, 1997: 26). This was a tick for remedies in general, and a further 
tick for monetary remedies. Again, this was less about what government departments 
might find uncomfortable in terms of these types of decisions, and more about the New 
Zealand state providing redress for breaches of civil and political rights under domestic 
law and international obligations. 
8.1.3 Judicial boundaries 
One positive effect of the UN-New Zealand dialogue about NZBORA and the express 
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remedies discussion was that it resulted in a higher profile for covenant obligations in 
judicial decision-making, a theme which has echoes in other parts of this research. New 
Zealand‘s fourth periodic ICCPR report made the general comment that the covenant 
was now more prominent before the courts and in government decision-making than 
ever before (MFAT, 2002: 14-15).
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 In 1996 the NZ Law Commission had published a 
guide to increase the awareness of international law, including treaty obligations (NZ 
Law Commission, 1996). 
On the other hand the area of possible judicial activism in relation to Baigent has been 
viewed as controversial and much of this discussion has centred on the intent of 
Parliament. In the 16 August 1995 memorandum, the Rt Hon Doug Graham had 
concerns about the operation of the new public law action: ‗If left to the courts [it] can 
be developed in a piecemeal way only‘ (Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995c: 2). He 
further claimed that: ‗Baigent is a case of constitutional significance as it relates to the 
nature and extent of the respective law-making roles of Parliament and the Judiciary‘ … 
and ‗in Baigent the Court of Appeal has gone further than Parliament [had] intended‘ 
(Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995c: 4, 6). Matthew Palmer agrees about the lack of 
intention: 
In 1994 in Baigent’s Case, the Court of Appeal ‗interpreted‘ the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights Act 1990 impliedly to contain the remedy of public law damages. This was 
achieved in the face of Parliament explicitly having already considered, and rejected, 
the inclusion of such a provision. Constitutional ―dialogue‖ ensued where the executive 
was tempted but, with advice from the Law Commission, ultimately declined to 
introduce over-ruling legislation in Parliament (Palmer, 2008: 241).  
The Rt Hon Doug Graham addresses similar issues in a section on ‗Roles of Parliament 
and Courts‘ in the 24 May 1995 memorandum for the Cabinet Strategy Committee:  
It was not envisaged when the Bill of Rights Act was passed that the Courts would take 
it upon themselves to fashion a new type of action, as has been done in Baigent, when 
Parliament had specifically decided not to do so. In the Baigent and AUWRC cases a 
theme in all the judgments was that Parliament could not have intended to pay lip-
service to the rights and freedoms affirmed [in] the Bill of Rights Act and that, although 
there is no remedies provision in the Act itself, the Courts could supply those remedies. 
The Judges regarded this as an application of the common law principle that where 
                                                 
153 However, Butler and Butler (2005: 1117) stated that: ‗Overall, our impression is that even within the legal community, 
awareness of the ICCPR is limited. BORA has raised the ICCPR‘s profile a little. Judgments citing articles of the ICCPR and/or 
views adopted by the Human Rights Committee (―HRC‖) under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR have increased over the years 
in New Zealand … Nonetheless, reference to the ICCPR and the HRC‘s views is still, relatively speaking, limited‘. Four years later 
in February 2009 the UN Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR noted its satisfaction that in the determination of cases the New 
Zealand courts take account of the covenant and of its general comments (UNGA, 2009c: 12). This was in response to New 
Zealand‘s fifth periodic report to the ICCPR stating that the covenant was central in New Zealand law-making and citing various 
Supreme Court cases where it had been a key factor (MFAT, 2007: 8-9). 
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there is a right there should be a remedy … In contrast to the remedies that Parliament 
envisaged would be available (fettered in the case of tort by the scope of the tort and by 
statutory immunities), the public law remedy is at this stage untrammeled by any such 
constraints (Office of Minister of Justice, 1995a: 5).  
He then stated that NZBORA affirms New Zealand‘s commitment to the ICCPR and 
that Article 2(3) about effective remedies was a binding obligation in international law, 
but said: ‗the Government considered that it already met that obligation under the 
general law as it stood prior to the two cases‘ (Office of the Minister of Justice, 1995a: 
5). Butler and Butler also noted about this judicial/parliamentary boundary issue that: 
… a number of commentators argued (and have continued to argue) that it was 
illegitimate for Judges to create new remedies to give effect to NZBORA rights. In our 
view the Court of Appeal‘s decisions on remedies are perfectly defensible and we 
support the path along which the Court struck out. At the same time, however, we 
acknowledge that a differently constituted Court of Appeal, approaching BORA against 
the background of its legislative history, might have adopted a much more conservative 
approach to remedies, utilising only those remedies generally available at common law 
and exercising them by reference to criteria established by the common law, with no re-
weighing of interests to reflect the new statutory status of the guaranteed rights. In this 
limited sense, the Court of Appeal‘s BORA jurisprudence can be legitimately labelled 
as ―bold‖. But, at the same time, it cannot be regarded as being particularly creative. 
Truly new remedies, such as sentence reductions, have not yet found favour with the 
Court (Butler and Butler, 2005: 1111-1112).  
While there has been much disagreement on the intent of Parliament and the legitimacy 
of the remedies, the Rt Hon Doug Graham did believe that the Baigent decision 
importantly cast light on a number of areas that needed resolving. He stated that the 
Crown Proceedings Act 1950 was ‗badly in need of replacement‘ and the decision had 
highlighted ‗gaps in coverage and apparent inconsistencies … [and] … raises issues 
about the extent of a bad faith exception to immunities‘ (Office of the Minister of 
Justice, 1995a: 7). The Secretary for Justice, writing to the Commissioner of Police on 
27 April 1995, noted that Crown Law was advising more discussion about ‗the reasons 
for statutory immunities and constitutional issues (judicial v parliamentary lawmaking)‘ 
(Hay, 1995: 1). Because Baigent damages were created in public and not private law 
(tort), the NZ Police echoed the Rt Hon Doug Graham‘s concerns about the lack of 
constraints. They also believed that the Court of Appeal had ‗circumvented‘ Crown and 
police immunities and protections in the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, the Police Act 
1958 (now repealed) and the Crimes Act 1961. 
The area of a lack of express remedies in NZBORA was crying out for a court case: a 
set of facts was needed and in Baigent the set of facts was perfect. Normally the 
violation to the right would be dealt with by the remedy of exclusion. Here there was no 
evidence to exclude, so the straightforward question was is this just too bad or is there a 
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need to provide damages? Also, it was not a simple case of every time someone‘s rights 
are breached the courts are now going to have to pay damages. What the Baigent 
decision said was that if there is no other avenue, the courts might have to give 
damages, but much of the time the remedies will emerge from other circumstances. The 
question is not have you got a right to damages, but have you got an effective protection 
of your right? The case therefore raised a number of issues about judicial interference, 
but it also highlighted areas of law which needed tightening. As the ruling was not 
overturned, the next phase in the Baigent story became the gradual accommodation of 
the decision into the everyday functioning of the state sector. 
8.1.4 Eventual mainstreaming 
In Baigent the domestic courts effectively said it is inappropriate to have New Zealand 
citizens complaining to the UN Human Rights Committee – the Optional Protocol 
route. They felt the need to give NZBORA some teeth and this was their way of doing it 
i.e. by providing damages. However, the public service then reacted that this was going 
to be very difficult to implement, but officials were eventually able to accommodate this 
change. This case highlights the broader question of how these rights come into New 
Zealand via the interaction between the international arena and the domestic sphere.
 
 
Table 11. Mainstreaming process – Baigent 
UNEXPECTED NEW ISSUE INTO STATE SECTOR 
 
Instigator (lead role): Courts 
Stage 1: Alienation – Panic – Rejection  
Stage 2: Acceptance 
Stage 3: Modification 
Stage 4: Implementation – Assimilation  
Stage 5: Mainstreamed into public policy  




Baigent is also an excellent illustration of the five-stage mainstreaming process that this 
research suggests occurs when a new issue arrives unexpectedly into the state sector 
(see Table 11). Initially a change is seen as completely foreign; then there is a period of 
acceptance and modification until it becomes workable. Finally there is an 
acclimatisation phase where the issue becomes mainstreamed. Once the change is 
implemented it becomes part of public policy and the resistance turns to acceptance. 
This is the same way that mores are changed. Issues surrounding homosexual law 
reform are now mainstream compared to 1986 when people believed this would be a 
catastrophic change. Sixteen years on from Baigent it is now inconceivable that the 
right to damages would be challenged from within the public service, and there has also 




8.1.5 Australian reaction 
The above discussion looks at Baigent‘s impact domestically, but the case has also been 
cited in Australia. There are two legislative bills of rights in Australia at the state level. 
The Australian Capital Territory (ACT) was the first Australian state to provide a bill of 
rights, the Human Rights Act 2004, which gives the state a ‗central role‘ in human 
rights protection within its jurisdiction (Evans, 2004: 3). Victoria was the second state 
to provide a bill of rights in the form of the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act 2006. Under the Charter all government departments and other 
public agencies must observe certain rights when developing laws and policies.
155
 
Baigent was cited in the state of Victoria before their charter was adopted. For instance 
                                                 
154 Noort‘s Case (Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA)) is a similar example to Baigent where the Police said it 
would not prove workable to provide access to a lawyer in roadside drink driving test situations. The courts ruled that it simply 
came down to handing the person a cell phone, so in reality it added a slight complication and is now routine. This is an instance 
where it was possible to introduce a new policy and get it flowing through the system. Unlike Baigent, Noort‘s Case is not primarily 
an international covenant case but a Bill of Rights case (only indirectly implementing the ICCPR). However, it is similar to Baigent 
from a public policy perspective. The same reaction occurred: we can‘t do this. However, the ruling relied on the ‗free and 
democratic society‘ exception of section 5 of NZBORA where it was possible to say this was a legitimate restriction, justified by 
law, but an acceptable one because of the greater good of reducing road deaths. The ruling did intrude into a right, but in protection 
of a larger one for public policy reasons. Note that the five-stage process of Table 11 would also apply to Noort‘s Case. 
155 For a copy of the charter see www.humanrightscommission.vic.gov.au/about%20us/default.asp (accessed on 14 February 
2010). 
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Rights, Responsibilities and Respect: The Report of the Human Rights Committee 
looked at the question of damages and Baigent is discussed:  
Quite a few submissions argued that a larger range of remedies, including damages, 
should be available. This is the case in the United Kingdom and by judicial implication 
also in New Zealand, but not yet in the ACT. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
does not mention damages, but the Court of Appeal implied this remedy in a case called 
Baigent’s Case. This decision means that damages are now possible for breaches of the 
Bill of Rights Act in New Zealand. However, awards under this principle have been 
rare.
156
 In the United Kingdom people can seek ‗just and appropriate remedies‘. The 
right to compensation for human rights breaches is only available if no other remedy is 
appropriate. This approach was very attractive to many stakeholders, including the Law 
Institute of Victoria (LIV). The LIV supports the inclusion of an effective remedy under 
the Human Rights Charter for the infringement of an individual‘s human rights by any 
department or agency of government and strongly recommends the adoption of the 
method of enforcement currently contained in the UK Human Rights Act 1998 
(Submission 128). Some people thought that the threat of damages would help to ensure 
compliance (Victoria Human Rights Committee, 2005: 126). 
On the other hand, in the ACT Baigent was cited after their new Act was passed. A 
2009 case concerns the availability of compensation under the ACT Human Rights Act 
for unlawful detention, which is a parallel case to Baigent. The judge concluded:  
… that s 18(7) HRA conferred a statutory right to compensation, his Honour left aside 
the question of whether a general remedy power could be read into the HRA as in 
Baigents Case. In Baigents Case the NZ Court of Appeal found that even though the 
NZBORA did not contain an express enforcement provision, effective remedies could 
nonetheless be available by necessary implication for a breach of rights [Morro, N & 
Ahadizad v Australian Capital Territory [2009] ACTSC 118]. 
Even though general remedies were not made available, in this case damages amounting 
to $190,000 were awarded to the plaintiffs. The issue of remedies is also raised by 
Carolyn Evans in her commentary on the ACT Human Rights Act 2004 and she used 
Baigent to illustrate the dangers of lack of clarity in this area. She raised the effect of 
their new Act on administrative law and is concerned that it does not contain more 
explicit detail about remedies: 
In particular, the deletion of provisions dealing with compensation and the way in 
which such compensation should be determined will not necessarily mean that no 
compensation is available for executive breaches of rights. In New Zealand a scheme 
for compensation as a remedy has been judicially developed despite the (probably 
intentional) failure to include such an entitlement in the Act [Simpson v Attorney-
General]. While the development of a right to compensation under the Act is not 
terribly likely, the New Zealand precedent shows that it cannot be excluded. If the ACT 
government wanted to be sure a right to compensation was not available, then it should 
                                                 
156 This is a similar trend to the European situation. Black-Branch noted in his July 2009 talk at the Victoria University of 
Wellington Law School that the European Court of Human Rights, for instance, has not been known to award large damages. If they 
do find a breach the remedy of changing the offending legislation or practice is considered enough of a remedy in itself (Black-
Branch, 2009).  
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have done so expressly rather than leaving the judiciary without guidance on this issue 
… an Act that asserts legislative supremacy in the area of rights protection should not 
have left these issues to the judges (Evans, 2004: 9, 12). 
8.1.6 Summary 
The case is important for several reasons. It is a very good illustration of the clarity by 
which human rights travel through various levels: covenant-statute-judicial-
Cabinet/departmental/policy-individual. At the covenant level, it is a striking instance of 
the New Zealand courts taking note of the ICCPR origin of rights protected in a 
domestic human rights statute (NZBORA). It was also a test case for NZBORA to align 
more fully with the ICCPR, in light of the affirmation of the covenant being part of the 
long title to the Act. Not only was Baigent seen to open the Crown to enormous fiscal 
liability (particularly the NZ Police), from a policy perspective it was feared that it 
would affect the very way that policing and related operations were carried out. The 
implications for the judiciary were two-fold. On a helpful note it raised the awareness of 
international covenant obligations in judicial decision-making. However, more 
contentiously, parliamentary/judicial boundaries were seen by some to have been 
crossed. It was also a case that severely stressed the state sector. A positive effect for 
individual citizens has been direct redress through domestic law instead of via the UN 
Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The review of the 
military justice system that follows was an altogether more positive experience of 
mainstreaming human rights issues through the New Zealand state sector. 
8.2 Military justice system: proactive 
8.2.1 Background 
The issue of the human rights of soldiers in the UK has already been raised, with the 
2009 case about whether troops are protected by the UK Human Rights Act 1998 when 
they are on active service outside their country (see Section 6.1.2). New Zealand has 
been exploring similar issues for some years. The lack of alignment of New Zealand‘s 
military justice system with international human rights law was reviewed between 1996 
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and 2007, both internally by the NZDF
157
 and through two Victoria University PhD 
theses. Alex Conte‘s (1996) research was on the impact of human rights on military 
discipline in New Zealand. Gordon Hook‘s (2002) subject was the constitutional status 
of military tribunals and a critical analysis of New Zealand‘s military justice system. 
These two reviews found problems in critical areas taken for granted by civilians such 
as arrest and search procedures, fair trial rights, the right to consult and instruct a 
lawyer, and impartiality.  
The military justice system is administered by a number of tribunals with the power to 
impose penalties for offences under the Armed Forces Discipline Act (AFDA) 1971.
158
 
The Armed Forces Discipline Amendment Act 1971 (No.2) 2007 was a direct result of 
an NZDF review carried out between 2002 and 2007. The system is uniquely based on 
an ‗inquisitorial‘ rather than adversarial system and has two tiers: a ‗summary system‘ 
gives commanders a way of dealing in a quick and efficient manner with less serious 
matters; and if an offence is serious enough service personnel may be subject to a court 
martial (Conte, 1996: 6-7). As NZDF reviewer Christopher Griggs noted, the 1,000 
summary disposals carried out each year is a much larger number than the approximate 
10 courts-martial, with the former having punishments below the threshold of what are 
regarded as ‗true penal consequences‘ (Griggs, 2006: 292).  
This military justice system case is another very good illustration of the route travelled 
by human rights at a number of levels: covenant-statute-judicial-
Cabinet/departmental/policy-individual (see Table 12). The Conte and Hook theses will 
be discussed first as they raised relevant issues before and during the NZDF review. 
This review will then be looked at, followed by a section on the response of politicians 
on both sides of the House to the system overhaul and new proposed legislation. 




                                                 
157 The internal Military Justice Review consisted of 30 Options Papers and was authored by Commander Christopher Griggs 
(2003) and reviewed by Colonel Kevin Riordan, both from the Directorate of Legal Services, NZDF, Wellington, NZ. 
158 Before the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 there had been other legislation including a Navy Act, New Zealand Army Act 
and Royal New Zealand Air Force Act, each with its own rules and traditions (Hansard 2007a: 5). 
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Table 12. Military justice system – levels of impact 
INTERNATIONAL 
COVENANT 
International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights 
1976 
Asserts basic pre-trial and trial rights 
DOMESTIC 
LEGISLATION 
Armed Forces Discipline Act 
1971 
Courts-Martial Appeal Act 
1953 
Defence Act 1990 
Old legislation and policies inconsistent 




Human Rights Act 1993 
Privacy Act 1993 
Growing human rights legislation 
Armed Forces Discipline 
Amendment Act (No.2) 2007 
New military law developed 
JUDICIAL  Military justice tribunals 




Summary trial system 
Permanent Court Martial of 
NZ 
 











Cabinet agreed to revised 
military law and policies 
 





Collaborative effort – departments 
consulted by NZDF (Treasury, Ministry of 
Defence, Ministry of Justice, CLO, 
Parliamentary Counsel Office, MFAT) 




INDIVIDUAL Individual service personnel 
could not assert rights in 
military setting 
 
Legislation now in alignment with ICCPR 
and domestic human rights legislation – 
averted need for litigation or for case to 
UN Human Rights Committee under 
Optional Protocol to ICCPR 
                                                 
159 For more information on this consultation see Hansard (2007a: 4) and NZDF (2009b: 1). 
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8.2.2 Conte and Hook: constitutional unfairness 
These two researchers analysed the implications of NZBORA and the ICCPR for the 
military justice system. Other countries had endeavoured to make significant changes to 
their military justice systems in the light of domestic and international human rights 
obligations, and Conte and Hook were examining this area for New Zealand. The notion 
of being ‗jurisprudentially xenophohic‘ is mentioned by Hook who said that: ‗Learning 
the lessons of our allies and taking a proactive approach will result in value-added 
benefits to a critical corner of justice in New Zealand‘ (Hook, 2002: xxv). In particular, 
the researchers examined the lack of independence, impartiality and principles of 
natural justice in military law compared to civil law and raised questions about the 
resulting breach of basic constitutional freedoms and rights. Conte noted the 
traditionally conservative viewpoint that soldiers, as servants of the Queen, do not have 
human rights. He believed that not only are soldiers bound by the AFDA 1971, but they 
also have individual rights protections under ever-increasing human rights legislation 
such as the ICCPR, NZBORA the Human Rights Act and the Privacy Act. He claimed 
that examining the system in the light of these instruments exposed many ‗actual and 
potential‘ rights infringements (Conte, 1996: 1).  
Under the AFDA 1971 and related Acts and Regulations military personnel have 
different constraints to civilians and are subject to both civilian and military law. Conte 
asserts that given the overriding purpose of the military justice system is to maintain the 
defence force personnel ‗for its ultimate objective: combat‘, the necessary obligations 
and restraints will of course impinge on individual rights and freedoms (Conte, 1996: 
25). He quoted a USA Supreme Court Case – Parker v Levy (1974) 417 US 733, 758 – 
in which the judge observed that: 
… the fundamental necessity for obedience and the consequent necessity for imposition 
of discipline may render permissible within the military that which would be 
constitutionally impermissible outside it (Conte, 1996: 103).  
It was the extent to which these obligations and restraints impinge on individual rights 
and freedoms that became the focus of his research, and that of Hook and the NZDF 
reviewers.  
Conte and Hook both examine pre-trial issues as well as aspects of the military trial 
system itself. Conte used section 5 of NZBORA 1990 as the starting point to check 
whether a military justice system provision or practice is inconsistent with 
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the Act (Conte, 1996: 45).
160
 This section 5 places the onus on the NZDF to show that a 
particular limitation on the rights or freedoms of service personnel ‗can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society‘ (the same test applied to 
Noort‘s Case just mentioned in the Baigent case study), and that the breach ‗must 
impair the right or freedom as little as possible‘ (Conte, 1996: 46, 48). Hook‘s view is 
that in the last half of the 20
th
 century there has been a ‗paradigm shift‘ in ‗operational 
military thinking from combat to peacekeeping‘ (Hook, 2002: 3).161 Added to this, the 
military justice system is dealing with ‗highly educated, and intensely trained 21st 
century forces‘ as well as offences which were unheard of when the system was 
developed centuries ago (Hook, 2002: 5). Two international instruments which he 
believed have shone an intense focus on the system have been the ICCPR and the 
Optional Protocol to that treaty:  
The fundamental rights articulated in the former touch criminal justice procedures at the 
core, while the latter grants the right of personal complaint to the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee. Neither of these instruments exempt military law or the 
system of military tribunals by which discipline is imposed on members of armed 
forces. Moreover, unlike other nations, New Zealand did not express a reservation in 
regards to its military law and military tribunals when ratifying these instruments 
(Hook, 2002: 6).  
Looking at the system‘s consistency with NZBORA, Hook noted that the Act only 
contains one exemption in relation to military justice under section 24(e) – the right to a 
jury trial.
162
 Overall he believed that:  
... the military justice system has failed to keep pace with the development of ordinary 
law yet has remained in existence as a separate code. But neither the ICCPR nor the 
                                                 
160 This section reads: ‗Section 5. Justified Limitations – Subject to section 4 of this Bill of Rights, the rights and freedoms 
contained in this Bill of Rights may be subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society‘.  
161 This view was echoed five years later by the Hon Dr Richard Worth in the first reading of the Armed Forces Law Reform Bill 
in 2007: ‗The comment has been made about the number of lawyers in the military. That is a truly striking change. To some extent I 
am not supportive of that change, but it is the reality that this Government has significantly moved our focus of military activity not 
from war fighting but to peacemaking. In that peacemaking context the provision of legal advice becomes quite critical. In a war 
fighting setting those issues do not bear time for reflection‘ (Hansard, 2007a: 6). In the same reading of the Bill the Hon John Hayes 
(National MP) states ‗… the Defence Force‘s legal directorate now has 28 officers, compared with four just a few years ago‘ 
(Hansard, 2007a: 12-13). The Hon Ron Mark (Labour MP) also commented during the reading that: ‗Internationally, most of our 
friends and allies are involved in peacekeeping and peacemaking operations, and that is a far more complex environment to be 
working in. The international consequences of a private soldier getting it wrong are considerably greater than they ever were in the 
First World War, the Crimean War, the Boer War, or the Second World War. These amendments take note and give cognisance to 
those realities‘ (Hansard, 2007a: 7). New Zealand policy advisors now need to be aware they are operating in an international as 
well as domestic legal environment; soldiers operating overseas in a changed role (with local armed services, police and citizens) 
instead of in combat situations against other troops brings a whole new international legal component to their work. 
162 Section 24(e) states that persons charged: ‗Shall have the right, except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a 




BoRA are ―ordinary law‖ and if any threat is posed to the current military justice 
system it is now posed by the Bill of Rights Act 1990. … It is time to align the military 
justice system with the constitutional standards in the BoRA and to establish a new 
paradigm where the need for discipline is subordinate to the requirements of justice 
(Hook, 2002: 771-772).
  
He asserted (in 2002) that not making the necessary changes would leave the system 
vulnerable to litigation on similar human rights grounds which had been successful in 
overseas jurisdictions (Hook, 2002: 18). At a practical level there are significant 
benefits in the NZDF identifying these inconsistencies before the issues are raised in the 
courts as the experience of other countries shows. Griggs noted that even though the 
British military justice system had been substantially reformed in 1996, it continued ‗to 
be the subject of successful challenges in the European Court until very recently. This 
process has demanded the devotion of significant resources by the British Ministry of 
Defence‘ (Griggs, 2006: 290). Also a case tried in the Supreme Court of Canada – R v 
Genereux (1992) 70 CCC (3d) 1 – on the grounds that a general court-martial was not 
an independent and impartial tribunal as required by the Canadian Charter (similar to 
section 25(a) of NZBORA) was costly for the Canadian Forces. They ‗were compelled 
to expend considerable resources in an effort to substantially reform Canada‘s military 
justice system within a tight timeframe‘ (Griggs, 2003: 2). Griggs himself asserted that 
‗the Government is now vulnerable to litigation in the superior courts challenging the 
validity of convictions and sentences imposed by military tribunals on the ground of 
non-compliance with NZBORA‘ (Griggs, 2003: 2). It was therefore critical that the 
changes were made before the situations experienced by other jurisdictions happened 
here. 
Hook had therefore identified broad constitutional issues around lack of alignment 
between the ICCPR, NZBORA and the New Zealand military justice system. He and 
Griggs were both warning about the potential litigious element if the system was not 
updated. Conte in his research had also identified several specific areas with the most 
potential to be out of alignment with human rights instruments including: arrest, search 
and seizure; the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial court; 
and the right to consult and instruct a lawyer during summary disposals (Conte, 1996: 




8.2.3 Arrest, search and seizure 
Conte asserts that under military law there are possible occasions where orders to 
service personnel constitute a type of detention or de facto arrest that do not comply 
with the strict arrest criteria set out in NZBORA. He examined deprivation of liberty of 
service personnel when they are detained or under arrest, using Froggatt v R [1992] 9 
CRNZ 181 as an illustration. Lance Corporal Froggatt received a home visit by the 
Royal NZ Military Police, and without being informed of section 23 of NZBORA rights 
was told he was under suspicion for burglary and drug charges and was requested to go 
with them to the MP section. At the same time, as a serviceperson he was lawfully 
obliged under section 38 of the AFDA 1971 to obey orders (Conte, 1996: 76-77). Conte 
noted that the court in this instance – the Courts-Martial Appeal Court (CMAC) – felt it 
would be ‗absurd‘ if a serviceperson was under detention whenever they were ordered 
to go somewhere. However, he believed that the discipline and obedience factors in 
military law led to a relationship between superiors and their subordinates which means 
more coercion is often exerted than in civil life, and that boundaries can be crossed if 
strict adherence to detention and arrest guidelines are not carried out (Conte, 1996: 80).  
To illustrate this point Conte used Police v Grootjans [1975] 3 NZLR S87 where a 
naval rating was involved in an onshore hotel brawl. The next day in front of two civil 
police officers he was ordered by the Master at Arms of the ship to ‗tell the truth‘ – he 
confessed and was charged with assault. A District Court judge did not find any 
compulsion but the High Court ruled in Grootjans‘ favour in an appeal against 
conviction because pressure from the Master of Arms was ‗the exercise of a form of 
compulsion‘ (Conte, 1996: 83-84). Conte noted, however, that: 
As evident in Froggatt, and Isaacs, service members are seldom arrested pursuant to the 
provisions contained in the AFDA [1971]. More often than not, they are ordered or 
requested to attend questioning since, from a Commander‘s point of view, it is much 
easier to exercise the power of command than to invoke the specific provisions of 
sections 88-92 (Conte, 1996: 87-88).  
He believed this constituted not a formal or ‗de facto‘ arrest, but a ‗command arrest‘, 
and concluded ‗the end result is the same: any statements obtained while a person is in a 
state of arbitrary detention will be prima facie excluded‘ (Conte, 1996: 88-89). In his 
view: ‗concepts of arrest and detention are just as applicable to the military context as 
they are to the civil one, with a few potential exceptions‘ (Conte, 1996: 107). Other 
difficulties that Conte identified for the NZDF‘s NZBORA compliance were: there was 
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a lack of manuals or service documents across the three services about how to 
administer section 23 rights; and there was inadequate guidance for NZDF 
Commanders who had powers of subjecting personnel to different types of arrest 
(Conte, 1996: 89-90). The main consequences Conte sees for a breach of NZBORA for 
the NZDF were inadmissibility of evidence, invalidation of processes, and (since 
Baigent) a concern about liability for damages under the Act. In his view it is possible 
for ‗human rights and military discipline‘ to ‗co-exist‘, but ‗the New Zealand Defence 
Force has a responsibility to ensure that its system of military discipline marches in time 
with the requirements of human rights law‘ (Conte, 1996: i).  
8.2.4 Judge and jury 
Hook (2002: 485) affirms Conte‘s statements about the difference between the civil and 
military justice systems, but has even more concerns about military officers playing 
‗multiple roles (investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative)‘: 
… the essential functions that make up a justice system, namely the investigative 
prosecutorial and judicial functions – all separated within the civil justice system – are 
unified within the armed forces command … In short, they are the police, the 
prosecutor, the judge and the jury, all in one. The civil system moved from this 




In particular Hook felt the summary disposal process was flawed because it failed to 
meet the basic requirements of natural justice and believed ‗servicepersons accused of 
military offences and convicted by military tribunals have been dealt with by a system 
which is systematically unfair‘ (Hook, 2002: 484-485, 726). He also said that: 
… giving effect to New Zealand‘s legal obligations under the ICCPR … and except for 
the right to a civil jury only, Parliament did not exempt the armed forces justice system 
from any of the general procedural and substantive rights of the BoRA … military 
tribunals must offer the guarantees of independence and impartiality. Compliance with 
these principles is particularly important in the armed forces, given the very close 
proximity of the executive (i.e. command chain) to the tribunals responsible for 
determining allegations of offending. … Under a system designed to ensure 
compliance, subordinates may be charged with disobeying lawful orders by the very 
officers who issued those orders and have those charges determined by the same 
superiors (Hook, 2002: 728, 729).  
                                                 
163 Hook (2002: 13) noted progress in this area in Canada and the UK where extensive reviews of the military justice system with 
domestic and international human rights legislation had been carried out: ‗Investigative powers have been separated from 
prosecutorial powers; Prosecutorial powers have been separated from judicial powers; Judicial functions have been vested in 
separate judicial officers; Convening officers have been abolished and ―jury‖ selection replaced with independent authorities‘.  
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Reasons Hook identified for military commanders not to examine and change the 
system in the light of these international and domestic human rights instruments 
included: that summary disposals were, positively, a ‗relatively easy‘ way to deal with 
justice issues away from civilian or military appeal courts because a speedy disciplinary 
resolution is often needed. However, more negatively, he saw that hand-picked court-
martial juries of ‗senior officers wielding extensive prosecutorial powers without 
appropriate legislative safeguards to ensure against improper executive influence‘ may 
influence trial outcomes before they even start (Hook, 2002: 10). Hook had therefore 
flagged a huge area of constitutional and procedural unfairness that would be 
unacceptable in criminal law courts.
164
 
8.2.5 Fair trial rights and instructing a lawyer 
On the right to a fair trial, section 25 of NZBORA sets out the right to a fair and public 
hearing by an independent and impartial court. Article 14(1) of ICCPR also stated that 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. However, Conte found that this entitlement is 
different in military law from civil law in two ways. Section 24(e) of NZBORA 
demarcates the extent to which the Act applies for service personnel: they have a right 
to a fair trial ‗except in the case of an offence under military law tried before a military 
tribunal‘ (Conte, 1996: 35, 48). Section 74 of the AFDA 1971 also allowed the trial of a 
civil offence (such as offences under the Crimes Act 1961 or Misuse of Drugs Act 
1975) within the military justice system (Conte, 1996: 139, 183). Conte also researched 
the related question of consulting and instructing a lawyer in the military system. He 
                                                 
164 The three readings of the Bill gave some MPs who had been in the services time to reflect on their own experiences in this area. 
The Hon Ron Mark (NZ First) told the House: ‗I joined the army in 1971 and was subject to the Armed Forces Discipline Act 
[1971] at that stage. … Some time later, I had the opportunity to cross swords with an officer commanding, which resulted in me 
being fronted up as a junior officer – second in command of a unit – on a charge. It occurred to me then that there was no way in 
heck I was going to take the punishment of a commanding officer, so I opted for a court martial. I did so because I knew straight 
away that it was by means of a court martial that one could get a fair hearing, and that natural justice would be more likely to be 
played out and as a result – just for the curiosity of members – they promptly changed their minds and ordered a court of inquiry, 
which gave me the opportunity to cross-examine my accuser. All charges were dismissed. … What is pleasing about this bill is that 
the laws of natural justice and the Human Rights Act are written into this with a far higher degree of compliance than has ever been 
the case before. … I could talk about some of the things I observed in the way in which military justice was meted out in my 20 
years in the military. Some of it I find still sticks in my throat to this very day. … I hope that some of the things I witnessed in my 
time as a junior officer will never ever be able to be played out again, because this bill will clearly take care of what I consider to be 
anomalies that are well past their use-by date‘. … About military hearings he said: ‗I watched three New Zealand soldiers get 
rammed through hearings at 1.30 in the morning in a tent in the field, without being given the opportunity to seek legal counsel or to 
get legal advice as to what the consequences of a guilty plea would be. … those soldiers were put through the disciplinary process in 
a manner which could only be described as showing undue and unfair haste, which seriously jeopardised and compromised the 
ability to prove their innocence, or to at least mitigate their case‘ (Hansard 2007a: 7, 8; Hansard, 2007b: 14). 
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believed this was a ‗sub-right‘ to the right to consult and instruct a lawyer set out in 
section 23(1)(b) of NZBORA under which persons arrested or detained: ‗shall have the 
right to consult and instruct a lawyer without delay and to be informed of that right‘ 
(Conte, 1996: 100). These rights do not exist in the same way as civil law because it is 
often difficult to arrange this when the serviceperson is on active service in a remote 
location. There could also be grey areas about when an issue was a matter of discipline 
to be dealt with at the time and when a serviceperson is in fact entitled to consult.  
Conte found a useful suggestion for the NZDF from Noort‘s Case which used the 
section 5 of NZBORA justified limitations clause and what is suitable in a free and 
democratic society to limit legal access to telephone advice at the time of an alcohol 
testing regime. He said that when a serviceperson needs to consult a lawyer the NZDF 
could restrict this sub-right to telephone advice only ‗because it takes into account 
discipline and the exigencies of the armed forces‘ and would be helpful in cases where 
the detainee is on active service or in a far-off posting (Conte, 1996: 103). He also noted 
in relation to fair trial and consulting a lawyer rights that the inquisitorial vs adversarial 
nature of military trials under the ADFA 1971 means that the usual cross-examination 
by lawyers is not permitted in summary disposals and therefore the accused cannot be 
fully represented by counsel (Conte, 1996: 161).  
Conte believed that although this might be in breach of section 24(c) of NZBORA 
relating to persons charged having the right to consult and instruct a lawyer, a section 5 
justified limitation could be argued by the NZDF to ‗preserve the administrative 
efficiency‘ of summary disposals (Conte, 1996: 163). At the second reading of the 
Armed Forces Law Reform Bill 2007 the Hon Wayne Mapp (National MP) felt, 
however, that unless there were extreme circumstances (a combat ship at sea), service 
personnel should have the right to independent legal advice and the amended legislation 
eventually reflected this (Hansard 2007b: 4). The language used by the two researchers 
– Hook and Conte – is very much that of the human rights field. Drawing the concept of 
‗a right to a lawyer‘ and ‗a right to independent legal advice‘ into the military justice 
system review opened up the discussion about the grey areas concerning the 
constitutional rights of service personnel. The NZDF internal review which followed 
explored this thoroughly, eventually resulting in the drafting of the Armed Forces Law 
Reform Bill 2007.  
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8.2.6 NZDF internal review 
Commander Christopher Griggs, undertaking research within the NZDF itself, noted 
that the implications of these international and domestic human rights instruments on 
the military justice system were unclear in the early 1990s. However, like Hook, he saw 
developments in Canada and the UK during the following decade which warned that 
challenges in this area could ‗develop very quickly and have the potential to seriously 
undermine the military justice system‘ (Griggs, 2003: 1). By monitoring overseas 
experiences with the ICCPR and equivalent domestic legislation and constitutional 
documents (e.g. the Canadian Charter and NZBORA), the NZDF could foresee any 
likely challenges before the issues involved were tested in the courts. The military 
justice review, which began in 2002 with help from a number of government agencies, 
identified inconsistencies with NZBORA while preserving the ‗vital elements‘ of the 
system i.e. maintenance of discipline, consistency, portability, expedition, fairness, 
efficiency and simplicity (Hook, 2002: 3-7). The review looked at a wide variety of 
issues: the right to legal representation and aid; restorative justice and victim‘s rights; 
the right to appeal; the right to natural justice; the conduct of prosecutions; arrest and 
questioning procedures; a joint system of summary disposals for the army, navy and 
airforce; a review of summary disposal systems; independent and impartial courts; and a 
permanent court-martial structure and reform of the court-martial systems (Griggs, 
2003: Options Papers 1-30).  
Conte, Hook and Griggs raised many issues that affected the individual rights of service 
personnel. By instituting its own internal review, feeding through information from 
independent researchers and consulting with other departments, the NZDF was able to 
proactively re-draft legislation to iron out inconsistencies between the outdated military 
code and the ICCPR and NZBORA. In particular, the NZDF took NZBORA rights very 
seriously and endeavoured to see how constitutional documents in other jurisdictions 
interacted with their military systems and international obligations. The language of 
NZBORA about ‗justified limitations in a free and democratic society‘ has now 
penetrated into the military justice system, shining a human rights focus on a previously 
non-rights-based process. 
Changes finally made as a result of the Armed Forces Discipline Amendment Act (No. 
2) 2007 were: 
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… the summary trial system will operate across all three services [army, navy, 
airforce]; there will be a right of appeal [to an independent civilian judge]; summary 
trial will be available for senior officers; a permanent, independent court martial will 
now exist, replacing temporary courts martial; two new offences of negligence will be 
introduced – negligently failing to perform a duty and negligent performance of a duty 
(NZDF, 2009a: 1).  
On 9 July 2009 eight judges of the new Court Martial of New Zealand were sworn in at 
the High Court in Wellington, eight days after the new system officially came into 
effect on 1 July 2009 ‗to modernise and provide a fairer justice system for all military 
personnel‘ (NZDF, 2009a: 1; NZDF, 2009b: 1). This had been a very long journey to 
come to this stage as the issue had a 13-year incubation through various phases: the 
Conte and Hook research; the NZDF internal review; and the system overhaul and 
amending legislation. The process has come full cycle and the next section shows how 
it was viewed as a success by MPs on both sides of the House. 
8.2.7 Political support 
Once the Armed Forces Law Reform Bill 2007 was drafted the debate started in 
Parliament.
165
 At the first reading of the Bill the Hon Phil Goff (then Minister of 
Defence) noted that attitudes had changed enormously since the 1971 AFDA Act and 
that NZBORA rights needed to be observed. Condensing the issue succinctly he said:  
… the military justice system today should apply to our armed forces personnel the 
same rights enjoyed by civilians in the criminal justice system, to the greatest extent 
possible consistent with the efficient and disciplined operation of the armed forces 
(Hansard, 2007a: 1).  
The ‗marching in time‘ concept of respecting individual rights while ensuring the 
defence of New Zealand outlined by Conte had therefore been recognised as possible. 
The Minister‘s comment highlights how far thinking in this area had changed to give 
rights pre-eminence instead of no place at all in the military justice system: 
One of the principles that underpins many of the reforms in this bill is that the processes 
of the ordinary criminal law should be the benchmark for military law unless there are 
sound reasons arising from the nature of the armed forces that dictate otherwise 
(Hansard, 2007a: 2).  
Like Conte he believed that the NZDF should defend why rights were to be breached, 
not the other way around. Not only was the Bill exemplary in its attempts to align 
                                                 
165 The Armed Forces Law Reform Bill 2007 was eventually split into four separate Bills: the Armed Forces Discipline 
Amendment Bill (No. 2); the Court Martial Appeals Amendment Bill; the Defence Amendment Bill (No. 3); the Court Martial Bill‘ 
before it was passed as the Armed Forces Discipline Amendment Act 2007 (Hansard, 2007c: 1). 
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archaic military law with contemporary human rights law, it also became for politicians 
a very good example of sound and considered human rights policy making. The Hon 
Dianne Yates (Labour MP) for instance was especially positive about the quality of the 
Bill:  
I must say that a good deal of preparation has gone into this bill. It is one of the best 
pieces of legislation I have seen. The explanatory note is extremely good. Not only does 
it talk about the policy statement but also it outlines the public policy objectives, 
discusses the analysis of the clauses, and outlines the consultation processes. As I have 
said, this bill is one of the best pieces of legislation I have seen come before this House. 
It is a doorstopper. … I recommend that those who are interested in legislation – and 
those who are drafting future legislation, take a good look at the explanatory note of 
this bill and at the actual structure of the bill itself (Hansard, 2007a: 4, 5).  
The Hon Tim Barnett (Labour MP) also said: ‗We as a House should recognise it [the 
bill] as a model of its type‘ (Hansard, 2007a: 13). This confirms the point that when 
human rights are factored in early in the process then policies develop ‗which respect 
and reflect human rights‘ and ‗are more likely to be inclusive, equitable, robust, durable 
and of good quality. Critically, such policies will also be less vulnerable to domestic 
and international legal challenge‘ (Ministry of Justice, 2000a: 95). The Hon Phil Goff 
also referred to the Bill as ‗the product of four years of policy development‘ (Hansard, 
2007b: 1). This, then, was a marriage of well-developed policy and well-drafted 
legislation, an excellent example of complementarity.  
Tim Groser (National MP) also made the further important point that: ‗Every major 
policy issue has to be looked at by each generation through their own eyes‘ (Hansard, 
2007b: 7). This was because political and social changes, ‗such as the enhanced role of 
women in the armed forces‘, meant policies have to be revisited from time-to-time 
(Hansard, 2007b: 7). Obviously the military justice system was well overdue for this 
review given the previous 1971 Act was over 30 years old. As this research shows, the 
field of human rights is an evolving one. One of the signs of robust human rights 
governance is the ability to have in place processes for stock-taking and planning when 
necessary to take account of changes in out-dated structures, laws or policies. 
The Bill also found easy support on both sides of the House. Reflecting on the 
anomalies that had led to the drafting of the new legislation the Hon Wayne Mapp 
(National MP) said at the second reading of the Bill: 
We owe it, as a House, to ensure that when people don the uniform in this country, they 
do not surrender their rights and privileges as citizens. We have to ensure that the 
armed forces law, which operates in obviously unusual circumstances, reflects those 
rights and privileges. One of those is to know that one will receive justice in the 
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military chain of command (Hansard, 2007b: 3).  
He went on to say that an individual‘s rights must always ‗stand above‘ those of the 
‗cause of the service at large‘ (Hansard, 2007b: 4). The archaic, cut-off branch of 
military law that was operating well outside the principles of natural justice protected 
by civil law has finally been scrutinised and changed so that service personnel are not 
treated in an unfair or biased manner, and this has been given cross-party endorsement. 
8.2.8 Mainstreaming the changes 
While it took time to fine-tune the military justice system to align with international and 
domestic obligations, the reviews were carried out in a less pressured environment than 
the battleground of an expensive and public civil court case or under the shadow of an 
individual serviceperson taking a case to the UN Human Rights Committee under the 
Optional Protocol.  
The benefit of the proactive approach therefore is that the layers are less complex (a 
four-stage instead of five-stage process – see Table 13) and that a measured approach 
can be taken to resolving potential rights infringements. This ‗expected‘ new issue into 
the state sector involved much less turbulence than the ‗non-expected‘ Baigent‘s Case 
to reach a point where the changes involved were mainstreamed. After Baigent it took 
some time for the state sector (in particular the NZ Police) to realise it was not going to 
be a costly decision for departments, nor was it going to disrupt everyday operational 
procedures to any great extent. Critically the expensive ‗Stage I: Alienation – Panic – 
Rejection‘ which was present in Baigent was not evident in the military justice review 
case. Nor was there any need for the long period of acceptance. Instead the first stage 
that the military justice review entered seemed to go straight into acceptance as it 
became immediately clear from the work done by Conte, Hook and Griggs that the out-
dated system was in urgent need of an overhaul. Once the scope of this had been 
assessed it was then possible to move easily into the second stage of modification. From 
there further stages of implementation (particularly the 1 July 2009 roll-out of the new 
military justice system) and assimilation have also happened in a timely manner. The 
changes are now mainstreamed into both policy and legislation: hence complementarity.  
However, it is possible to have substantial resistance from within an organisation to 
major legislative/policy reviews and institutional restructuring, particularly in relation to 
cost. In such a case the ‗Stage I: Alienation – Panic – Rejection‘ would be 
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carried out informally, and it would come down to the persistence of the core leadership 
in the area that this stage does not become formalised (as it did with the NZ Police 
response to Baigent). This confirms a point made earlier about the need for a rights-
literate policy advisor network. It also affirms the findings of this research that when 
good policy analysis is carried out in conjunction with the bedrock law+litigation 
approach, then there are fewer inconsistencies between international human rights 
obligations and domestic laws and policies. In the military justice case, individual legal 
officers were highly aware of the legal consequences of the international framework 
interacting with existing domestic military laws and regulations and they acted as 
advocates to press that the rights of individual soldiers were not violated. Unlike 
Baigent, the military justice review was therefore proactive and protective of New 
Zealand‘s possible breaches of the ICCPR. 
 
 
Table 13. Mainstreaming process – military justice system 
EXPECTED NEW ISSUE INTO STATE SECTOR 
Instigator (lead role): The Government (NZDF) 
Previous Stage 1: ALIENATION – PANIC – REJECTION  
(by-passed as it was an intentional review) 
Stage 1: Acceptance 
Stage 2: Modification 
Stage 3: Implementation – Assimilation 
 
Stage 4: 
Mainstreamed into legislation and public policy 
(complementarity) 
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8.3 Human rights governance level interactions 
These two cases, along with a third case Taunoa v Attorney-General, will now be 
examined together. This will reveal the presence of a human rights governance level 
made up of several interacting factors all linked to the international human rights 
system (see Figure 2).  
Baigent was a case that had a panic effect on the state sector in New Zealand until the 
rhetoric and implications of the decision had time to settle down. It is now being cited 
in other jurisdictions as a ‗test case‘. It can be seen from Section 8.1.5 that courts in 
other countries are also grappling with the issue of how best to deal with breach of 
remedies for bills of rights and the New Zealand approach is being looked at. However, 
this research suggests that Baigent is not being looked at carefully enough i.e. behind 
the layers of rhetoric and panic and the law+litigation approach and into a deeper 
analysis of what actually happened at other levels such as policy and fiscal reality. The 
reason why other jurisdictions cannot carry out a deeper analysis is because it has not 
been done in New Zealand, and it is hoped that the value of this research is that it does 
peel back the layers to show what really occurred. This clearer picture then enables 
several conclusions to be reached: 
 far from being perceived as something of a disastrous decision, which sent 
panicked shock-waves through the state sector, it did actually uphold the rights 
of the individual citizen as set out in the ICCPR 
 it was also an effective decision in that it caused the NZ Police to look seriously 
at search and warrant procedures, which until the monetary damages were 
introduced were not being carried out as well as they could have been 
 it further showed the political response brought a measured calm to the panic. It 
could have been that Cabinet joined the NZ Police in the ‗Stage I: Alienation – 
Panic – Rejection‘ reaction but did not. The decision to proceed carefully and 
then not to repeal the legislation meant that after a time ―Stage 2: Acceptance‖ 
was able to begin and thereafter Stages 3 and 4. The political response was 
therefore one of de-escalation of panic 
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 with hindsight it can be seen that the rhetoric of panic and a knee-jerk reaction is 
not best practice and the question needs to be asked: ‗What response should 
occur under robust human rights governance?‘ There was a dual response to 
Baigent: a fragile/weak response by the NZ Police; and an eventual robust 
response at the political level through Cabinet. In an ideal world and in a truly 
robust human rights state all responses from all parties would be robust.  
Since Baigent another case – Taunoa – has been awarded Baigent damages, but in this 
instance the political response went in a different direction.
166
 In Taunoa, prisoners who 
were forced to be on a ‗Behaviour Management Regime‘ were jointly awarded 
$130,000 damages for inhumane treatment, which breached both prison regulations and 
NZBORA. However, this time public outrage influenced political action, and the case 
was instrumental in the development of the Prisoners and Victims Claims Act 2005 
which enables compensation to go to the victims of these prisoners instead of to them 
directly.
167
 This highlights further concluding points: 
 in a democracy, political and/or public responses can be large factors in some 
cases 
 in a sense it gave weight to the NZ Police Chief Legal Advisor (DB Kerr‘s) 
fears that penal institutions would have to treat prisoners with ‗kid gloves‘. With 
a growing rights environment in the state sector, it was only a matter of time 
until prisoner‘s rights (which have long been a concern of the UN Human Rights 
Committee) would take centre stage. This has parallels with the military justice 
case study, where the human rights of military personnel finally became centre 
stage after a long history of non-recognition 
 other wider debates (such as law and order and tougher sentencing) can also cut 
across cases like Taunoa, so there is a dynamic picture emerging with a number 
of intersecting points. 
                                                 
166 There have been a number of Baigent awards since the Simpson v Attorney General case, including
 
Taunoa v Attorney-General 
(2004) 7 HRNZ (HC).  
167 For a further discussion on this case see Butler who noted that under the 2005 Act ‗the right of prisoners to compensation for 
violation of his or her BORA rights while in prison is not removed: rather the Act ―only‖ gives victims the right to ―share‖ in the 
proceeds of the rights violation‘ (Butler, 2006: 25).  
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This dynamic picture can be described as a human rights governance level. It works for 














(Of legislation and policies by 































(Of issues generated from various actors e.g. the government, Courts) 
 
 
Figure 2. Human rights governance level interactions 
 
In Baigent all the factors in the case were intersecting at the human rights governance 
level:  
 in relation to ‗Legislation‘, NZBORA was set up with its link in the long title to 
the rights in the ICCPR 
 this provided a basis for the ‗Enforcement‘ part of the human rights governance 
level (the courts) to then make decisions based on the link between domestic law 
and international human rights obligations. The courts were also instrumental in 
providing ‗Remedies‘ 
 the decision caused panic in the ‗Implementation‘ arm of the state sector, in 
particular the NZ Police 
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  ‗Public values‘ were important in Baigent because it involved the wrongful 
search of a member of the public, and it brought to light what was felt to be 
acceptable or not in this regard 
 the ‗Political‘ response was not to be defensive or alarmist, but to take advice 
and not repeal the legislation. That is, the approach was to effectively ride out 
the panic and see that it was not going to have the disastrous consequences at 
first thought 
 the ‗Policy‘ response was that the NZ Police, in particular, eventually provided 
much more internal information to officers about breach of NZBORA rights and 
actual procedures were from that time carried out more stringently to avoid 
Baigent damages 
 as a result of the decision, ‗Institutional organisation and governance‘ 
strengthened. This was because (as noted in Section 8.1.2) a large number of 
departments were involved in the state sector response and there now exists a 
way of dealing with such decisions 
 eventually a ‗Mainstreaming‘ process occurred as the issue became assimilated 
through the state sector. 
In Taunoa: 
 the ‗Legislation‘ part again involved NZBORA and the ICCPR 
 this also provided the basis for the ‗Enforcement‘ part (the courts) to make a 
decision based on the link between domestic law and international human rights 
obligations. In this case there was also a Baigent ‗Remedy‘ provided by the 
courts 
 this time the decision did not cause panic in the ‗Implementation‘ arm (the state 
sector) 
 instead it caused outrage in the ‗Public values‘ arm 
 this in turn caused the ‗Political‘ response to come up with a compromise (the 
Prisoners and Victims Claims Act 2005) 
 213 
 the ‗Policy‘ response was that the Department of Corrections would look more 
carefully in the future at instituting policies such as the Behaviour Management 
Regime 
 the ‗Institutional organisation and governance‘ aspect had already been 
strengthened by the state sector‘s Baigent experience 
 the ‗Mainstreaming‘ process only occurred after all these factors had settled 
down. 
In the military justice case study: 
 the ‗Legislation‘ part also involved NZBORA (with its link to the ICCPR) and 
out-dated military justice legislation was eventually amended 
 this also provided the basis for the ‗Enforcement‘ part (the military court 
system) to be reviewed so there was an alignment between domestic law and 
international human rights obligations. There were no ‗Remedies‘ involved in 
this case 
 this time the decision did not cause panic in the ‗Implementation‘ arm (the 
NZDF) 
 this case did not stir up issues at the ‗Public values‘ level 
 the ‗Political‘ response was very supportive and the amending legislation was 
endorsed by all parties in the House 
 the ‗Policy‘ response was to have policies and practices amended in line with 
NZBORA and the ICCPR 
 as a result of this military justice system review, ‗Institutional organisation and 
governance‘ was strengthened. This was because (as noted in Table 12) the 
review was the result of a collaborative effort between number of agencies 
 there was also one less level involved in the ‗Mainstreaming process‘, because 
the panic of Baigent did not occur. 
Looked at as a whole, this human rights governance level shows that for a deeper 
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analysis to be carried out, all factors need to be examined individually and in concert. 
Different parts of it will be prominent in different cases and best practice occurs when 
each part is operating in a considered, instead of knee-jerk, manner in relation to human 
rights issues that arise in the state sector. It is also the case that all parts of the human 
rights governance level are closely linked to the international human rights system: 
 ‗Legislation‘ ensures consistency between domestic laws with international 
human rights obligations 
 the ‗Enforcement‘ part (the courts) act as the interpreters of these obligations; 
and sometimes provide ‗Remedies‘ 
 the ‗Implementation‘ arm (the state sector) is required to give effect to these 
obligations in all its policy and legislative work 
 individuals collectively express ‗Public values‘ and are able (under some 
covenants) to seek individual redress at the UN, and to expect that their rights 
under ratified treaties across a wide range of areas are protected 
 the ‗Political‘ part is acutely aware that the international dimension impacts 
closely on the domestic and that all decisions must be taken into account with 
this in mind 
 the ‗Policy‘ arm also has to take account of international obligations in everyday 
work, hence the need for early mainstreaming 
 the domestic ‗Institutional organisation governance‘ part is closely tied to the 
international human rights framework.  
This links back to an earlier discussion in Chapter 1.2.2 where the concept of 
complementarity was introduced. It has already been suggested that underlying the New 
Zealand approach to fulfilling obligations has been the interaction between international 
processes and domestic constitutional, law and bureaucratic systems and that this can 
best be understood using the metaphor of ‗weaving‘. Figure 2 is an illustration of how 
intermeshed the international-domestic spheres have become, to the point where they 
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cannot be seen as distinct from one another.
168
 This shows that the work that has been 
done to align the international and domestic spheres resonates across the state sector, 
and that the effects on one area can be felt in another. 
The issue of the relationship between public policy and human rights can now be 
returned to in light of the concept of a human rights governance level. A purely 
instrumentalist, standard approach to public policy – having an issue, stating the 
problem, and finding a solution – is inadequate to deal with the complexities and multi-
directional influence of the human rights governance level. Closer resonance can be 
found in Mark Considine‘s alternate view that suggested that public policy ‗is the 
continuing work done by groups of policy actors who use available institutions to 
articulate and express the things they value‘ (Considine, 1994: 4). He further talked of 
policy culture (values). Figure 2 conceptualises an ongoing dynamic between domestic 
and international human rights actors, institutions and values. It also fits with his 
definition of policy systems, which ‗need to be understood as complex structures for 
political learning and memory‘ (Considine, 1994: 47). As Chapters 3-6 in particular 
show, the build-up of (and constant changes made to) the international and domestic 
human rights framework involve political learning and memory. As each issue or 
episode arises, for instance these two case studies, lessons are learned and political 
memory grows strategies to deal with similar situations (for example, much was learned 
from Baigent). 
8.4 Summary 
There are points of similarity between the two case studies. The military justice review 
and Baigent are both examples of loopholes in the system where individuals could have 
taken cases to the UN Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol to the 
ICCPR. In both instances domestic legislation and policy were out of alignment with 
international law. At each of the levels it has been identified in both examples 
(covenant-statute-judicial-Cabinet/departmental/policy-individual) there was a lack of 
                                                 
168 There has also been a different type of interweaving, as Baigent was cited by one of the NZDF researchers in his conclusion: 
'On another level, several motivating factors arise from the practical consequences of acting in breach of the NZBORA. In the 
majority of cases, such action can result in the inadmissibility of evidence or, in the worst case, might result in the invalidation of 
the entire process in question. However, the sting of the Act does not end there. Since the Court of Appeal judgment in Baigent‘s 
Case, the Defence Force must also be wary of its liability for damages under the Act‘ (Conte, 1996: 202).
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clarity to a seamless covenant fulfillment in the domestic arena. It was noted earlier that 
during the 1940s New Zealand had urged the necessity for individuals to be able to 
petition the UN directly. Ironically part of the problem in each case was that individuals 
would have had better protection through the international committee than redress 
through the domestic civil and military justice systems – a long detour and not a smooth 
passageway for the implementation of human rights in this country. Both case studies 
also highlighted that policy/legal advisors/service personnel are operating in an 
international and domestic bill of rights climate, and the result has been heightened 
respect for the ICCPR and NZBORA in their work. Looked at together the cases are a 
lesson that early mainstreaming of human rights considerations in the policy-making 
process, and ironing out inconsistencies with ratified international human rights 
instruments, are more cost-effective for the state sector than not carrying out these 
initiatives. Policy advisors also need to be aware of constitutional rights and freedoms 
which is why an effective human rights training programme for them should also 
include a thorough grounding in New Zealand‘s constitutional arrangements and the 
protections this gives individual citizens.  
However, the differences between the two case studies were marked in terms of their 
impact on the state sector. The reactive Baigent‘s Case caused turbulence at many 
levels: in the relationship between Parliament and the judiciary; for many government 
departments as they scrambled to estimate the potential costs of the new damages; and 
for the NZ Police in particular as it affected the everyday work carried out by officers. 
This case was like a grenade that had panic effects that resonated throughout the state 
sector. These shock waves were even felt in Australia where Baigent has been used as a 
warning case (a possible ‗what not to do‘ example) in the development of federal bills 
of rights. However, as just noted Australian commentators have only ever been 
presented a ‗surface‘ view of what actually happened, and this thesis has been able to 
give a deeper analysis of the factors surrounding the case. On the other hand the 
proactive military justice review stands out as being the most considered, the least 
disruptive for the state sector, and the most comprehensive. At the second reading of the 
Armed Forces Law Reform Bill 2007 the Hon Wayne Mapp commented: 
Had the director of legal services for the armed forces, Brigadier Riordan, and his team, 
and, particularly, the naval commander [Griggs], not taken the initiative, we would not 
be dealing with this legislation today (Hansard, 2007b: 3).  
That is, proactivity needs leadership, foresight and the resources to thoroughly assess 
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all domestic legislation (civil and military) against international law. The review was 
carried out after other jurisdictions had been down similar routes and made mistakes 
that New Zealand could beneficially learn from at a distance, so in this case other 
countries became ‗what not to do‘ examples for us. A further reflection on Baigent is 
that despite the potential charge of judicial activism, it can be seen that the courts were 
‗taking the lead‘ in ensuring policy and legislation complied with international 
standards in a way that the government cannot always do. The policy-making arms of 
government (the legislature and executive) are more widely accountable, and are 
therefore more influenced by public opinion than the courts. The government resisted 
any pressure to repeal the decision, but the question needs to be asked: would the 
government have introduced Baigent-type damages, given its initial unpopularity? It is 
doubtful this would have happened, which is why the courts became the vehicle to do 
this. A similar instance was Brown v Board of Education (1954), the landmark case 
where the USA courts took a leadership role in declaring racially segregated schools as 
unconstitutional. This would have been a politically contentious issue, and the courts 
again became the instigators for this broad policy change.  
Also the human rights governance level has shown that several factors – ‗Legislation‘, 
‗Enforcement‘, ‗Implementation‘, ‗Public values‘, ‗Political‘, Policy‘ and ‗Institutional 
organisation and governance‘ – all intersect with the international human rights system 
to react to issues that arise in the state sector. It is possible to list 20 criteria to broadly 
assess effectiveness to get a clearer picture of New Zealand‘s robustness as has been 
done in Chapter 7. To obtain an even more detailed understanding of this robustness, it 
has been necessary to uncover the dynamic that is operating between the various parts 
of the human rights governance level. This has been well illustrated by examining 
particular cases that have impacted on the state sector (such as Baigent, Taunoa and the 
military justice system review). This research also shows that the standard public policy 
view is inadequate to deal with this multi-faceted and dynamic human rights 
governance level. The work of Considine (1994) does, however, resonate and helps to 
understand this area of policy.  
Having presented the case studies – which show in the military justice system review a 
more fine-tuned illustration of complementarity working well – Chapter 9 now turns to 
the concluding comments. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
9.1 General findings 
Robust human rights governance is not of course perfection, nor does it require constant 
harmony with all views of UN treaty body monitoring mechanisms. For example, New 
Zealand has a different perspective to the UN on the unentrenched status of human 
rights as set out in NZBORA. Another example concerns the justiciability of second 
generation rights. Compliance does not necessarily mean absolute uniformity, with 
some room for ‗doing‘ human rights in a local context. As the two case studies have 
shown, the human rights framework is ‗self-correcting‘. There was a problem in each 
instance, but the architecture was in place to close the gap and address the issue. One 
(Baigent) was time-consuming and costly and involved a court case. The other (military 
justice system review) was considered and carried out without the cost of a potential 
breach being tested in the courts. One was reactive and the other proactive, but this ‗re-
balancing‘ nevertheless occurred in both cases. Put another way, when rights seem to be 
breached the New Zealand framework is able to ‗stand upright in the winds that would 
blow‘.169  
Another finding of this research is that rights need to be respected before they are 
workable: they assume the operation of the rule of law and a well-informed ‗rights 
conscious‘ citizenry. Even so, things go wrong and the key then is the capacity for 
correction. Thus in Baigent an allegedly casual attitude by a police officer, and a 
determined response from a concerned citizen, produced not only a judicial response of 
damages, but more awareness by the NZ Police in particular about the effect of 
NZBORA and the ICCPR. Similarly, the military justice system case study shows the 
importance of a rights-literate NZDF and rights-literate service personnel in their dual 
role as citizens/soldiers, and the cut-off point for when the issue of discipline could 
impinge on rights. This second case study illustrates that proper implementation is 
possible if the law+litigation and policy fields are aligned, which means the 
circumstances favouring complementarity are present. The case studies also show that 
                                                 
169 From the 1960 play ‗A Man For All Seasons‘ by Robert Bolt.  
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the state sector can work towards robust human rights governance when there is a best 
practice approach to issues as they arise, or towards a fragility or weakness when there 
is a panicked knee-jerk response to them. 
Why is complementarity taking place? This research suggests it is part of a natural 
evolution of domestic human rights frameworks as they change and grow and (ideally) 
become more robust. New Zealand‘s framework developed slowly over decades, 
suggesting that its robustness has occurred through incremental changes. The stepping 
back and ‗taking stock‘ of the last several years was arguably necessary for the entire 
human rights environment to be reassessed. New, more active, ways of proceeding are 
starting to be put in place. Action plans are also being used as tools to progress or grow 
the realisation of rights in this country. This approach mirrors the preamble of the 
ICESCR that urges each state party to undertake steps to ‗progressively achieve‘ the full 
realisation of rights in the covenant. This factor was also a defining feature of the 
distinction between the human rights and public policy fields clarified at the beginning 
of the research. Mark Considine (1994: 7) noted this when he said:  
Governments do not start and stop a commitment to a policy area; rather, they modify, 
prune and adjust. Key interests rarely leap from one ideological position to something 
entirely different. They amend, reorganise and re-position through smaller steps. 
Big bangs of reform or change in constitutions make good copy for newspapers. But 
there is at least a plausible case to be made that the path towards robust human rights 
governance is a progression of small movements and incremental changes that over 
time build a stronger framework. Looking back over this country‘s history, the progress 
did not occur by accident. New Zealand‘s historical experience was in part shaped by 
Prime Minister Peter Fraser, especially his views on the role of the state in achieving 
human dignity after the Great Depression of the 1930s. This informed his views at the 
end of World War II, particularly his championing of what were to become second 
generation human rights. The steady progression of steps that have been charted here 
echo the comments of the NZ Constitutional Arrangements Committee about the 
constitution more generally, and their description of a ‗process of pragmatic evolution‘ 
certainly describes the human rights history of New Zealand: 
Constitutional issues are subtle and interlinked, and New Zealand‘s strong tradition has 
been to deal with them piece by piece, through a process of pragmatic evolution over 
time (NZ Constitutional Arrangements Committee, 2005: 9).  
As an architect of the human rights framework, New Zealand was perhaps always more 
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likely to be a willing subject of it, although not all founding members of the UN have 
been so supportive of this framework (including the USA). The process has therefore 
been interactive between international law and domestic implementation as New 
Zealand was (and is) a ‗maker‘ as well as a ‗taker‘ of the international processes. Even 
for states with close historical and political parallels, the exact processes for domestic 
implementation are also likely to differ. The differences will also be even more marked 
for states with significantly different histories, capacities, willingness and systems for 
implementation. The complementarity metaphor might also highlight the fragility of 
effective implementation in some developing states, and hence the concept of fragile (vs 
robust) human rights governance. It has been suggested too that New Zealand has its 
own fragility in its generally strong human rights framework with the areas that are still 
developing, weak or non-existent. A domestic human rights system works best when 
there is a central agency or working group with oversight for this topic; when no such 
entity exists then fragmentation occurs. Following on from this, the combination of the 
practical tool of a phased history and a new understanding about a human rights 
governance level (with criteria for judging effectiveness) could also act as a template for 
other countries on a currently fragmented human rights journey. Using this 
combination, Pacific Island states or small emerging nations for instance could possibly 
see more clearly what international best practice in the implementation of ratified treaty 
rights might look like. 
The metaphor of waves was used at the outset of the research: the first wave in the 
1940s setting up the international human rights framework; the second in the 1970s 
where there was a flurry of domestic human rights-related institution building and 
legislation; the third of 1994-2009 when the stock-take and planning initiatives were 
carried out; the fourth wave of trying to implement rights more effectively; and the fifth 
of actively setting up robust human rights governance. In relation to this last wave this 
research shows that effectiveness in achieving a robust human rights state is highly 
nuanced. It requires many of the couplets set out in the research – international-
domestic, law-policy, rhetoric-action, proactive-reactive – to be in good alignment. On 
top of these complexities there also needs to be an accommodation of the rights 
generational dimensions. Instead of many developments happening at once, though, 
there is a sense of minor but complex and convergent wave patterns within each of the 
five major waves just described. 
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9.2 Original and significant contributions  
The original and significant contributions of the research can now be summarised. The 
relationship between human rights and public policy has been examined in a way that 
has not been carried out before. The research broadly looks at the human rights field 
and its increasing importance within and to the side of the public policy field. 
New concepts have been introduced. For instance, complementarity, which suggests 
that the more effective implementation of human rights occurs when the two fields of 
law+litigation and public policy are fully aligned. It also introduces the notion of a 
‗human rights governance level‘, and locates its position at the intersection of a number 
of factors which link to the international human rights system – institutional, political, 
legal, policy, enforcement, implementation and public values. The research develops 
the notion of governance further by introducing the concept of robust human rights 
governance, and its opposite, fragile human rights governance.  
The staged development of New Zealand‘s human rights history has been set out in a 
way that has not been carried out before, and criteria have been developed against 
which to assess effectiveness as a robust human rights state. Chapter 4 has documented, 
for the first time, the large volume of work done in the stock-taking and planning 
initiatives of 1994-2009. The research both identified this as a unique phase of 
development in New Zealand‘s human rights history, and found that while there have 
been advances, there are still many problems to be resolved. Insights from the public 
policy field about whole-of-government collaboration were linked with ideas for inter-
agency coordination on human rights issues. 
Links have been made with the constructs in this research and the public policy 
literature. It has been noted that the standard view of public policy is inadequate to deal 
with the multi-directional human rights governance level. The thesis has also identified 
that although authors such as Mark Considine do not examine human rights as an area 
of public policy, his alternative theory does accommodate the complexities of the 
human rights governance level introduced in this research. 
The two case studies were used to show how human rights issues can be mainstreamed 
in the state sector, and that if this happens proactively it takes less time for this 
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mainstreaming to occur. The Baigent case study uncovered unpublished material which 
contributes to the scholarship on this decision. 
Finally, the two frameworks (the staged history and the effectiveness criteria) also 
provide analytical tools which may help other states. With its synthesising and 
analytical components, this research could also contribute to the human rights field in 
New Zealand. 
9.3 Summary 
To summarise, this thesis began by suggesting that although New Zealand appeared to 
have a well-developed domestic human rights architecture reflected in institutions, laws 
and policies and an endorsement of international standards, what was lacking is a means 
to judge the effectiveness of the achievements to date and to recommend areas for 
improvement. As a contribution to the field a six-phase New Zealand human rights 
history has been suggested as a way of gaining a better picture of the development of 
this area over several decades. The concept of robust human rights governance was then 
introduced, which is also the sixth stage of the historical phases. Looking at the 20 
criteria for effectiveness it was found that although New Zealand has reached the most 
robust stage there is still room for improvement. It was also suggested that a human 
rights governance level is lacking in the state sector. This research has therefore 
provided constructs which show that if what might appear to be a rather ad hoc human 
rights system is examined, a ‗whole‘ can actually be found that is well described by the 
concept of complementarity. New Zealand‘s own developing practice reveals 
complementarity + effectiveness in the evolving human rights framework and 
approaches. Most particularly, it reveals the need now for a fuller integration of the 
law+litigation and public policy approaches in order for ratified treaty rights to be more 
effectively implemented through the New Zealand state sector.  
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